Civil Litigation - Plaintiff

The defendant freight forwarder brought a motion for partial summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid invoices.

The plaintiff had contracted the defendant to transport machinery from Brazil to Ontario, which was delayed and invoiced at a significantly higher amount than quoted.

The plaintiff sued for damages and the defendant counterclaimed for the unpaid invoice balance, relying on a clause in its Standard Trading Conditions requiring payment without set-off.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the disputed invoice amounts were deeply connected to the plaintiff's underlying claim and that granting partial summary judgment would not reduce the complexity or duration of the upcoming trial, risking inconsistent findings of fact.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a lakefront property.

The transaction failed to close after disputes arose regarding the vendor's non-resident tax holdback and the lack of legal access over a private road.

The court found that because neither party was ready to close on the agreed date, time was no longer of the essence and the contract remained valid.

Given the unique characteristics of the property, the court ordered specific performance, set a new closing date, and directed a mini-trial for the remaining damages claims.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion to strike the defendants' statement of defence for failing to comply with previous court orders, and sought judgment for breach of trust under the Construction Act.

The Associate Judge struck the defence and noted the defendants in default.

Although the Associate Judge found he lacked jurisdiction to grant default judgment for an unliquidated breach of trust claim, he determined it was appropriate to grant summary judgment.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the corporate defendant's breach of trust and the principal's personal liability.

The request for a declaration under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants sought to adjourn their appeal of an associate judge's ruling on undertakings and refusals due to the unavailability of their lead counsel.

The appellants also sought to file transcripts of the multi-day hearing before the associate judge, which the respondent opposed.

The court granted the adjournment, setting a peremptory date for the appeal.

However, the court denied the request to file transcripts, noting they were unnecessary as they contained only legal arguments and the appellants had not referenced them in their factum.

The court also directed the parties to settle the underlying order with the associate judge.

The defendants moved to dismiss the proposed class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiffs did not oppose the dismissal but requested a 60-90 day delay of the effective date to locate new representative plaintiffs for a fresh action.

The court held that s. 29.1 is a mandatory provision and the court lacks discretion to delay the effective date of the dismissal.

The motion to dismiss was granted.

The Ontario Court of Appeal remitted the issue of the Huron plaintiffs' Stage One trial costs to the Superior Court for reconsideration, questioning the substantial difference in hours claimed compared to the Superior plaintiffs.

The court found the Huron plaintiffs' costs to be fair and reasonable, noting the added complexity of representing 21 First Nations, the extensive evidence led on the Anishinaabe perspective, the incorporation of Anishinaabe Ceremony and protocol, and the necessary creation of the Robinson Huron Trust to manage the litigation.

The court concluded that the costs were proportionate and within the reasonable expectations of the parties given the historical significance and complexity of the treaty claims.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a franchise dispute action from Toronto to Ottawa.

The court found the motion premature because the defendants had already been noted in default in Toronto for failing to file defences.

The court adjourned the transfer motion sine die, directing the defendants to first bring a motion in Toronto to set aside the noting of default under Rule 19.03, or obtain the plaintiff's consent to file defences.

Hiawatha First Nation applied for a permanent injunction to restrain three of its members from constructing a gas station on the reserve.

The band argued the construction violated the Indian Act, a band by-law requiring building permits, a band resolution imposing a moratorium on new businesses, and environmental legislation.

The court found that the building permit by-law and environmental legislation did not apply, and that the proposed business structure did not violate the Indian Act.

However, the court held that the band resolution imposing a moratorium was an enforceable by-law.

The court granted an injunction restraining construction while the moratorium remains in effect and until the proponents comply with all applicable laws.

The plaintiffs, an independent truck driver and his company, sued the defendant for the value of a transport truck destroyed by fire while leased to the defendant.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant breached their National Transportation Lease Agreement by failing to obtain first-party property damage insurance, and claimed negligent misrepresentation regarding the extent of coverage.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding the contract clearly placed the onus on the plaintiffs to satisfy themselves as to the adequacy of the insurance provided, which only covered third-party liability.

