Benita Wassenaar

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a judge and jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude that the only reasonable inference from the cumulative effect of the evidence was the appellant's guilt.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of failing to stop at the scene of an accident causing death under s. 252 of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in law in assessing intent to escape civil or criminal liability, including through the doctrine of wilful blindness, where the respondent testified he believed he struck a deer rather than a cyclist.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's treatment of the evidence and credibility findings were, at their highest, matters of mixed fact and law and therefore not reviewable on a Crown appeal restricted to questions of law alone.

The court further held that the correct intent requirement under s. 252 had been accurately stated and applied.

The Crown appeal was quashed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 15 years.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for murder and the statutory defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that the narrow statutory definition of provocation applied when considering the impact of the deceased's conduct on the appellant's state of mind for the mens rea inquiry.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of importing firearms and alcohol from the United States into Canada.

One appellant's conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly assessed the unsavoury co-accused witness's testimony and found sufficient corroboration.

The other two appellants' conviction appeals were allowed and new trials ordered because the trial judge's reasons failed to address whether they had the requisite mens rea (knowledge or wilful blindness) for the firearms offences, as opposed to just the alcohol offences.

One appellant's sentence for the alcohol offences was varied to time served.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that allowed the accused's sentence appeal and remitted the matter for a fresh sentencing hearing.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by refusing to permit cross-examination on the complainants' victim impact statements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the summary conviction appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to remit the matter for a fresh sentencing hearing.

Furthermore, the Court found no error by the trial judge, as the accused failed to identify disputable facts in the victim impact statements to justify cross-examination.

The original sentence was restored.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

During the investigation, an undercover police officer posed as an Obeah spiritual advisor and obtained incriminating statements from two of the appellants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the undercover operation violated their Charter rights to freedom of religion and equality, constituted a 'dirty trick', and that the statements were protected by common law religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants' participation was motivated by a desire to obstruct the justice system rather than sincere religious belief, and that the police conduct did not shock the conscience of the community.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding an in camera hearing and the refusal to sever the trial of the third co-accused.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, and her sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant poured scalding tea on the complainant, causing severe burns and permanent hearing loss.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying reasonable doubt, and reaching inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range for the vicious assault.

In a criminal appeal involving a niqab-wearing complainant at a preliminary inquiry, the Court addressed how to reconcile freedom of religion with fair-trial rights.

The majority held neither an absolute ban nor an absolute permission rule is acceptable, and adopted a contextual four-step framework.

A witness may be required to remove a niqab only where necessary to prevent a serious trial-fairness risk that cannot be avoided by alternatives, and where the benefits of removal outweigh the harms.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted for application of that framework.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge failed to apply the mens rea test later established in R. v. Roy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that driving at least 136 k.p.h. in a 60 k.p.h. zone constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person, satisfying the mens rea requirement.

The respondent was found passed out in the back seat of a parked van with the keys in the ignition.

He was convicted at trial of having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent might wake up and drive was based on speculation.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding of a risk of danger was supported by ample circumstantial evidence and the summary conviction appeal judge erred by substituting his own view of the evidence.

The respondent pled guilty to several charges and sentencing was adjourned.

On the sentencing date, the trial judge took a recess and, when the Crown prosecutor was a few minutes late returning, dismissed all matters for want of prosecution.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge had no power to make the order, which was illegal and an abuse of judicial authority.

The dismissals were quashed, convictions substituted, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The applicant sought special leave to appeal from the dismissal of an application for an extension of time, which had been dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that it did not meet the strict statutory test under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, as no issue essential to the public interest or the due administration of justice arose.

The Court noted that the appropriate remedy was an application to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court to reopen the application for the extension of time.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based on strong DNA evidence linking his blood to the crime scene.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of the appellant's pre-trial statements, specifically by failing to give an O'Connor instruction and by incorrectly stating that prior inconsistent exculpatory statements were not evidence unless adopted at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in omitting the O'Connor instruction given the independent evidence of concoction.

While the court agreed the trial judge erred in his instruction on prior inconsistent statements, it applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming DNA evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a high school teacher, appealed his conviction for touching a student for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability, particularly after finding certain events could not have occurred as described.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principle and reasonably relied on overwhelming independent evidence, including graphic electronic messages and notes, to support the conviction.

The applicant was convicted of several traffic and by-law offences after failing to appear for trial because he was out of the country.

He applied to the Ontario Court of Justice for an extension of time to appeal the convictions, which was denied.

He then sought leave to appeal that denial to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Provincial Offences Act does not provide a right of appeal from an unsuccessful application for an extension of time under section 85(1), and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that his failure to call or report to the police could be considered as consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the direction infringed the holding in R. v. Turcotte.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso as the Crown's case was not overwhelming and the error could have impacted trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offence, appealed his adult sentence of life imprisonment with seven years of parole ineligibility for second-degree murder.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by not considering declining pre-sentence custody credit to make a youth sentence sufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the adult sentence was supported by the appellant's age and the violent, unprovoked nature of the crime.

The Court also declined to alter the sentence based on fresh evidence of recent progress in custody, noting this could be addressed in future applications under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant, who had a long history of mental illness, was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for robbery and resisting arrest.

He appealed the finding, arguing it was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the psychiatric evidence did not support the conclusion that the appellant was incapable of knowing his actions were wrong.

The NCRMD verdicts were set aside, a conviction was entered for robbery, and a new trial was ordered for resisting arrest.

The appellant was sentenced to one day in jail for the robbery, considering the 44 months he had already spent in custody.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

The convictions were based on the testimony of a single complainant regarding historical sexual activities.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the criminal standard of proof, noting her inadequate treatment of significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and her problematic formulation of her ultimate conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the trial judge gave only conclusory reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and made no comments about the complainant's evidence on Counts 1 and 2.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.