Human Rights

The plaintiff sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add allegations that the defendant insurer's underwriting policy constituted discrimination under the Human Rights Code, and to clarify facts and plead provisions of the Insurance Act.

The defendant opposed the Human Rights Code amendments, arguing lack of jurisdiction, untimeliness due to limitation period expiry, and prejudice.

The court found it had jurisdiction under Section 46.1 of the Code, as the Code claim was brought with an independent cause of action (breach of insurance contract).

It also determined that the limitation period for the Code amendments had not expired, as the plaintiff only discovered the relevant underwriting guidelines in March 2021, and in any event, declaratory relief sought under the Code has no limitation period.

The court found no uncompensable prejudice to the defendant.

Leave to amend was granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant, Alexander Shaulov, appealed the dismissal of his claims against the Law Society of Ontario (LSO) and other respondents, and sought leave to appeal a costs order.

Shaulov, a prospective lawyer, was removed from the LSO's licensing process after failing the Barrister Licensing Examination multiple times.

He sued, alleging discrimination under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights Code, and challenging the LSO's processes.

The motion judge dismissed most claims.

The Court of Appeal partially allowed the appeal, granting leave to amend the discrimination claims against the LSO and remitting the administrative law claims for determination of dismissal under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The appeal from the costs order was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision.

This pre-trial motion addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained during the police investigation.

The court found multiple Charter violations including unlawful detention without rights advisement, compelled statements in violation of section 7 rights, unlawful arrest and breath demand, unlawful vehicle seizure without reasonable grounds, and unlawful seizure of blood samples and airbag data.

The court determined that the investigation was fundamentally flawed from its inception, with police taking investigative shortcuts that resulted in evidence being unlawfully obtained.

The court found that evidence obtained in violation of the Charter could not be relied upon to lawfully seize other evidence, rendering subsequent warranted seizures unlawful as well.

The accused brought a third-party records application under the O'Connor regime seeking production of medical records and clinical notes from the complainant's psychiatrist relating to her mental health treatment.

The accused argued the records were necessary to establish that the complainant suffered from psychotic episodes that could affect her credibility and reliability as a witness.

The court dismissed the application at the first stage, finding the accused failed to establish "likely relevance" and that the application relied on speculative, discriminatory, and stereotypical reasoning linking mental illness to testimonial unreliability without case-specific evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of assault, one count of sexual assault, and one count of unlawful confinement arising from a domestic relationship.

The appellant was acquitted of four other charges and one charge was withdrawn.

He was sentenced to 21 months in jail and three years probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of a Charter section 11(b) delay motion and raised three grounds of appeal relating to credibility evaluation and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit ("over 80").

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand and breath samples under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an unreasonable search and seizure.

The defendant also challenged the Crown's reliance on the presumption of accuracy under the transitional provisions of Bill C-46.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion based on the strong odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, satisfying the threshold for an approved screening device demand.

The court rejected the Charter application and found that the Crown could rely on the presumption of accuracy, adopting the reasoning from R. v. Does and R. v. Porchetta over R. v. Flores-Vigil.

The defendant was convicted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of Crown non-disclosure.

The Crown failed to disclose medical records relating to the appellant's mother's health until partway through the appellant's cross-examination.

These records were relevant to the appellant's defence that his mother, rather than the appellant, killed the victim.

The trial judge initially dismissed the mistrial application, expecting that expert evidence would neutralize any prejudice.

However, the expert changed his evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the overall fairness of the trial process and ordered a new trial.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was stopped for a traffic violation, subjected to an approved screening device test, arrested for driving over 80, and provided breath samples.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the breath demand based on a faint odour of alcohol from the vehicle, the applicant's admission of earlier drinking, and confirmation of the odour from the applicant's mouth.

The court further found that the officer complied with the informational component of section 10(b) by reading the pre-printed rights, and that the applicant did not exercise his right to counsel until requesting duty counsel at the police station, at which point the police properly implemented that request.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with "Young Driver – Blood Alcohol Above Zero" contrary to section 44.1(5) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant's right to be advised of her right to retain and instruct counsel was infringed under section 10(b).

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

With the breath sample evidence excluded and no other admissible evidence of blood alcohol concentration, the court dismissed the charge, finding the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the offence.

The appellant protested outside town hall with a megaphone against a municipal by-law permitting a medical marijuana facility to be built near his home.

Town employees expressed fear for their safety, and the town issued a one-year trespass notice banning the appellant from all town property.

The application judge found the appellant's protest was violent and therefore not protected by the Charter.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant's protest was peaceful expression protected by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the trespass notice unjustifiably limited his freedom of expression.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on October 23, 2016, in Perth, Ontario.

