Alison Wheeler

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge's finding of joint enterprise was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence from independent witnesses that the appellant and the deceased were racing, and concluding the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence.

The accused chased a stolen vehicle at high speeds and struck and killed a police officer who had stepped onto the highway to deploy a spike belt.

The accused was acquitted of criminal negligence causing death but convicted of the included offence of dangerous driving.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the defence closing address was unfair and the jury instructions on causation were misleading.

The accused appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly interrupted the defence closing and erred by instructing the jury to consider his driving throughout the entire chase rather than just at the point of impact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge's caution to the jury adequately addressed the defence closing, the causation instructions were proper, and the dangerous driving charge correctly encompassed the continuous transaction of the chase.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based on a DNA match from a saliva sample he provided to police while on post-release supervision.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by applying the balance of probabilities standard to determine whether he voluntarily consented to providing the sample, asserting that the common law confessions rule standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the common law confessions rule is confined to statements due to reliability concerns, and the balance of probabilities standard remains appropriate for assessing consent to bodily samples.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari.

The trial court had adjourned the matter to two dates: a pre-trial date and a confirmation date.

The matter was not spoken to on the first date, and the appellant argued this resulted in a loss of jurisdiction over the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 803 of the Criminal Code permits remands to more than one date, and the failure to place the matter on the docket on the first date did not result in a loss of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a large-scale commercial fraud.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued that his counsel's waiver of the election caused a miscarriage of justice because the effect of the waiver was not explained to him.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that counsel had explained the effect of the waiver and the appellant had specifically agreed to give up the right to a preliminary hearing.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by finding a breach of trust as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the trial judge's reference to breach of trust related to the nature of the fraudulent enterprise, which called for general deterrence and denunciation.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his two step-daughters and designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on bad character evidence, reasonable doubt, and prior inconsistent statements.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing he was entitled to the benefit of the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions, while pre-dating Lifchus and not perfect, did not result in an unfair trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the long-term offender provisions, the court applied the curative proviso because the expert evidence overwhelmingly established that his risk could not be controlled in the community.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual offences arising from allegations made by his daughter, whose unsworn videotaped police statement was the only inculpatory evidence and who recanted at trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the videotaped statement was properly admitted for its truth under the principled hearsay exception because the complainant was available for cross-examination at trial, the entire interview was videotaped, and the circumstances sufficiently addressed the main hearsay danger.

However, the court found reversible error in the trial judge's treatment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

By treating acceptance of the videotaped statement as necessarily requiring rejection of the defence evidence, the trial judge failed to assess whether the whole of the evidence raised a reasonable doubt under the W. (D.) framework.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder after a shooting outside a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a single identification witness who refused to answer questions during cross-examination by the defence.

The trial judge admitted the witness's evidence and provided an inadequate warning to the jury regarding the lack of cross-examination.

The trial judge also erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement of another witness for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence regarding the police manhunt for the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant's right to make full answer and defence was undermined.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a notice regarding a publication ban under s. 539(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code.

The text of the decision on the appeal from the dismissal of two applications for certiorari in respect of a preliminary inquiry was withheld from publication until the completion of the trial to protect the evidence adduced at the preliminary inquiry.

The appellant was convicted of assault, assault with a weapon, and sexual assault against his wife.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting prior discreditable conduct evidence, reversing the burden of proof, misusing the complainant's statements to her doctor, and failing to consider good character evidence.

He also appealed his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or evidentiary rulings.

While the trial judge erred in stating a penitentiary sentence was mandatory, the Court of Appeal upheld the 30-month sentence as fit given the serious domestic violence context.

The applicant, a young person, sought a stay of a placement decision transferring him to the federal adult system pending his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience weighed against a stay, as the trial judge's concerns for the safety of others in the youth system outweighed any potential prejudice to the applicant.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences arising from a high-speed police chase in a stolen vehicle that crashed into a police cruiser.

The primary issue at trial was the identification of the driver.

The police failed to preserve the stolen vehicle and the damaged police cruiser for defence examination.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's motion for a stay of proceedings based on the lost evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the failure to preserve the evidence breached the appellant's section 7 Charter rights, a stay was not the appropriate remedy due to the defence's lack of diligence and tactical decisions.

The court also dismissed appeals regarding the jury instructions on eyewitness identification, the Crown's closing address, and the sentence imposed.

The appellants appealed an order reviewing their committal for trial on fraud-related charges.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that there was some evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the appellants engaged in deceit.

This included attracting investors who could not afford the loans, directing them to obtain loans for the benefit of a corporation, and withholding knowledge that the corporation could not make the promised loan payments.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle in two respects: first, by holding that the plea to manslaughter fully accounted for the mitigating effect of the appellant's intoxication; and second, by failing to give adequate weight to the appellant's aboriginal status under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court noted the appellant was only a party to the offence, did not administer the fatal blows, and had a restorative plan in place.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 15 months' imprisonment (an effective sentence of five years considering pre-sentence custody) followed by 12 months' probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and using a firearm, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the uncorroborated and inconsistent testimony of three complainants who had opportunities to collude.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the inconsistencies and credibility issues.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing the concurrent sentence for the firearm offence was illegal under s. 85 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, imposing consecutive sentences for the firearm offences, resulting in a total sentence of two years and ten months.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual assault and sexual touching involving his adopted son and nephew.

He argued unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, improper cross-examination by the Crown, inadequate jury instructions, and an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's delay analysis or jury charge, and concluding the cross-examination did not undermine trial fairness.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part; the 4.5-year sentence for offences against the son was upheld, but the consecutive 1-year sentence for the nephew was reduced to 4 months, resulting in a total sentence of 4 years and 10 months.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual and physical assault involving three complainants over a 10-year period.

He appealed his convictions on the sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on the dynamics of abusive relationships, by allowing similar fact evidence, and by giving improper jury instructions on credibility and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was admissible to explain delayed disclosure, the jury instructions on similar fact evidence and credibility were adequate, and the pre-Lifchus charge on reasonable doubt did not mislead the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction, raising five issues regarding the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pre-Lifchus charge on reasonable doubt was adequate and substantially complied with the requirements.

The Court also found no errors in the trial judge's review of evidence on intent, instructions on circumstantial evidence, handling of the deceased's statements, or conclusions regarding the appellant's character evidence.

The respondents, two Canadian citizens who were 18 at the time of the offences, were wanted in the State of Washington for three counts of aggravated first degree murder.

The Minister of Justice ordered their extradition without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while sections 6(1) and 12 of the Charter were not directly violated, extraditing the respondents to face the death penalty without assurances violated their rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the principles of fundamental justice, informed by Canada's abolition of the death penalty, international trends, and concerns over wrongful convictions, require the Minister to seek assurances in all but exceptional cases.

The violation could not be justified under section 1.

The Minister's appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying historical indecent assault and sexual assault charges against a physician based on the loss of a complainant's signed police statement.

The court held that, although it was open to the trial judge to find the statement was lost through unacceptable negligence, the prejudice analysis was flawed because the lost statement was assessed in isolation rather than in light of multiple other available statements and prior sworn testimony.

The court held that the missing statement made the defence task more difficult but did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The loss of the statement also did not amount to abuse of process in the absence of bad faith or prosecutorial misconduct.

The stay was quashed and a new trial ordered.