Benita Wassenaar

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with an offensive weapon, arguing that the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no indication that the trial judge applied different standards in assessing the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights due to the police's failure to provide a Tamil interpreter.

The trial judge found no "special circumstances" requiring an interpreter, a decision upheld on appeal.

The Superior Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which considered the appellant's 30 years of residency in Canada, employment, ability to converse in English, and his actions indicating understanding of his rights, including attempting to contact duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and his sentence.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's section 35(1) defence of property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that even if the appellant believed the complainants were about to unlawfully enter his home, his act of pointing a gun at the head of the female complainant and pulling the trigger was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The court distinguished the case from R. v. Weare on the basis that the appellant had invited the complainants' son to return and knew precisely why they appeared at his door and that they posed no unlawful threat.

The sentence had been served and was dismissed as moot.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for various firearms offences.

He was arrested on an outstanding warrant during a search incident to arrest, in which a loaded handgun was found.

The appellant challenged the vehicle stop as violating his Charter rights to be secure from arbitrary detention, arguing the police lacked reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

The trial judge found the police had reasonable grounds to suspect a robbery suspect was in the vehicle based on the observation of red clothing matching the suspect's description.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no Charter violation.

The appellant's sentence of six years less 18 months pre-sentence custody (3 years 9 months remaining) was also upheld as fit.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including assaults and threats against his wife and son, as well as firearms offences involving possession and unsafe storage of a semi-automatic rifle.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 28 months imprisonment for the assault and threatening convictions, along with fines and ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and reliability of witness testimony, acknowledged inconsistencies in the evidence, and resolved those that mattered for establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was not pressed at oral argument, but the court reviewed it and found no error of law or principle.

The victim surcharges were set aside.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a nine-year sentence for unlawful act manslaughter based on failing to seek medical attention for a two-year-old child who died.

The trial judge conducted a Gardiner Hearing and found the appellant had assaulted both the mother and child, though could not determine if he inflicted the fatal blow.

The appellant argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her findings and that the sentence was disproportionate to the six-year sentence imposed on the mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and the disparity in sentences did not constitute error.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the sentence imposed, including a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant killed his mother by striking her with a baseball bat and stabbing her repeatedly with a knife.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the statutory partial defence of provocation.

The jury rejected the provocation defence and convicted the appellant of second-degree murder.

On appeal, the appellant raised four grounds of appeal regarding the trial judge's charge to the jury, the admission of evidence, and the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted by two separate juries of two murders committed in January 2008.

On appeal, the appellant challenged four pre-trial evidentiary rulings: (1) the admissibility of his statements to police on April 15 and 16, 2008; (2) the admissibility of shotgun shells found during a lawful traffic stop on January 15, 2008; (3) the admissibility of a statement made on February 19, 2008 regarding ammunition; and (4) the admissibility of bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all evidentiary rulings and dismissed the appeals.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on four counts of sexual offences involving a five-year-old complainant.

The trial judge found the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown advanced four grounds of appeal: (1) erroneous approach to the complainant's testimony; (2) improper imposition of a memory requirement for adoption of the videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code; (3) reliance on evidence outside the trial record; and (4) findings of fact without evidentiary foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no legal error and emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges on credibility findings and evidentiary assessments.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the shooting death of a drug dealer.

He appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in rejecting evidence regarding an alternate suspect, and (2) that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on party liability through aiding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly excluded the alternate suspect evidence as lacking sufficient probative value, and that while references to aiding may have been unnecessary, the jury charge read as a whole would not have misled the jury regarding the requirement that the appellant be a principal or joint principal with the requisite mental state.

The applicant, convicted of second-degree murder and other offences, applied under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for the appointment of government-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was sufficiently complex to warrant counsel but opposed the application on the basis that the applicant had not exhausted his Legal Aid remedies or been transparent about his finances.

The Court of Appeal found that while the applicant lacked candour regarding his historical finances, his current financial situation demonstrated he had no assets or other sources of funding.

The application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The applicant sought to set aside a 2008 order dismissing his conviction and sentence appeals as abandoned.

He claimed he never instructed his former appeal counsel to abandon the appeal, while counsel maintained he received clear instructions to do so.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the surrounding circumstances, including telephone records, the applicant's subsequent conduct, and counsel's vague recollection and lack of written confirmation.

The Court concluded the applicant did not instruct counsel to abandon the appeal and that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the appeal.

The respondent, a mortgage broker, was convicted of 25 counts of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a large-scale Ponzi scheme.

The sentencing judge imposed a 23-month conditional sentence, characterizing the respondent as a victim of the scheme's mastermind.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle as the jury's verdict implicitly rejected the respondent's claim that he thought the investments were legitimate.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds involving breach of trust, the Court varied the sentence to four years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how intoxication relates to planning and deliberation, and unfairly commented on the defence toxicologist's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions contained all essential legal elements and properly directed the jury to consider intoxication separately for intent and for planning and deliberation.

The court also found the trial judge's comments on the expert evidence were supported by the record and not objected to by trial counsel.

The Crown applied for a review of a bail review judge's decision to release the accused pending trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had initially been denied bail, but a bail review judge later granted release based on a material change in circumstances arising from evidence at the preliminary inquiry regarding the accused's intent and level of intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's application, finding no error in the bail review judge's conclusion that the new evidence materially diminished the strength of the Crown's case and that the accused's continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.

The Crown appealed a judicial stay of proceedings granted at its own request during a pre-trial abuse of process motion.

The stay was requested after the motion judge ordered the production of communications between police investigators and Crown counsel, over which the Crown asserted solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's appeal was not an abuse of process and that the motion judge correctly found no waiver of privilege by the police.

However, the Court concluded that the motion judge's disclosure order was premature, as solicitor-client privilege should only be abrogated as a last resort if a stay could not be granted without the privileged information.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the trial court.

The appellant appealed her sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing that the public could be adequately protected by a determinate sentence made consecutive to her lengthy remanet.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's violent behaviour could not be controlled in the community was supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual and related offences arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's utterances during a later seizure-like episode as independent corroboration, because they were not admissible for the truth of their contents under the hearsay and prior consistent statement rules.

The court further held that the Crown expert's opinion linking the episode to the alleged assault was inadmissible because it exceeded the expert's qualifications and depended on unproven foundational facts.

As the impugned evidence was central to the credibility assessment, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's police statement.

The trial judge found the statement involuntary because the police offered an improper inducement, suggesting the complainant would only get psychiatric help if the accused confessed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct contextual test for voluntariness under Oickle and Spencer, and his factual findings were entitled to deference.