Alison Wheeler

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction arising from a motel room encounter where the central issue was consent and credibility.

The court held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that a deliberately false explanation could be used as circumstantial evidence of guilt without first requiring extrinsic or independent evidence that the explanation was concocted.

Given the nature of the case, the jury's difficulties, and the risk that the burden of proof was distorted, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a Court of Appeal order setting aside their acquittals for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in excluding a key Crown witness on the basis of taint, because the issue went to weight rather than admissibility.

The Court further held that the subsequently released decision in Carosella did not apply, as there was no finding or evidence of deliberate police failure to create records to avoid production.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, facing a Canadian drug charge, was subsequently indicted in the United States for similar offences carrying a ten-year minimum sentence.

On the morning of his Canadian trial, the Crown stayed the proceedings and the appellant was arrested on an extradition warrant.

The appellant argued that the Crown's earlier offer to stay extradition in exchange for a guilty plea to the Canadian charge constituted egregious misconduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no lack of good faith or abuse of process by the Crown.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to purchase the sexual services of a person under 18.

During the investigation, he made a statement to police without being informed of his right to counsel.

The trial judge excluded the statement from the Crown's case in chief under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

When the accused testified at trial, the Crown sought to use the excluded statement to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.

The trial judge refused, and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the proposed use of the statement for impeachment was not a material change of circumstances that warranted reconsidering the initial ruling that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the jury address by Crown counsel was inflammatory and resulted in an unfair trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the address was repugnant to the role of Crown counsel, but the majority held that the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate to prevent an unfair or partial trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were held in custody for 22 months pending their first trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding that a 4.5-month delay caused by the Crown's unjustified request for an adjournment, combined with late disclosure, rendered the total delay unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the stay of proceedings, holding that the Crown's failure to adequately investigate the grounds for the adjournment and respond to defence counsel's inquiries justified the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was unreasonable.

On a Crown appeal arising from a pre-trial constitutional ruling, the Court held that the reverse onus in s. 394(1)(b) of the Criminal Code violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes framework, the Court accepted that deterring theft of precious metal ore was a pressing and substantial objective and that some burden on the accused was rationally connected to that objective.

However, imposing a legal burden on the accused was not minimally impairing and was not proportionate, because an evidentiary burden would substantially achieve Parliament's purpose with far less intrusion on the presumption of innocence.

The appeal was allowed in part, the stay remained lifted, and the provision was modified to impose only an evidentiary burden.