Benita Wassenaar

The appellant, an 18-year-old driver, was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle suddenly swerved across a median into oncoming traffic, killing one passenger and injuring others.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of a surviving passenger who described the vehicle jerking but could not say if the appellant deliberately caused it or was trying to regain control.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, holding that the evidence of a two-to-three-second loss of control, without proof of deliberate swerving or prior bad driving, could not support a finding of a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay from arrest to trial was 44 months.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing two periods of delay as neutral rather than institutional or Crown delay, particularly a 7.25-month adjournment sought by the Crown to rejoin the appellant's trial with a co-accused after previously agreeing to a severance.

The Court concluded that 25.25 months of the delay were unjustified, violating the Morin guidelines.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding his committal for trial on a charge of first degree murder.

The appellant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he knew the victim's death was likely as a result of the assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's admissions to his girlfriend, combined with the nature of the assault, provided a basis upon which a reasonable jury could infer the requisite knowledge for murder.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, relying on a dissent in the court below.

The appeal was brought pursuant to section 693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the matter to determine if the dissent raised a valid question of law.

The Court concluded that the dissent in the court below did not raise an issue of law as required by the statute.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a vehicle 'over 80'.

The accused was stopped and a roadside breath demand was made, but the officer had to wait 16 minutes for a screening device to arrive.

During this time, the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, despite having a cellular phone and being near a police station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that because the officer was not in a position to require a breath sample before there was a realistic opportunity to consult counsel, the demand was not made 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and the failure to provide s. 10(b) Charter rights was not justified.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a domestic assault that resulted in the victim suffering a broken jaw.

At trial, the victim's out-of-court statements to an emergency room doctor and a police officer were admitted for the truth of their contents, despite her stated inability to recall the events at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statements, finding they met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The appeal judge had ruled that the arresting officer should have waited 15 minutes before administering an approved screening device test to rule out the possibility of residual mouth alcohol, as the accused had just left a bar parking lot.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that an officer is not required to delay the test if they honestly and reasonably believe they cannot form an opinion about whether the driver consumed alcohol within the prior 15 minutes.

The officer was entitled to rely on the accuracy of the screening device and administer the test forthwith.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon after striking the complainant in the face with a broken beer bottle outside a bar.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the conviction appeal but varied the sentence.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's threats and the appellant's state of mind, and misstated the burden of proof under the W. (D.) test.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a costs order made against it by a bail review judge.

The bail review judge had awarded costs due to the Crown and police's failure to bring a victim's statement to court, which was characterized as sloppy conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding no Charter breach and that the conduct did not reach the level warranting costs against the Crown, as the respondent suffered no prejudice.

Armstrong J.A. dissented, finding the police conduct went beyond mere sloppiness and justified the costs order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in handling the complainant's delayed disclosure and in treating a witness's testimony as corroborative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered whether the witness's evidence was confirmatory of the complainant's evidence under the Vetrovec standard.

The court also held that the trial judge adequately addressed the delay in disclosure and inconsistencies in the evidence.

The appellant was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of robbery due to an error of law, but convicted him of the firearm offence.

A month later, at sentencing, the trial judge realized his error and changed the robbery acquittal to a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was functus officio on the robbery count and had no jurisdiction to change the verdict.

Furthermore, the firearm conviction could not stand without a conviction on the underlying robbery charge.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered on both counts.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a $4 million fraud against his employer, driven by a pathological gambling addiction, and was sentenced to two years in penitentiary.

The trial judge also ordered full restitution of the $4 million, acknowledging it was purely symbolic and intended to save the employer civil litigation costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the restitution order, holding that such orders must bear some reality to the offender's means and should not be used merely as a substitute for civil proceedings, especially where it would impair rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence, noting there was no improper shifting of the burden of proof and the verdict was reasonable.

Regarding the sentence, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in principle by declining to impose a conditional sentence, and the sentence imposed was fit.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the 20-month sentence (7 months plus 13 months pre-trial custody credit) imposed on the respondent for pointing a firearm, assault with a weapon, and possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The respondent had a lengthy criminal record, was on probation for harassing the victim, and was subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, noting the serious facts and negative pre-sentence report.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to three years (23 months going forward after credit).

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion and his sentence of four years' imprisonment.

The sole ground of appeal argued was the trial judge's failure to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding evidence of the appellant's association with the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the instruction should have been given, its absence occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the strong Crown case and the lack of objection by trial counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the four-year term was within the fit range.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that reversed the respondent's convictions for sexual assault and assault with a weapon.

The summary conviction appeal court had found that the trial judge erred by failing to expressly address each count and element separately.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's brief reasons were sufficient given that the two counts were inexorably linked and credibility was the central issue.

The acquittals were set aside and the convictions restored.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court judge dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's conclusion was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the summary conviction appeal court judge's finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of stolen property and other offences.

At trial, the Crown sought a 12-month sentence, but the trial judge imposed a significantly longer sentence without providing reasons.

The Court of Appeal noted the appellant's youth, early guilty plea, history of childhood abuse, and pretrial custody.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 18 months' imprisonment, accomplished by reducing the sentence for possession of stolen property to five months concurrent.