Anne M. Molloy

The United States of America sought the extradition of an individual for prosecution on fraud-related charges.

The individual applied for a stay of the extradition proceedings, arguing that the extradition was a ruse to obtain his testimony as a material witness in other cases, and that U.S. police had coerced him and reneged on promises of protection, endangering his life.

The court dismissed the stay application, finding no factual basis for the "ruse" argument and noting that alleged abuses did not have a nexus to the fairness of the extradition process itself.

The court also held that alternative remedies were available to address safety concerns.

The court then found that the test for committal for extradition was met, satisfying the dual criminality and prima facie case requirements, and issued the committal order.

This endorsement addresses the sentencing of an offender convicted of 10 counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder.

Due to a pending Supreme Court of Canada decision on the constitutionality of consecutive parole ineligibility periods under s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code, the court, with agreement from all counsel, decided to proceed with the evidentiary portion of the sentencing hearing and impose the mandatory life sentence for one count of first-degree murder.

The sentencing for the remaining counts will be adjourned until the Supreme Court of Canada releases its decision in R. v. Bissonnette.

The court also deemed it appropriate to transfer the offender to a federal penitentiary.

The accused, Jonathan Salazar-Blanco, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

The Crown alleged he conspired to find and kill Alex Vinogradsky in Costa Rica, motivated by tow-truck business disputes and retaliation for shootings.

The defence argued Salazar-Blanco merely pretended to agree to the scheme without genuine intent.

The court found Salazar-Blanco's police statement largely incredible but concluded that, despite his dishonesty, there was a reasonable doubt as to whether he truly intended to carry out the conspiracy's objective.

The court found no reliable evidence of motive or concrete acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, leading to an acquittal.

The accused, F.D., applied for a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including a new release plan, significant trial delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the general impact of the pandemic on the inmate population.

The court found the proposed release plan, involving strict house arrest, electronic monitoring, and supervision by the applicant's fiancée's parents, to be robust.

Considering the strength of the supervision plan and the public health risks posed by COVID-19 in detention centers, the court granted bail, concluding that release would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

D.D. applied for a bail review, citing a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and trial delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that D.D. failed to satisfy the secondary and tertiary grounds for release.

The decision highlighted D.D.'s extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance with court orders, and the inadequacy of the proposed supervision plan.

The court concluded that the pandemic, while a relevant factor, did not outweigh the significant risk of reoffending and the necessity to maintain public confidence in the justice system.

This decision from a Gardiner hearing addresses factual determinations for sentencing after Curtis Murray and Corey Murray were convicted of second-degree murder.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, motivated by revenge against a specific group, and that the victim was killed under the mistaken belief he was part of that group.

While the judge's legal view was that these facts would typically constitute first-degree murder, the jury's verdict of second-degree murder was respected.

The court also determined that Curtis Murray was the leader and instigator, with Corey Murray being a willing but more of a follower, which was considered a mitigating factor for Corey.

T.L. brought a bail review application after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds following a shooting incident.

The initial bail hearing before a Justice of the Peace was flawed due to a misapprehension of evidence regarding a proposed surety.

The Superior Court conducted a *de novo* hearing, considering a new supervision plan involving house arrest with grandparents as sureties, electronic monitoring, and the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the accused satisfied the onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds, emphasizing the strength of the supervision plan and the elevated risks of detention during the pandemic.

T.L. was released on strict conditions.

Terrence Noftall, convicted of multiple sexual and child pornography offences, challenged the validity of production orders obtained by the Crown for psychiatric, psychological, medical, and employment records.

These records were sought in preparation for a potential dangerous offender application.

The defence argued that the production orders lacked statutory authority under s. 487.014 of the Criminal Code, as a dangerous offender application had not yet commenced, and that the disclosure of MCSCS records via a Memorandum of Understanding violated privacy rights.

The court dismissed the defence's application, ruling that s. 487.014 applies to the sentencing phase, including pre-assessment for dangerous offender applications, and that the MCSCS records were lawfully obtained under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

Alek Minassian, charged with multiple counts of murder and attempted murder related to the Toronto van attack, brought a motion for disclosure of data from three password-protected electronic devices seized by the police.

The Crown argued it lacked possession or control over the encrypted data and could not disclose it without prior review due to public safety concerns, including potential child pornography and incel-related threats.

The court found the defence met the relevance test and that the Crown had possession and control of the data.

Balancing the accused's right to full answer and defence against public safety, the court ordered disclosure to defence counsel, subject to strict undertakings and conditions.

These conditions included counsel retaining custody, not providing raw data to Minassian, and a duty to report evidence of child pornography or future criminal acts by third parties to the police, with flexibility for anonymous reporting or seeking court directions.

The defendant, Tal Singh Fermah, was convicted of possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition, possession of 111 grams of heroin for trafficking, and simple possession of 1.4 grams of heroin.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years, but credited the defendant with 7 years for time served due to the "excruciatingly difficult" and "unacceptable" conditions of his pre-trial custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

These conditions included frequent lockdowns, failure to administer prescribed medications on time, neglect of serious medical issues, and repeated unsafe bunk assignments despite a seizure disorder.

