Andrew Lokan

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

The plaintiff brought a motion for the return of computer files and devices from its former Chief Operating Officer.

The parties agreed to appoint an Independent Solicitor to review the files for privilege.

After the Independent Solicitor's report was released, the defendants eventually returned the non-privileged files and the laptop, settling the motion.

The court determined that the plaintiff was the successful party and awarded costs, but reduced the amount claimed because the parties had acted in good faith to agree on the review process.

The costs of the Independent Solicitor were ordered to be shared equally.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

The appellant mother travelled to Ontario from Dubai with her two children for a visit, but subsequently informed the respondent father that she would not return.

The father commenced proceedings in Ontario seeking a return order under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The trial judge declined jurisdiction under ss. 22 and 23 of the Act, ordered the children returned to Dubai, and dismissed the mother's constitutional challenges to s. 40(3).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the risk of serious harm under s. 23, and upholding the constitutionality of the return order provision under both division of powers and the Charter.

Following a trial where the applicant father successfully obtained an order for the return of the parties' children to Dubai, the court determined the issue of costs.

The father sought $486,000 on a partial and full recovery basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The respondent mother argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to her limited financial means.

The court found the father was entitled to costs and had beaten his offer to settle, but fixed costs at $250,000 on a partial indemnity basis to ensure the award was proportionate and within the mother's reasonable expectations and ability to pay.

In a family law trial concerning whether two young children should be returned to Dubai, the respondent mother brought an application to adduce expert opinion evidence from a psychotherapist.

The proposed evidence concerned the potential emotional and psychological impact on infants separated from their primary caregiver.

The applicant father opposed the admission of the evidence.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the test for expert evidence and found the proposed expert was properly qualified and capable of giving fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence.

The court granted the application, permitting the expert to testify strictly on the potential impact of separation from a primary caregiver, but prohibited her from opining on the specific attachment of the children to either parent.

The applicant sought costs following her success on two motions regarding jurisdiction and the respondent's constitutional challenge based on aboriginal rights.

The applicant claimed $500,000 on a full recovery basis, including a risk premium.

The court rejected the inclusion of a risk premium in family law cases and found the respondent's conduct unreasonable but not amounting to bad faith.

The court fixed costs at $315,415 and ordered that the costs be designated as a support order enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office, as the underlying motions were necessary to clear the path for the applicant's support claims.

Following the dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's $17 million action against the WSIB and WSIAT for lack of jurisdiction, the defendants sought costs.

The WSIB claimed $7,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, and the WSIAT claimed $3,000.

The court considered the principles of indemnification, reasonableness, and access to justice, noting that the plaintiff's claim, while lacking a viable cause of action in the Superior Court, was not frivolous or vexatious.

Recognizing the plaintiff's self-represented status and the need to balance access to justice with discouraging improper litigation, the court fixed costs at $3,000 payable to each defendant.

Three Mexican seasonal agricultural workers were terminated by their employer and repatriated to Mexico.

They sued for wrongful dismissal and alleged violations of their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights, claiming they were 'privately deported' without procedural fairness.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the constitutional and Bill of Rights claims.

The court struck the Charter and Bill of Rights claims, finding that the pleadings did not contain sufficient material facts to support a deprivation of liberty or security of the person under s. 7, nor discrimination under s. 15.

The court also struck the contractual claims against Canada and F.A.R.M.S. as they were not parties to the employment contract.

The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their Charter claims.