Human Rights

The defendant, Samantha Robinson (carrying on business as Postering Ottawa), brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action brought by Diffusart International and Marc Agostini.

The court found that while Robinson’s expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs’ claim had substantial merit and Robinson did not have valid defences.

The court concluded that the harm to the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting Robinson’s expression, and dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion without costs.

The accused was charged with willfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group (homosexuals) by distributing DVDs with accompanying cover jackets containing statements such as "God hates the wicked and will destroy them with war; famine and death; the wicked includes sex-perverts; Christ has cursed Ontario for turning a blind eye to sexual perversion; God's wrath is on all who show compassion to her kind and commands good government to put her to death." The Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused's defence that the statements were religious opinion based on biblical interpretation was rejected.

The court found the materials constituted a clear call to action for violence against the identifiable group and did not fall within the scope of protected religious expression or freedom of expression under the Charter.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking after surrendering drugs during a police parade following her arrest for a firearms offence.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended voir dire.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful, the police flagrantly violated the accused's Charter rights by failing to implement her right to counsel without delay for approximately four hours and by conducting an unjustified strip search without reasonable grounds specific to the accused's circumstances.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these violations and entered acquittals on all counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, and driving while suspended.

The defence brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to stop the vehicle and make the breath demand, that the detention was not arbitrary, and that while the right to counsel issue was potentially troubling, the accused failed to exercise appropriate diligence in communicating his preference for his own counsel.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.

A young person was charged with 16 firearms and drug-related offences following a high-risk police takedown in a Toronto parking garage.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and the searches conducted on Charter grounds.

The Crown conceded that the arrest was unlawful and violated the accused's section 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The court found that while the police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest, they would have had authority to conduct an investigative detention based on bullet holes discovered in the vehicle.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the court admitted the evidence, finding that while the Charter violations were serious, the impact on the accused was mitigated by the availability of investigative detention powers, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove most charges beyond a reasonable doubt, convicting only on one count each under sections 91(1), 92(1), 94(2), and 95(1) of the Criminal Code relating to the firearm found on the accused's person.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.

The appellant appealed his convictions on one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal involved two main issues: (1) whether the police violated the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) when they arrested and searched him based on information from a confidential informant, and (2) whether certain telephone calls received on seized cellular phones were admissible as evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge rejected the Charter challenge and admitted the telephone evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Debot test for assessing confidential informant information and finding the telephone calls admissible under the principled exception to hearsay as established in Baldree.

Following a finding of a section 8 Charter breach in a prior decision (R. v. Muhammad, 2018 ONCJ 468), the court addressed whether evidence seized pursuant to a defective search warrant should be admitted or excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The affiant's Information to Obtain contained misstatements regarding surveillance that had not been conducted and omissions regarding the accused's lack of criminal record, despite references to a "lengthy criminal past" involving weapons.

The court applied the Grant test, examining the seriousness of the breach, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court concluded that while the breach was serious, it did not rise to the level of egregious conduct, and the reliable evidence (drugs and firearm) was necessary for trial.

The evidence was admitted.

Media outlets applied for access to exhibits filed in 2003 proceedings where Bruce McArthur pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The exhibits included a psychological report and pre-sentence report.

McArthur, facing murder charges, opposed release arguing it would prejudice his fair trial rights.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and granted access to the reports with redactions of family members' names and residential information, finding the open court principle presumptively favoured disclosure and McArthur failed to establish a serious risk to fair trial rights.

Appeal from convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and failure to comply with a probation order.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's pre-trial ruling dismissing his application to exclude evidence arising from alleged breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The key issues were whether the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, whether the vehicle was lawfully seized and searched, and whether the appellant was arbitrarily detained.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on all grounds, dismissing the appeal.

A high school teacher was acquitted at trial of voyeurism contrary to s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after using a camera pen to surreptitiously record videos of female students focusing on their chests and cleavage.

