Human Rights

This decision concerns a motion by Paula Boutis to amend her statement of claim in an employment and civil liability action against The Corporation of the County of Norfolk, the Board of Health for Haldimand-Norfolk Health Unit, Kristal Chopp, and Jason Burgess.

The court reviews the proposed amendments, including new causes of action such as breaches of the Human Rights Code, intrusion upon seclusion, intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent infliction of mental suffering, and defamation.

The court applies the principles governing amendments to pleadings, limitation periods, and the rules of pleading, granting or refusing leave to amend specific paragraphs accordingly.

The defendant was charged with driving while disqualified.

The court addressed two main issues: the defendant's knowledge of the disqualification and whether the police stop and subsequent vehicle search violated sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to racial profiling.

The court found the Crown proved the defendant's knowledge of the disqualification.

However, the warrantless search of the vehicle was deemed an unreasonable search (s. 8 violation) and tainted by racial profiling.

This racial profiling was also found to have tainted the initial traffic stop (s. 9 violation).

Consequently, the evidence obtained (defendant's self-identification) was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

This case concerns a Charter application to exclude firearm evidence in a criminal trial.

The defendant, a Black male, was stopped by police based on a robbery suspect description (white male, skinny build) that he did not match.

The court found that the initial detention was unlawful, violating sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10 (right to counsel) of the Charter, as police lacked reasonable suspicion and failed to provide rights immediately.

Constable Akgul's testimony regarding the reasons for detention was deemed unreliable.

However, the court accepted Constable Mehmoud's evidence that subsequent observations of the defendant displaying signs of firearm possession created reasonable suspicion for the physical takedown, during which the loaded firearm fell out.

The court found no section 8 (unreasonable search) violation.

Applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court acknowledged the seriousness of the Charter breaches due to the officer's wilful disregard and fabricated reasons.

However, the impact on the defendant's Charter rights was deemed fleeting, as the evidence would have been discovered lawfully seconds later.

Crucially, society's interest in adjudicating serious firearm offences on their merits overwhelmingly favored admission.

Consequently, the firearm evidence was admitted.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

A citizen called 911 reporting dangerous driving, and police observed the vehicle swerving between lanes, nearly striking a parked bus.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer detected a strong odour of alcohol and observed signs of impairment.

The defence challenged the arrest and detention under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, and disputed the Crown's proof of impairment.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest, no arbitrary detention, and no breach of the right to counsel despite language barriers.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, with the second count stayed under the Kienapple rule.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single motor vehicle accident.

The accused challenged the grounds for her arrest under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on her observable signs of impairment at the roadside, including unsteadiness, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and incoherent responses.

The court also found that a formal breath demand was made at the detachment, and the accused's refusal to comply constituted the offence of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and related allegations in June 2017, with trial scheduled for March 2019, resulting in a gross delay of 21.5 months.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging the right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

After deducting 1.5 months of defence delay, the net delay was 19.5 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The court found that systemic disclosure failures, particularly the late disclosure of a key witness's statement on the morning of trial, could not be justified as exceptional circumstances.

The charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl, cannabis, and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a prohibited weapon, and three counts of breaching a probation order.

The Crown alleged that police lawfully stopped the accused for operating an E-bike with a non-functioning rear light and swerving behavior, detected the odour of fresh marijuana, and arrested the accused.

A search incident to arrest revealed quantities of controlled substances and weapons.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the stop, arrest, and search, and alleged a violation of the right to counsel.

The court found the stop and arrest lawful, but identified a technical violation of the right to counsel due to an 11-minute delay.

The court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach technical in nature with no real impact on the accused's protected rights, and that excluding reliable evidence would undermine the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on October 10, 2016.

The Crown presented evidence of dangerous driving patterns, physical signs of intoxication, and breath test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts, rejecting Charter arguments and finding that the officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and that any delay in providing rights to counsel was justified by safety concerns.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood and an open liquor charge under the Liquor Licence Act.

The accused pleaded guilty to the liquor charge and proceeded to trial on the impaired driving charge with a concurrent Charter application alleging six violations.

The court found two Charter breaches: an unlawful search of the accused's backpack at an impound yard and an arbitrary detention resulting from over-holding the accused in custody beyond the time he should have been released.

Applying the Grant analysis under section 24(2), the court excluded the breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused on the impaired driving charge.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging an infringement of the right to a speedy trial under s. 11(b).