An approved screening device (ASD) test resulted in a fail reading.

The defence argued that the officer failed to follow a November 26, 2013 memorandum from the Ontario Provincial Police Deputy Commissioner regarding the potential effects of food, drink, and hand sanitizer on ASD readings, which required a 15-minute waiting period before testing.

The court rejected the defence argument and distinguished the case from R v. Wong, finding that the memorandum lacked proper evidentiary foundation and that an officer cannot be bound to follow a directive of which they were unaware.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop.

The Crown called evidence from the arresting sergeant and the qualified breath technician.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b).

The trial judge found no breach of sections 10(a) or 10(b), and no breach of section 8 regarding the sobriety tests or reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

However, the trial judge found a breach of section 9 (arbitrary detention) due to unexplained over-holding of approximately six hours after the breath samples were obtained.

The trial judge declined to exclude the breath samples or stay the over 80 charge.

On the impaired driving charge, the trial judge found the Crown had not proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, as the sobriety test results were inadmissible and the remaining evidence of impairment was insufficient.

The accused applied to stay proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter to remedy an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) rights (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The information was sworn on July 22, 2015, and the trial date was September 1, 2016, representing 408 days of delay.

After accounting for defence-requested adjournments, the net delay was 380 days, falling below the presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that while the case took longer than it should have, it did not take markedly longer such that a stay was appropriate.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights to counsel were properly informed and whether the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was satisfied.

The Crown conducted an approved screening device (ASD) demand approximately 13 minutes after the initial traffic stop.

The defence argued that the accused was not provided with his rights to counsel at the roadside and that the delay in administering the ASD violated the forthwith requirement.

The court found that the accused had been informed of his rights to counsel and declined them, rendering the evidence admissible.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The overall delay from arrest to trial was approximately 20 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the four-part test from R. v. Morin, finding 13 months of Crown and institutional delay, 3 months of defence delay, and 4 months of neutral intake delay.

The court found minimal prejudice to the accused and considered the complexity of the case, which involved a Charter application challenging the grounds for arrest based on historical police information.

The court concluded that the 13 months of Crown and institutional delay, while exceeding the 8-10 month guideline, was not unreasonable given the case's complexity and the minimal prejudice demonstrated.

Following a 19-day trial, the accused was convicted of 60 firearms and weapons offences, including possession of prohibited and restricted firearms with readily accessible ammunition, breach of prohibition orders, unsafe storage of firearms, and possession of firearms with removed serial numbers.

The accused, a former RCMP officer and convicted gun trafficker on federal parole, was arrested after police executed a high-risk search warrant and seized 67 firearms, prohibited devices, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and explosives from his residence.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years 9 months (resulting in 6 years after pre-trial custody credit), with consecutive sentences for breach of prohibition orders.

The court also granted a 3-month sentencing remission as a remedy for the accused's unlawful detention for 15 days without being brought before a judicial officer, which constituted an abuse of process and breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified.

A Charter application was brought alleging violations of section 9 (arbitrary detention) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no section 9 breach, as the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the officer's observation of evasive driving and information about a prohibited driver.

However, a clear section 10(b) breach was established and conceded by the Crown, as the accused was detained and questioned for approximately 30 minutes without being advised of his rights to counsel.

The court found the evidence obtained prior to the breach was not tainted by the subsequent violation, as the connection was too tenuous.

The accused was convicted of driving while disqualified.

A sentence reduction was imposed as a remedy for the Charter violation.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that her right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed in a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The court examined the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, prejudice, and societal interests.

The court found that the operative institutional delay of approximately 8 months and 21 days fell within the Morin guidelines, that actual prejudice to the applicant was minor, and that the applicant failed to discharge the onus of proving a violation.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, drive disqualified, possession of a prohibited weapon, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

At trial, the Crown sought to rely on the presumption of identity regarding breath test readings to establish the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The defence challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the police failed to meet this statutory requirement due to unnecessary delays, including an unaccounted period after the demand, a vehicle search, a leisurely personal search, and note-taking at the scene.

The Crown could not rely on the presumption of identity without evidence of compliance with the "as soon as practicable" requirement.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams percent.

He brought an application for a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The case was approximately 15 months old at the scheduled trial date.

The court found that the combined institutional and Crown-attributable delay exceeded 12 months, which was well in excess of what is constitutionally tolerable.

Although the allegations were serious and created heightened public interest, the excessive delay, combined with significant prejudice to the accused's security of the person, warranted a stay of proceedings.