The Crown appealed the acquittal on three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding no sexual purpose; whether evidence from a warrantless search should have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter; and whether the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The majority (Feldman and Watt JJ.A.) allowed the Crown's appeal on the sexual purpose issue but dismissed it on the privacy issue, finding that students in public areas of a school do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, arguing the students did have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed.

The accused was convicted of child luring by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual conversations with a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of three provisions: the presumption of belief in section 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement in section 172.1(4), and the mandatory minimum one-year sentence in section 172.1(2)(a).

The trial judge found section 172.1(3) violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The trial judge upheld section 172.1(4) as constitutional under section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportionate under section 12 of the Charter and imposed 75 days intermittent incarceration instead.

Both the conviction appeal and Crown's sentence appeal were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

A Charter motion was heard and blended with the trial.

The defence raised six alleged Charter violations: (1) that the officer making the ASD demand lacked grounds; (2) that there was a violation of the right to counsel at roadside; (3) that the delay between suspicion and demand violated the "forthwith" requirement; (4) that there was no evidence the device was an approved screening device; (5) that the officer failed to verify calibration; and (6) that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court rejected all Charter violation arguments and found the accused guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol content was over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The central issue at trial was whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and demand breath samples.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of the officers' evidence, alleging inconsistencies and omissions in their notes.

The court found that the arresting officer had sufficient grounds based on observations of the accused's driving (headlights off, missing tire, iPad under foot), her demeanor (unsteadiness, fumbling with documents), and the odour of alcohol.

The court rejected the defence's credibility challenges and found the officers' evidence credible and reliable.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on March 26, 2015.

The Crown presented evidence of the accused's dangerous driving, a failed approved screening device test, and breath samples exceeding the legal limit.

The defence raised eight Charter and procedural issues, including questions regarding reasonable suspicion, the "forthwith" requirement, the validity of the approved instrument demand, and the right to counsel.

While the court found a breach of the right to counsel due to inadequate police documentation regarding the implementation of the accused's request to contact counsel of choice, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The impaired driving charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the Crown's evidence.

At trial, the defence raised two issues: a Charter application to exclude breath test results based on an allegedly invalid approved screening device demand, and an argument that the presumption relating breath test readings to the time of driving did not apply because the tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter breach but determined that the Crown failed to prove the tests were taken as soon as practicable, thereby defeating the statutory presumption.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit (over 80), and stunt racing (exceeding the speed limit by more than 50 km/hr).

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence, claiming a violation of her right to counsel under the Charter.

The court found the defendant not guilty of impaired driving but guilty of over 80 and stunt racing.

The court rejected the Charter argument, finding the police made reasonable efforts to locate counsel of choice and that the defendant's testimony regarding denial of cell phone access was not credible.

The accused was charged with three counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm and three counts of operating a vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit where bodily harm was caused.

Two counts were dismissed at the close of the Crown's case due to lack of evidence of bodily harm.

The court found that the accused operated a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration of approximately 180 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, more than twice the legal limit.

The collision was caused solely by the accused's impaired driving, including tailgating, failure to stop at a yellow light, and attempting to pass other vehicles at high speed through an intersection.

The accused was convicted on all remaining counts.

The defendant was charged with operating a motorcycle with handlebars exceeding the maximum height of 380 millimetres as prescribed by Ontario Regulation 596, section 10(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the regulation on grounds of vagueness and anachronism, arguing violations of sections 7, 9, and 26 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the regulation was not vague, not anachronistic, and did not violate the defendant's Charter rights.

The defendant was convicted after the prosecution proved the handlebars measured 830 millimetres above the seat.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

Charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mgs per 100 mls of blood, the accused faced a delay of approximately 15 months and 20 days from charge to trial conclusion.

The court found institutional delay of 12 months and 3 weeks to be unacceptable for a straightforward drinking and driving case.

The accused suffered actual financial and emotional prejudice from the delay, including unexpected adjournment after the first trial date commenced.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.