Human Rights

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a RIDE stop in Mississauga where he registered a fail on an approved screening device.

At trial, the Crown sought to rely on breath samples showing readings of 130 and 120 mg/100mL.

The defence raised three Charter arguments: (1) that the Crown failed to establish the concentration of the alcohol standard solution for the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31 of the Criminal Code; (2) that the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) was breached by failing to facilitate his request to contact a friend to obtain his lawyer of choice and by "funnelling" him toward duty counsel; and (3) that the accused's right to be free from arbitrary detention under s. 9 was breached by being held for approximately two hours after the breath tests without a timely assessment of his suitability for release.

The court found breaches of s. 10(b) and s. 9, and excluded the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The applicant was arrested for impaired operation after police discovered him apparently asleep behind the wheel of his father's car at a traffic light.

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample results and police observations under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging violation of his section 10(b) right to counsel.

The Crown conceded a section 10(b) Charter violation during the voir dire, specifically that police failed to establish they contacted the applicant's chosen counsel.

The court found the violation was moderately serious but ultimately admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that exclusion would undermine confidence in the justice system despite the Charter breach.

The appellant appealed his conviction on nine offences arising from an armed robbery of a salon, including use of a firearm, robbery, wounding, and assault.

The trial judge had upheld the validity of two search warrants (residential and digital video recorder) despite Charter challenges.

The Court of Appeal found that both warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds due to material non-disclosure in the Information to Obtain affidavits.

The affiant officer failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of licence plate evidence, vehicle colour discrepancies, and other material facts.

The digital video recorder evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Without this evidence, the Crown's case was gutted, and acquittals were ordered.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration under the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant challenged the legality of the roadside screening procedure, the pat-down search conducted prior to the screening, the delay in administering the screening, and the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court conducted a blended voir-dire and ruled on the Charter application.

The court found no violations of the defendant's Charter rights and dismissed the application for exclusion of the evidential breath testing results.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by drug following observations of erratic driving, two motor vehicle accidents, and physical indicia of impairment.

The trial judge found Charter breaches regarding the suspension of the right to counsel at the roadside and the failure to obtain an informed and unequivocal waiver of counsel at the police station.

Evidence obtained following these breaches was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the trial judge found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on admissible evidence including civilian witness testimony of erratic driving, police observations of physical impairment indicators, and expert evidence regarding the effects of drugs on driving ability.

The appellant, a professional truck driver, was convicted of dangerous driving after his dump truck collided with the Burlington Skyway Bridge on the Queen Elizabeth Highway.

The collision occurred when the trailer box rose higher than the bridge's clearance because the Power Take-off (PTO) system was left engaged.

The appellant was detained in a police cruiser for approximately 2.5 hours at the accident scene, during which police detected the smell of alcohol on his breath.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence relating to the alcohol detection, arguing the detention was arbitrary and his Charter rights were violated.

The trial judge excluded breath sample evidence but admitted the evidence of the smell of alcohol.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to one year in custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and sentence.

Two offenders pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(4)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought Charter applications challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of six months imprisonment, alleging breaches of s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment) and s. 7 (arbitrary deprivation of liberty) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected both Charter challenges and upheld the mandatory minimum as constitutional.

Mitchell, who is paraplegic, received a sentence of ten months imprisonment; Clouthier received nine months.

Both were subject to two years of probation and ancillary orders including DNA sampling, forfeiture of devices, SOIRA registration, and s. 161 prohibitions.

The appellant was convicted of 28 counts of fraud over $5,000 in connection with a Ponzi scheme involving three accused persons and losses exceeding $2,000,000.

He appealed his convictions and sentence on grounds of delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that while the total delay of 59½ months exceeded the presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework, it was justified by defence delay, discrete events (including the co-accused's illness), case complexity, and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on the parties' reasonable reliance on the Morin framework.

The jury instructions were found to be fair and balanced when reviewed as a whole.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for conspiracy to import a narcotic.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine from St. Maarten to Montreal.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the verdict was unreasonable, whether the jury charge was inadequate, and whether the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding delay.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the evidence supported the conviction, the jury instructions were adequate, and the delay was justified under both the Jordan framework and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The sentence of nine years was upheld as fit.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of approved instrument breath test readings pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple breaches of his Charter rights.

The primary focus at trial was whether the officer had reasonable grounds for the approved instrument demand given the possibility of mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no Charter breach.

The officer's observation of the accused drinking while driving, the presence of an open beer can in the vehicle console, the accused's admission of prior drinking, and the odour of beer on the accused's breath provided reasonable suspicion for the approved screening device test.

