Alison Wheeler

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing the proceedings should have been stayed as an abuse of process due to the misconduct of a forensic pathologist and the Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario.

The appellant had previously been convicted of murder based on the pathologist's flawed pediatric forensic pathology evidence, a conviction later overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that while the state actors' misconduct was egregious and fell within the residual category of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

Balancing the interests, the court found that a trial on the merits was appropriate given the serious nature of the allegations of chronic physical child abuse and the fact that the systemic issues had since been addressed.

The appellant, a non-citizen, pleaded guilty to obstruction of a peace officer after repeatedly lying to police about her involvement in a fatal hit-and-run committed by her boyfriend.

She received a suspended sentence.

Upon learning that the conviction rendered her inadmissible to Canada, she appealed her sentence, seeking a conditional discharge to avoid deportation.

The summary conviction appeal judge conducted a de novo hearing but dismissed the appeal, finding a discharge contrary to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge properly applied the Supreme Court's framework in Pham regarding collateral immigration consequences and correctly concluded that a discharge would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence.

The young person appellant was arrested for possession of stolen property and gave a videotaped statement to police.

During the interview, the appellant began discussing unrelated and more serious offences, including break and enter and theft of marijuana.

The police continued questioning without re-advising the appellant of his right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that while the initial caution complied with the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the police violated the appellant's section 10(b) Charter rights by failing to re-advise him when his jeopardy increased.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered for the more serious charges.

The trial judge failed to call on the Crown for closing submissions before acquitting the respondent on two charges and convicting on a third.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give the Crown an opportunity to be heard was a fundamental procedural error amounting to an error in law.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals and convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and firearms offences.

At trial, the victim recanted his preliminary inquiry identification of the appellant.

The Crown introduced the preliminary inquiry evidence for its truth and a video of the victim's initial photo line-up identification.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of the video line-up, prior inconsistent statements of a witness, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for the recanting victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the trial judge's cautions regarding the witness's evidence were sufficient.

The appellant appealed the sentences imposed for two charges, one of which was an indictable offence.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing was improperly conducted in the absence of the accused without the required inquiry, and that the sentences were excessive.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varying the sentences to two months consecutive on each charge to account for pre-trial custody, and declined to impose a probation term.

The young person appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as a serious violent offence designation.

In an addendum to a previous endorsement, the Court of Appeal noted the Crown's intention not to proceed on a new trial.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, ordered a new trial, and stayed those charges.

Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the serious violent offence designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, as the remaining conviction for weapons dangerous could not support it.

The young person appealed their conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appellant relied on s. 34(1), but the trial judge only addressed s. 34(2).

The Court of Appeal found an air of reality to the s. 34(1) defence, noting the trial judge made no finding that the appellant intended to cause grievous bodily harm and the findings did not establish disproportionate force.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for forcible confinement arising from a home invasion, arguing that their identity as the perpetrators was not the only reasonable inference from DNA and fingerprint evidence found at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence, including the pristine condition of the mask containing DNA, the location of the fingerprint on the duct tape roll, and the victims' descriptions of the perpetrators.

The court concluded that innocent explanations for the forensic evidence were speculative rather than reasonable.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing claims of self-defence or accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the objective medical evidence provided a sufficient basis for the trial judge to reject the appellant's testimony, and noting no other evidence supported her claims.

The appellant appealed his 1995 conviction for aggravated assault in relation to the death of his infant son, which was based on a guilty plea.

The plea was heavily influenced by the unequivocal opinion of a pathologist that the infant died from non-accidental head injury.

Fresh expert evidence cast considerable doubt on that opinion, offering non-culpable explanations for the autopsy findings.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the conviction unreasonable, set aside the guilty plea, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing a stranger during an altercation.

At trial, the judge only instructed the jury on self-defence under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on sections 34(1) and 37, failing to give a Baxter instruction regarding the exact measure of defensive action, and failing to adequately answer a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the other self-defence provisions and concluding that the omission of the Baxter instruction did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant participated in a home-invasion robbery during which his gun discharged, killing an occupant.

He was convicted of second degree murder under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 229(c), arguing it violated s. 7 of the Charter by not requiring an intent to cause serious bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that subjective foresight of death combined with an unlawful object is a constitutionally sufficient mens rea for murder.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions, Vetrovec warning, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellant appealed his sentence, specifically challenging his designation as a Dangerous Offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the designation and its associated stigma were entirely warranted in this case.

The respondents, a principal and vice-principals, were charged with failing to report forthwith a suspicion of harm to a child under the Child and Family Services Act after a student was sexually assaulted.

The charges were laid more than six months after the incident and were quashed as statute-barred under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Crown appealed, arguing the failure to report was a continuing offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence is a single offence completed when the failure to report forthwith occurs, meaning the charges were laid out of time.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding intoxication, the W. (D.) framework, and the temporal relationship between the actus reus and mens rea under Cooper.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting the trial judge properly focused the jury on the appellant's actual intent and correctly applied the legal frameworks.

The court also upheld the 12-year parole ineligibility period as fit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of perjury for swearing under oath that he was licensed to practice law in the State of New York.

At trial, the Crown relied on a business record from the New York State Unified Court System showing no record of the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence only established he was not registered to practice in state courts, not federal courts in New York.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the charge as framed in the indictment was not established by the evidence and declined the Crown's request to amend the indictment.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant, suffering from a severe delusional disorder, was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after representing himself at trial and refusing to raise a mental disorder defence.

On appeal, the Crown sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence establishing that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer test and was necessary to prevent a wrongful conviction.

The Court rejected the argument that entering an NCRMD verdict after ten years of proceedings constituted an abuse of process, emphasizing the public interest in protecting society and ensuring mentally ill individuals are not improperly labelled as criminals.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a verdict of NCRMD substituted.