Mattison v. Pelham (Town), 2013 HRTO 1166

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Eric Mattison

Applicant

-and-

The Corporation of the Town of Pelham and Sara Thomson

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Naomi Overend

Date: July 4, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 1166

Indexed as: Mattison v. Pelham (Town)

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Eric Mattison, Applicant

No submissions

The Corporation of the Town of Pelham and Sara Thompson, Respondents

T.H. Hill, Counsel

1This Application alleges discrimination in employment on the grounds of disability and record of offences, contrary to Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2The Tribunal issued an earlier Case Assessment Direction seeking submissions from the parties concerning whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the allegation of discrimination on the basis of record of offences. The applicant did not file any written submissions and the time for doing so has now passed. The respondents’ submissions merely noted that they took the position that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction with respect to the allegations relating to this ground.

3The term “record of offences” is defined in section 10(1) of the Code as follows:

“record of offences” means a conviction for,

(a) an offence in respect of which a pardon has been granted under the Criminal Records Act (Canada) and has not been revoked; or

(b) an offence in respect of any provincial enactment.

4In de Pelham v. Mytrak Health Systems, 2009 HRTO 172, the Tribunal addressed the issue of whether the ground “record of offences” applies to someone who has merely been charged with a criminal offence (paras. 6 and 9):

Mr. de Pelham argues that notwithstanding the definition provided in the Code, I should give “record of offences” a broader meaning, to include situations in which an individual has been charged with a criminal offence. …

Although I appreciate the applicant’s arguments in this case, his position cannot succeed. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and provides that “record of offences” covers only persons convicted of an offence. It is true that the Code is an important public policy statute and must be given a large, liberal and purposive interpretation, but this does not mean that the Tribunal can depart from the express provisions of the legislation.

5In this case, the applicant was apparently charged with a number of criminal offences, many of which were dismissed at the preliminary hearing and the remainder subsequently withdrawn.

6The applicant does not allege that he was convicted of a criminal offence, for which he subsequently received a pardon, which is the only basis on which the Tribunal has jurisdiction with respect to allegations relating to such offences. The applicant’s allegations do not relate to that ground and are, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

7Accordingly, all allegations relating to that ground in the Application are dismissed.