Andrew Lokan

Application and cross-application concerning a municipal site-specific by-law aimed at clearing a longstanding homeless encampment to facilitate a transit hub project.

The court held that the by-law infringed s. 7 because closing the only lawful sheltering site of last resort in a region with grossly insufficient accessible indoor shelter exposed chronically homeless persons to serious risks to life, liberty, and security of the person in a manner grossly disproportionate to the by-law’s objective.

The court further held that the by-law infringed s. 15 by disproportionately burdening homeless persons who were women, gender-diverse, disabled, and Indigenous, and also recognized homelessness itself as an analogous ground under s. 15.

The infringements were not saved under s. 1, the bad-faith challenge under s. 273 of the Municipal Act failed, and the court declared the by-laws of no force and effect, restrained enforcement, and retained jurisdiction for further directions if a lawful alternative tenting protocol or site is implemented.

The approval holder brought a motion arguing that the Tribunal lost jurisdiction to determine the remedy for a revoked renewable energy approval because the statutory six-month time limit had expired, resulting in a deemed confirmation of the Director's decision.

In the alternative, the approval holder sought the recusal of the Tribunal panel due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that it had disposed of the hearing within the statutory time limit when it issued its original decision, and that the deeming provision did not apply to a remedy hearing remitted by the Court of Appeal.

The Tribunal also found no evidence to support the allegations of bias.

Ostrander brought a motion to narrow the scope of the issues and evidence in a remedy hearing concerning a renewable energy approval for a wind turbine project, and to strike portions of the witness statements of two experts called by the Prince Edward County Field Naturalists.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding it premature to narrow the scope of the remedy hearing given its broad remedial jurisdiction and the introduction of fresh evidence.

The Tribunal also declined to strike the expert witness statements, finding the proposed evidence relevant to the remedy and responsive to the fresh evidence.

The approval holder brought a motion to define the issue to be determined in the remaining portion of the hearing and to strike portions of two witness statements.

The motion was dismissed, with reasons to follow.

The Prince Edward County South Shore Conservancy brought a motion for party status to address the remedy in an appeal of a Renewable Energy Approval for the Ostrander Point Wind Park.

The Environmental Review Tribunal dismissed the request for party status but granted the alternative request for participant status.

The Tribunal ordered that the Conservancy may participate in motions but may not bring them, with reasons to follow.

In an ongoing human rights application alleging discrimination based on place of origin and citizenship due to the employer's application of ITAR regulations, the Tribunal issued an interim decision on procedural matters.

The Tribunal limited the intervening Union's participation to written and oral submissions, denying its request to call evidence and cross-examine witnesses to avoid undue delay and repetition.

The Tribunal permitted the Canadian Civil Liberties Association to intervene regarding Charter issues.

Finally, the Tribunal ruled that extrinsic evidence from the applicant's former counsel regarding the interpretation of a prior Minutes of Settlement and Release was inadmissible, as the language of the release was clear and unambiguous.

The Union filed policy grievances alleging the Employer violated the collective agreement by unilaterally deciding to no longer agree to requests for compensating time off (CTO) in lieu of overtime pay for correctional officers.

The Union argued this undermined local bargaining, breached local agreements, and had a discriminatory effect on employees with family responsibilities.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievances, finding that the collective agreement required mutual agreement for CTO, and the Employer was entitled to withhold its consent for legitimate business reasons, namely reducing overtime costs.

The Board found no prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status, as employees had not requested formal accommodation.

The grievances were allowed only to the extent that the Employer breached notice provisions in any local agreements.

The Employer raised a preliminary objection that the Grievance Settlement Board lacked jurisdiction to hear grievances concerning its unilateral decision to cease agreeing to compensating time off (CTO) for overtime worked.

The Employer argued that the collective agreement made CTO subject to mutual agreement, and its refusal to agree was an unreviewable exercise of management rights.

The Union argued the decision violated local agreements, past practice, and other collective agreement provisions.

The Board dismissed the Employer's preliminary objections, finding it had jurisdiction to determine whether the Employer's exercise of management rights adversely affected substantive rights under the collective agreement, and that the Union had provided sufficient particulars of its case.

The Union filed a grievance alleging the Employer violated the collective agreement by failing to reimburse insulin pumps and supplies.

At the hearing, the parties agreed to adjourn the matter.

The Vice-Chair ordered the Employer to produce specific information regarding Manulife's past coverage, cost of claims, and direction letters related to insulin pumps and supplies.

The employer brought a motion requesting that the Vice-Chair recuse herself from hearing a policy grievance due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The employer argued that the Vice-Chair's prior experience mediating and arbitrating disputes between the parties, and specifically her familiarity with the phrase 'removed from the table' in the context of joint committee meetings, created an apprehension of bias.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the motion, finding that in the context of labour arbitration, an adjudicator's prior knowledge and experience with the parties and their collective agreement does not, without more, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Association of Management, Administrative and Professional Crown Employees of Ontario (AMAPCEO) filed a policy grievance asserting that the Employer, Management Board Secretariat, failed to include certain employees under the recognition clause of their collective agreement, claiming AMAPCEO is a 'tag end' unit.

The Employer opposed the grievance and argued that the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) should be granted third party status because the determination of the grievance could affect OPSEU's bargaining rights.

OPSEU sought status, while AMAPCEO opposed it.

The Grievance Settlement Board granted OPSEU third party status, finding that the fundamental question of whether AMAPCEO is a tag end unit directly implicates the scope of OPSEU's bargaining units, and natural justice requires OPSEU's participation.

OPSEU's intervention was made conditional on its agreement to be bound by the result of the proceedings.

The applicant union alleged that a sale of part of a business occurred when Ontario Hydro sold the Glen Cross Conference and Training Centre to Goldman Hotels Inc. The purchaser argued that it merely bought idle assets and started a new business.

The Board found that there was substantial continuity of enterprise, evidenced by a two-year leaseback to Ontario Hydro and continued room bookings from former clients.

The Board also found substantial continuity in the bargaining unit work performed by the front-line staff.

The Board concluded that a sale of part of a business occurred under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act and declared that the collective agreement applied to the purchaser's operation.

The Power Workers' Union applied under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging a sale of part of Ontario Hydro's business to Lincoln Hydro Electric Commission following a statutorily mandated transfer of retail distribution assets.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board found that a sale of part of a business had indeed occurred, as Lincoln Hydro acquired a coherent and functioning part of Ontario Hydro's operation.

However, because only one former Ontario Hydro employee accepted a job with Lincoln Hydro and was intermingled with its largely non-union workforce, the Board exercised its discretion under section 69(6) to terminate the union's bargaining rights effective the date of the transfer.