Andrew Pinto

In supplementary reasons following a motion, the court determined the temporary supervised parenting schedule for the respondent mother of a six-month-old child.

The court rejected the applicant father's proposal to have his sister supervise due to high conflict, and rejected the mother's request for overnight parenting time.

The court ordered a specific schedule for virtual and in-person parenting time, with in-person visits to be supervised by the mother's friend or a paid professional, requiring the father to contribute up to $150 per week for the professional supervisor.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking temporary orders that the parties' six-month-old child reside with him, that the respondent mother's parenting time be supervised, and that the mother undergo a psychiatric assessment.

The father raised serious concerns regarding the mother's mental health, including alleged threats of self-harm and erratic behaviour.

The mother disputed the allegations and opposed supervised parenting.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the recently amended Divorce Act, the court granted the motion, finding that supervised parenting was necessary to ensure the child's safety until the mother's mental health challenges could be properly assessed.

The applicant vendor and respondent purchaser entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a luxury new build home.

The purchaser failed to close, claiming the vendor made misrepresentations and the contract was unconscionable.

The vendor terminated the agreement and retained the purchaser's deposits totaling over $490,000.

The court found that the purchaser repudiated the agreement and that the vendor was not required to tender closing documents or conduct a pre-delivery inspection given the repudiation.

The court held the vendor was entitled to retain the deposits, finding no unconscionability, and directed the issue of the vendor's further damages to trial.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that set aside a Registrar's administrative dismissal of the respondent's action for delay.

The respondent law firm had commenced an action alleging wrongful solicitation of clients by the appellants.

The action was dismissed five years later under Rule 48.14.

The Superior Court found that the Master made several legal and palpable and overriding errors in applying the Reid factors, including equating delay with the litigation not advancing at all, lowering the bar for what it means to prosecute an action, and improperly shifting the burden of proving prejudice to the appellants.

The appeal was allowed, the Master's decision was set aside, and the Registrar's dismissal was upheld.

The moving parties (Fibracast Ltd., Anaergia Inc., Anaergia Services, LLC, Benedek Companies, LLC, and Diana Benedek) brought a motion to strike out parties, claims, and pleadings from Waterspin S.r.l.'s amended defence and counterclaim.

The underlying dispute arose from a Distributor Agreement between Fibracast and Waterspin.

Waterspin's counterclaim included broad allegations of enterprise liability against related corporate entities and personal liability against a corporate officer, as well as expansive product liability, misrepresentation, and defamation claims.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding that Waterspin failed to plead sufficient material facts to pierce the corporate veil or establish enterprise liability.

The court also struck out the overly broad product liability claims, declaratory relief, misrepresentation claims, and defamation claims for failing to meet pleading requirements, granting leave to amend only in specific, limited circumstances.

The applicant mother brought a motion to enforce an email direction from a family arbitrator regarding the choice of private schools for the parties' son.

The respondent father argued the email lacked the formality and clarity to be considered a binding arbitral award.

The court found that the email constituted a clear decision within the arbitrator's mandate and qualified as a secondary arbitration award under the Family Law Act.

The court ordered the award to be enforced and awarded costs to the applicant.

The plaintiffs sought costs thrown away after the trial was adjourned due to the defendant's late filing of an expert report and failure to comply with court orders.

The court found that the defendant's dilatory conduct necessitated several motions and case conferences, ultimately delaying the trial.

The court awarded the plaintiffs costs on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $11,983.48, payable within 21 days.

The defendant, Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff contractor's claim for additional compensation related to alleged delays and extra work on a construction project.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to comply with the strict notice provisions of the contract, which barred its claims.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the defendant waived strict compliance with the contract or that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant father brought a motion for equal decision-making and a 2/2/3 shared parenting schedule at his separate residence.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion for sole decision-making and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The court found that the status quo was an equal parenting arrangement under a previous consent order, and that it was in the children's best interests to maintain equal parenting time but in separate residences to reduce conflict.

The father's motion for equal decision-making and a graduated shared parenting schedule was granted.

The mother's cross-motion for exclusive possession was dismissed as unnecessary given the father's undertaking not to return to the home.

The respondent mother, who had supervised access to the parties' seven-year-old child, brought a motion for unsupervised access.

The applicant father, who had sole custody, opposed the motion due to the mother's history of severe mental illness, including hospitalizations for schizoaffective disorder.