The court found no unconscionability, ambiguity, or negligent misrepresentation in the commercial transaction.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend his statement of claim to add claims against the corporate directors for unpaid wages under the OBCA and CBCA.

One of the directors opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to strike the existing ESA claims, arguing the claims were premature because the corporate employer had not yet been sued to judgment and execution returned unsatisfied.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend, finding the claims were not clearly untenable at law and could be tried together with the corporate claims.

The court dismissed the director's cross-motion to strike, finding it was brought too late and was an improper disguised summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer of record, alleging an actual or perceived conflict of interest in her joint representation of all three defendants.

The plaintiff was never a client of the challenged lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of real mischief or that the proper administration of justice required the removal.

The court also found that the motion was brought for a tactical advantage, given the nearly two-year delay in bringing it after the issue was first raised.

The respondent self-represented condominium owner submitted a written request under Rule 2.1 to dismiss the applicant condominium corporation's application to enforce an arbitration award.

The respondent argued the application and a related condominium lien were frivolous and vexatious.

The court dismissed the request, finding nothing on the face of the application to suggest it was an abuse of process, and noted that Rule 2.1 cannot be used to strike a defence or pronounce on the validity of a claim before a hearing.

The moving parties requested to schedule a motion to bar a witness from testifying at the upcoming trial, alleging the witness had previously perjured himself and ignored court orders.

The case management judge declined to schedule the motion, finding that admissibility of evidence is a matter for the trial judge.

The judge emphasized that allowing the interlocutory motion would only cause further delay and tactical gamesmanship in an already protracted litigation.

The applicant, Essam Elbassiouni, brought a motion to be appointed as the litigation guardian for his brother, Ahmed Elbasiouni, in several ongoing proceedings against the City of Brampton.

The court found that the applicant failed to provide clear and cogent evidence that Ahmed lacked the capacity to instruct counsel or manage his litigation.

The court noted significant flaws in the capacity assessment report and concluded the motion was likely a tactic to delay an upcoming Court of Appeal hearing.

Furthermore, the court held that even if Ahmed required a litigation guardian, Essam would be inappropriate due to conflicts of interest.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an arbitration award concerning the division of proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned property.

The arbitrator had credited the respondents with $30,730 for construction costs incurred prior to the execution of Minutes of Settlement.

The Superior Court of Justice granted leave to appeal, finding that the arbitrator made an extricable error of law by ignoring the plain wording of the Minutes of Settlement, which reset the parties' rights as of the date of execution.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitration award was varied to remove the $30,730 credit.

Following a successful urgent motion by the tenant for relief from forfeiture and a declaration of unlawful lease termination during the COVID-19 pandemic, the court determined the costs of the motion.

The court awarded the tenant substantial indemnity costs fixed at $150,000, finding the landlord's conduct in terminating the lease and immediately re-leasing the premises to be reprehensible and high-handed.

The court declined to order costs against the landlord's principal personally but allowed the tenant to set off the costs award against future rent.

The applicant, a former officer and shareholder of the respondent corporation, brought an oppression application after his termination.

In the context of that proceeding, he moved to remove the law firm representing the respondents as counsel of record, alleging a disqualifying conflict of interest based on prior joint representation and the likelihood that the firm's lawyers would be called as witnesses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the firm's retainer clearly stated it represented only the corporation, not its officers or shareholders.

Furthermore, the court held that it was premature and speculative to remove counsel on the basis that its lawyers might be called as witnesses, as the applicant had not yet determined whether he would call them or convert his application into an action.

The moving party, a co-owner of the matrimonial home, sought to transfer a mortgage enforcement action commenced by the bank in Milton to Brampton, and to have it tried together with an ongoing family law application involving her son and daughter-in-law.

The court granted the transfer, finding that Brampton was a significantly better venue given the location of the property and the parties.

The court declined to order the matters be tried together at this early stage, but ordered that evidence obtained in each proceeding apply equally to the other to avoid duplication.