The court rejected the defence argument that the officer should have suspected further drinking during a two-minute interval when the accused was briefly unattended, finding the accused's testimony unreliable and the officer's belief that no further drinking occurred to be logical and reasonable.

The officer properly waited more than 15 minutes after the accused's last observed drink before administering the approved instrument test, ensuring test reliability.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of breaking into and assaulting a 68-year-old woman and breaking into and raping a 54-year-old woman.

He was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of DNA evidence obtained through a saliva sample, arguing his Charter rights were violated.

He also challenged the trial judge's failure to preserve evidence and appealed his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter violations in the DNA seizure, that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion regarding the destroyed evidence, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's high risk of reoffending and consistent refusal to engage in treatment.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop on November 15, 2013.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no violation of the right to counsel, determining that the accused had sufficient English comprehension to understand her rights despite English being her second language.

However, the court found a violation of section 9 (arbitrary detention) because the booking sergeant relied solely on blood alcohol content when determining when to release the accused, rather than considering all relevant circumstances as required by section 498 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the over-holding to be approximately 3-4 hours.

The court convicted the accused of both charges but stayed the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle to avoid double punishment.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol content (Over 80).

Following her arrest and breath testing, which revealed readings of 145 mg/100 ml and 135 mg/100 ml, she was detained at the police station.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a breach of Section 9 (arbitrary detention).

The court found that while the initial detention was lawful, the defendant was unlawfully held for approximately six hours beyond the point at which she should have been released.

The officers in charge failed to establish reasonable grounds under Section 498(1.1) of the Criminal Code to justify the continued detention.

The court found a Section 9 Charter breach and adjourned the matter for submissions on remedy.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application claiming a violation of section 9 rights, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had consumed alcohol.

The matter proceeded as a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol from the vehicle, an unsealed bottle of brandy, and the odour of alcohol on the accused's breath when isolated from the vehicle.

The accused was given multiple opportunities to comply with the demand and refused several times despite clear explanations of the consequences.

The accused's subsequent request to provide a sample after arrest was found to be too late.

The court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed at his apartment in a trial for possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought to rely on an edited information-to-obtain that contained redactions to protect a confidential informant's identity.

The Crown proposed that portions of the information that could not be summarized without disclosing the informant's identity be excluded from consideration, while the Crown would rely on the remaining edited portions and judicial summaries.

The court was asked whether the sixth step of the Garofoli procedure permits the Crown to decline to rely on excised material that cannot be summarized without risking disclosure of the confidential informant's identity.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended voir dire on Charter issues.

The Crown's evidence established grounds for the traffic stop, roadside demand, and breath demand.

The defendant's expert evidence raised reasonable doubts regarding the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000C results, particularly concerning an ambient fail that occurred during testing and potential interfering substances in the breath room.

The court found that the defendant successfully rebutted the presumption of accuracy and entered an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100mL following an erratic driving incident on the Don Valley Parkway that resulted in a collision.

An off-duty police officer observed the driving and made a citizen's arrest.

The Crown sought to prove impairment based on driving behaviour and breath test results showing readings of 202 and 192 mg/100mL.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest, the detention in police cells, and the strip search that followed.

The court found the arrest lawful but acquitted on the impairment charge due to insufficient evidence of actual impairment beyond the breath readings.

The court found violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding the detention and strip search but declined to stay proceedings, instead finding the accused guilty of the over 80 charge.

The accused was arrested for driving with excess alcohol after failing an approved screening device.

Following arrest, he provided his lawyer's name and two phone numbers to the arresting officer.

The officer attempted to contact the lawyer but was unsuccessful, and subsequently called duty counsel instead.

The accused spoke to duty counsel for approximately four minutes.

The central issue was whether the accused's right to consult with counsel of choice under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated.

The court found that the officer's evidence regarding her attempts to contact the accused's lawyer was unreliable and that the accused was effectively denied the right to consult with counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breathalyzer results and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 offences.

He brought two Charter applications: one alleging arbitrary arrest and withheld fundamental disclosure (sections 7, 8, and 9), and another alleging unreasonable delay (section 11(b)).

The court dismissed both applications.

The disclosure application was partially dismissed at the pre-trial stage, with the court finding the Crown had met its threshold disclosure obligations.

The delay application was dismissed after the court calculated that only approximately eight months of the 27-month period constituted cognizable delay under section 11(b), with the remainder attributable to inherent time requirements and defence conduct.

The court found that while the accused suffered actual and inferred prejudice, the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed such prejudice.