The court found the institution's conduct "shocking and appalling" and "unconscionable."

The appellant, Manpreet Sohal, appealed his conviction for impaired driving, challenging the trial judge's finding that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident.

The appeal raised five grounds, including alleged failures by the trial judge to properly instruct himself on eyewitness identification frailties, misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider collusion, erroneous treatment of absence of embellishment, and improper inferences drawn from video evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the first four grounds.

While the trial judge erred in drawing certain inferences from the video footage without seeking submissions from counsel, this error was deemed to be of negligible weight and did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

A young person, T.G., was found guilty of kidnapping with a firearm, firearm possession, possession of heroin (laced with fentanyl) for trafficking, possession of cocaine for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The defence argued for the maximum youth sentence.

The court found that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted due to T.G.'s leadership role in the serious and prolonged kidnapping, his active participation in violence, and his established criminal lifestyle.

The court determined that a youth sentence would not adequately hold T.G. accountable.

Consequently, T.G. was sentenced as an adult to a global sentence of 9 years, with credit for time served, resulting in 4 years and 5 months remaining to be served in a federal penitentiary.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired care or control and over 80.

The respondent was found asleep in his running car while intoxicated.

The trial judge acquitted based on the respondent's credible testimony that he had no intention to drive and had an alternate plan to walk home after recovering from an asthma attack.

The appeal court upheld the acquittal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessment regarding the realistic risk of the vehicle being set in motion.

The appellant, Androy Spring, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles of R. v. W.(D.) by failing to properly assess his alibi evidence and the totality of the evidence, and by concluding belief in the complainant solely due to disbelief of the accused.

The appellant also contended the trial judge failed to address conflicting evidence regarding the time of the assault and the complainant's memory issues.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge's application of W.(D.) principles, his assessment of credibility and reliability, or his factual findings regarding the timing of the assault and the alibi.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's alibi and acceptance of the complainant's detailed recollection were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

During a jury trial for possession of a firearm, trafficking, and proceeds of crime, the Crown sought to have a key witness, the defendant's common-law spouse, declared an adverse witness under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The witness's testimony contradicted prior statements and other evidence regarding consent to search, the defendant's movements, vehicle contents, and the source of seized cash.

The court found the witness adverse, citing inconsistencies and a motive to assist the defendant.

Leave was granted for the Crown to cross-examine her on specific points, with limiting instructions to the jury to ensure trial fairness.

Golam Mehedi brought three applications for certiorari seeking to proceed with private criminal charges against three individuals, which were opposed by the Crown.

The Crown also brought an application to have Mr. Mehedi declared a vexatious litigant.

The court dismissed all three of Mr. Mehedi's certiorari applications, finding them to be without merit.

The court granted the Crown's application, declaring Mr. Mehedi a vexatious litigant and issuing an order restricting his ability to institute or continue proceedings in any Superior Court in Ontario for the review of lower court proceedings or Crown action with respect to any private criminal information, except with leave of a Superior Court Judge based on written submissions.

The appellant, Furkan Karatekin, appealed his conviction and nine-month imprisonment sentence for sexual assault.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's credibility findings were fundamentally flawed due to misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence testimony, and improper use of the appellant's police statement.

The trial judge's reasoning regarding the appellant's cellphone number explanation, ankle injury, and police statement was deemed problematic.

The cumulative effect of these palpable and overriding errors rendered the conviction unsafe.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for assault causing bodily harm and, for one appellant, threatening death.

The court upheld the convictions for assault causing bodily harm, finding the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and rejection of self-defence, to be reasonable and supported by evidence.

However, the conviction for threatening death was set aside as unsupported by evidence.

This is an appeal from a conviction for uttering threats, criminal harassment, and breach of probation, and from the imposed sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's judicial notice of text messaging mechanics, assessment of gaps in the Crown's case, and credibility findings regarding the complainant.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge erred in the extent of judicial notice taken regarding text message fabrication methods, this error did not affect the outcome.

The court upheld the trial judge's credibility findings and her determination that the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt despite evidentiary gaps.

The appeal against sentence, seeking a conditional discharge, was also dismissed, as the trial judge had considered mitigating factors and imposed a lenient sentence given the repeat nature of the domestic violence.

Kevin Hanse was charged with firearm and ammunition offenses, with the Crown's case relying heavily on wiretap interceptions using alleged code words like "car," "whip," "gas," and "snub." The defence sought to introduce internet search results from "weedmaps.com" and "wikileaf.com" through an articling student to suggest that "snub" and "gas" were slang terms for marijuana, thereby challenging the Crown's interpretation.

The court conducted a voir dire and ruled the internet evidence inadmissible.

The judge found that the evidence did not meet the strict criteria for judicial notice of adjudicative facts, as the sources lacked indisputable accuracy and the facts were not notorious or generally accepted slang for marijuana.

The court emphasized the need for accuracy and reliability in evidence presented to a jury, rejecting the argument that trial fairness or cost considerations should relax the evidentiary standards for adjudicative facts.