Micheal G. Simaan

This motion concerned the plaintiffs' application for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The court addressed numerous issues with the proposed pleading, including the inclusion of evidence, argument, hyperbole, and personal attacks, contrary to Rule 25.06(1).

The defendants challenged specific footnotes and paragraphs, arguing they did not contain material facts.

The court largely agreed with the defendants, ordering the removal of many challenged sections, including those related to a prior settlement with a non-party, procedural history, and speculative concerns.

The court also addressed the plaintiffs' failure to properly blackline amendments and provide costs outlines.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff, an elderly woman, brought a motion to extend an interim and interlocutory Mareva Injunction against multiple defendants, alleging over $1 million in payments for uncompleted home renovation work constituted fraud.

The Mareva Injunction had been previously ordered and extended, and a Norwich Order was made against TD Bank.

Defendant Rahimi cross-moved to lift the injunction, claiming a payment was for a Rolex sale, but his explanation was deemed unsatisfactory and his compliance with disclosure incomplete.

Defendant Alradhi sought access to funds for living and legal expenses.

The court dismissed Rahimi's motion to lift the injunction but allowed him $10,000 for preauthorized expenses.

Alradhi's request for $15,000 for expenses was granted.

The Mareva Injunction was continued against all defendants, and TD Bank was ordered to immediately comply with the Norwich Order.

The appellants, Monica Murad, Aaron Murad, and 997322 Ontario Inc., sought to appeal a non-competition order issued by a motion judge during the receivership of Mill Street & Co. Inc. The motion judge had included the appellants in the order, despite their not being directly implicated in obstruction or fraudulent licensing, because the Murad companies operated as family businesses.

The Court of Appeal found no jurisdiction under s. 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act as the right to compete is a present, not future, right.

Leave to appeal under s. 193(e) was denied because the issue of making a non-competition order against a non-party did not arise, as the appellants were considered "Murad Parties" and treated as parties throughout the receivership.

The appeal was quashed.

This appeal concerned a failed condominium purchase where the central issue was the vendor's compliance with the Tarion Warranty Corporation Addendum, specifically regarding the delivery of an occupancy permit or confirmation of occupancy conditions.

The application judge found that no occupancy permit was required and that a letter from the builder was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal found a palpable and overriding error in the application judge's finding that the letter was *delivered* as required by the Addendum.

The evidence showed the letter was merely available for pick-up, not delivered.

The Court allowed the appeal, declared the vendor in breach of the agreement of purchase and sale, and ordered a reference to determine damages, along with costs to the appellants.

The plaintiff set the action down for trial and counsel attended trial scheduling court to fix a date.

The judge convened a case conference and determined that the action, commenced in 2014 regarding a construction dispute, was not ready for trial.

Interlocutory steps including undertakings, potential refusal motions, and expert reports were incomplete, and a companion action had sat dormant.

The judge struck the action from the trial list, directing counsel to return only when the matter is truly ready for trial.

The plaintiff moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached during a pre-trial conference, where the defendants agreed to pay $200,000.

The defendants argued the motion was premature, citing difficulties in refinancing their home to secure the funds.

The court found that a reasonable time for payment had passed, regardless of whether the payment was conditional on refinancing, as the defendants controlled the timing of the event.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted, and the plaintiff was awarded costs.

The applicant, Maryam Rezaee, brought a motion for a mandatory injunction to restore her as manager of a hospitality business, alleging that a corporate restructuring which transferred control to her son, Raymond Zar, was unenforceable due to *non est factum* and constituted oppression.

She also sought alternative prohibitory injunctions.

The respondent, Raymond Zar, brought a cross-motion to remove an existing interim order preventing property encumbrance, arguing non-disclosure of independent legal advice during the *ex parte* application for that order.

The court dismissed Maryam's motion for both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, finding she did not meet the "strong prima facie case" standard for mandatory relief or the "irreparable harm" standard for either.

The court also dismissed Zar's cross-motion, thereby maintaining the interim order pending the resolution of the Certificates of Pending Litigation motion.

Following a summary judgment, the court determined the post-judgment interest rate and confirmed an agreed-upon costs award.

The plaintiff sought the contractual rate of 6% per annum on outstanding principal and unpaid interest.

The court ruled that the contractual rate of 6% applies to the outstanding principal, citing the Courts of Justice Act and Supreme Court precedent.

However, for unpaid interest, the court applied the lower CJA rate, as the promissory notes did not provide for compound interest.

Costs were settled by agreement at $60,000.00.

The appellants appealed from a Superior Court judgment that enforced a term of Minutes of Settlement between the parties arising from a failed business arrangement and law practice shared between siblings.

The appellants raised two issues: (1) that the application judge erred in refusing to grant an adjournment, and (2) that the application judge erred in concluding that paragraph one of the Minutes of Settlement was a separate enforceable term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjournment was properly refused and that paragraph one was indeed a separate enforceable obligation independent of other disputed amounts between the parties.

This application sought a determination of contractual rights regarding an early termination provision in pre-construction condominium agreements.

The applicants argued that a 'sole, absolute and unfettered discretion' proviso in a financing condition rendered the entire condition null and void under the Tarion Addendum, leading to a breach of contract claim.

The court found that the proviso did not form part of the early termination condition or, if it did, it was inconsistent with the Addendum's requirement for commercially reasonable steps and was therefore unenforceable.

The court interpreted the condition to require vendors to take all commercially reasonable steps to arrange satisfactory financing, upholding the validity of the termination condition and dismissing the application.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a judgment dismissing its claim that the disclosure statement was false, deceptive, or misleading regarding the disclosure of parking lease obligations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that sufficient information was included in the disclosure statement and that it was not false, deceptive, or misleading.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a mixed commercial/residential property in Port Perry.

The agreement contained a mortgage assumption condition requiring approval from the mortgagee, Alterna Savings, on terms acceptable to the buyer.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the condition precedent had not been satisfied because the buyer failed to formally accept Alterna's approval by signing and returning the approval letter before the deadline.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the condition precedent was satisfied when Alterna sent its approval letter, and that formal execution was not required.

The court ordered specific performance subject to Alterna renewing its approval on substantially similar terms.

The applicant sought to remove his sister as an Estate Trustee and force the sale of their late father's home.

The estate had remained unadministered for over five years because the sister, who was living in the home rent-free, obstructed the listing and sale process.

The court found that the sister failed to act in the best interests of the estate and removed her as an Estate Trustee pursuant to section 37 of the Trustee Act.

She was ordered to vacate the property within 30 days, and the remaining trustees were granted sole authority to list and sell the home.