While the mother provided reports from her treating professionals indicating stability, the court found the evidence lacked sufficient detail regarding her ability to handle stress and her care plan for the child.

The court dismissed the motion for unsupervised access at this time and ordered the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer to provide an independent assessment.

The defendant insurer brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for insurance coverage after fish were contaminated by oil from an ice-making machine during processing.

The insurer relied on the 'Process Clause' and 'Fault in Preparation' exclusions in the all-risk policy.

The court dismissed the insurer's motion and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, finding that the accidental contamination was a fortuitous event not intended as part of the processing or preparation, and therefore the exclusions did not apply.

The plaintiff insured sought coverage after his tenants caused an explosion and fire while attempting to extract marijuana resin.

The insurer denied coverage based on a marijuana exclusion clause.

The plaintiff argued that a subsequent amendment to the Insurance Act (s. 129.1) protecting innocent insureds should apply.

The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the marijuana exclusion clause applied irrespective of the amendment because it excluded a specific use of the property regardless of the insured's knowledge.

Furthermore, the court held that the amendment could not be applied retrospectively as it would affect the insurer's vested contractual rights.

In a pre-trial motion for an action concerning latent structural defects in a residential property, the plaintiffs moved to strike the self-represented defendant's defence for failing to comply with a Trial Management Report and to exclude a late expert report.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for leave to file the late expert report and to call more than three experts.

The court declined to strike the defence, finding it a disproportionate remedy.

The court granted the defendant leave to file the late expert report under Rule 53.08, concluding that any prejudice to the plaintiffs could be cured by adjusting the trial schedule to allow them to respond.

A case conference was held to schedule summary judgment motions brought by the Toronto Police Services Board and the Eaton Centre defendants.

The plaintiffs opposed the motions and sought a 14 to 17-day hearing to accommodate viva voce cross-examination of experts, arguing for a trial instead.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed schedule as contrary to the purpose of summary judgment, which is meant to be a faster process.

The court scheduled a 6-day hearing for May 2021 and set a timetable for the exchange of materials and cross-examinations.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and incapacity to consent to treatment for an eating disorder.

Following the hearing, the appellant was discharged, regained capacity, and her community treatment order was terminated.

The respondent moved to admit fresh evidence of these developments and argued the appeal was moot.

The Superior Court allowed the fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no live controversy or special circumstances to justify hearing it.

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits, as the Board's decisions were reasonable and free of palpable and overriding error.

Allstate appealed an insurance arbitrator's decision holding it responsible for paying statutory accident benefits to a claimant.

The arbitrator found that Allstate failed to notify Wawanesa of a priority dispute within 90 days of receiving a completed application, and failed to satisfy the test for late notice.

Allstate argued the 90-day period had not commenced because the application was signed by the claimant's aunt, not the claimant.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator correctly interpreted 'signed application' to include signatures by non-claimants, and reasonably concluded that Allstate had sufficient information to commence its priority investigation but failed to act diligently.

The defendants, the Toronto Police Services Board and the Eaton Centre, sought to schedule summary judgment motions to determine their liability in four related civil actions arising from a 2012 shooting at the Toronto Eaton Centre.

The plaintiffs opposed the motions, arguing they were entitled to a full jury trial on all issues.

The court held that there is no absolute right to a civil trial and that a summary judgment process is a legitimate alternative.

Finding that the liability issues would likely turn on legal concepts and expert evidence rather than disputed facts, the court directed that the summary judgment motions be scheduled.

The defendant consented to the dismissal of its third party claim against the engineering firm before a summary judgment motion was heard.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendant argued the third party's costs should be reduced because the lawyers' time was split between two related actions and the summary judgment motion did not proceed.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the third party's methodology of equally dividing costs between the two actions was acceptable and the time spent on factum preparation was reasonable.

The court awarded the third party costs of $33,984.79 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent ex-parte motion for Mareva, Anton Piller, and Certificate of Pending Litigation orders against the defendants, alleging a multi-million dollar investment fraud.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and a significant risk of asset dissipation.

The court granted all three orders, finding the respective tests were met, and scheduled a return date for the parties to report back.

The applicant's application for the return of tools and equipment was dismissed.

The parties were unable to agree on costs, and the respondent sought $8,768.80 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found the respondent was entirely successful and entitled to costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the requested amount to reflect what an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay, fixing costs at $7,000 payable by the applicant.