The accused was charged with importing heroin, conspiracy to import heroin, and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The information was sworn on September 9, 2016, and trial was scheduled for June 25-28, 2018, resulting in a total delay of 658 days (21 months and 20 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that after deducting defence delay of 105 days, the net delay was 555 days (18 months and 13 days), exceeding the ceiling by 13 days.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

Appeal from conviction for arson and possession of incendiary material.

The appellant, an unrepresented accused in custody, was convicted after a two-day trial.

The appeal raised issues concerning the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused and the trial judge's duty to assist such an accused.

The Crown failed to ensure the appellant received a substantial disclosure package of over 500 pages containing witness statement transcripts and fire investigation photographs, which was couriered to the custodial institution but not properly communicated to the appellant.

The trial judge failed to adequately inquire into disclosure issues when they became apparent during trial.

The court found both a breach of the right to disclosure and inadequate judicial assistance, resulting in impairment of the right to make full answer and defence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal and Human Rights Code claims, and alternatively, a motion to transfer the proceeding from Thunder Bay to Kenora.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's developmental limitations and the fairness of the termination investigation.

The court also dismissed the venue transfer motion, affirming the plaintiff's prima facie right to choose venue and finding the defendant did not demonstrate Kenora was significantly better than Thunder Bay.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.

The defendant was charged with Over 80 following a traffic stop at a pub parking lot.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging violations of section 8 (unreasonable search) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The Crown sought to uphold the breath readings.

The court found that the delay in administering the approved screening device test was reasonable to allow for dissipation of residual mouth alcohol, and that the defendant's Charter rights were not violated.

The defendant was afforded access to counsel through an unrestricted cell phone and was read his rights.

A finding of guilt was registered.

The appellant was charged with unsafe lane change under the Highway Traffic Act.

On the trial date, a paralegal acting as his agent appeared and requested an adjournment based on incomplete disclosure.

The adjournment was denied.

The paralegal then withdrew from the proceedings, stating he was instructed to "walk away." The Justice of the Peace entered a conviction without a hearing pursuant to section 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: that the adjournment should have been granted, and that section 9.1(2) did not apply.

The court found the refusal of the adjournment was within the Justice of the Peace's discretion but held that section 9.1(2) could not be applied because the appellant had appeared through an agent and therefore had not "failed to appear" at trial.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and drive over 80 milligrams.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically in the early morning hours near a bar in Toronto's Entertainment District, exhibiting signs of impairment including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and poor coordination.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing 133 mgs per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused testified he had consumed only 3-4 shots of vodka and attributed his appearance and behavior to fatigue and nervousness rather than alcohol impairment.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, the Intoxilyzer was functioning properly, and the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The applicant was charged with Criminal Code and Highway Traffic Act driving offences arising from a three-car collision.

He brought a motion alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled trial date was 13¾ months.

The court assessed the delay against the Morin factors and regional guidelines for institutional delay in Peel Region.

The court found that the intake period was reasonable, the institutional delay was within acceptable parameters for a somewhat complex case, and any prejudice to the applicant was minimal.

The application was dismissed and the trial proceeded as scheduled.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The complainant, a 17-year-old, was heavily intoxicated at a party when the accused returned to her residence and engaged in sexual activity with her while she was incapacitated.

The court rejected the accused's defence that the complainant consented, finding that she was too intoxicated to consent and that the accused was aware of her incapacity.

The court also found that the accused unlawfully entered the dwelling with intent to commit the sexual assault.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and Over 80 following a motor vehicle stop in Milton on May 26, 2012.

The defence brought a section 8 Charter application challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving and demand breath samples.

The court found that the arresting officer's grounds were insufficient, relying on inconsistent and unreliable evidence from the officers regarding driving concerns.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed both charges, emphasizing the importance of police note-taking and the proper role of coach officers in investigations.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown established that the accused was observed driving at excessive speeds on Highway 410, making abrupt lane changes without signalling, and displaying delayed reaction time to police emergency signals.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings well in excess of the legal limit.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on the basis of a breach of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that language barriers prevented meaningful access to legal advice.

The court found a technical breach of the Charter right to counsel but admitted the breath evidence under section 24(2), finding that the integrity of the administration of justice would not be compromised by admission.

The court convicted the accused on both counts.