Alison R. Mackay

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his co-worker over a period from July 2016 to June 2017 at their workplace.

The complainant testified that the accused touched her breast and crotch area on more than 30 occasions without consent.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming the complainant fabricated them to obtain a layoff or money through the Human Rights Tribunal.

The central issue was credibility and reliability of the parties.

The court found the complainant's evidence consistent and credible despite vigorous cross-examination, and rejected the accused's denials and alternative explanations.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The defendant pleaded guilty to communicating via computer system with a person he believed to be under 16 years of age for the purpose of facilitating sexual touching, contrary to s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant engaged in extensive online grooming of an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl, including explicit sexual conversations and arranging to meet the purported child.

A forensic psychological assessment diagnosed the defendant with pedophilia, non-exclusive, sexually attracted to girls, though he denied such attraction.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a 10-year s. 161 order prohibiting computer and internet use to communicate with minors.

The defendant pleaded guilty to luring a child under the age of 16 for the purpose of committing a sexual assault contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The victim was a 15-year-old girl whose family the defendant had known for years.

The defendant engaged in sexually explicit communications with the victim over Snapchat while heavily intoxicated, requesting nude images and making sexual advances.

The defendant apologized the following morning and subsequently engaged in extensive counselling and therapy.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment followed by three years probation, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year prohibition on using computer systems to communicate with minors and restrictions on internet use.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

Following a search warrant execution, police seized computers and external hard drives containing video files.

The Crown proceeded on four accessible movies depicting young Asian girls in swimsuits and various clothing.

The central issue was whether three of the movies met the statutory definition of child pornography under section 163.1(1)(a)(ii), which requires that the dominant characteristic be the depiction of a sexual organ or anal region of a person under 18 years for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on one movie (as conceded by defence) but acquitted on the three contested movies, finding that while they could possibly meet the definition, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant characteristic was the depiction of sexual organs or anal regions.

The defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol under section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arising from a traffic stop on May 11, 2018.

The sole issue was whether the Crown could rely on the presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code to establish the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The defendant challenged the applicability of this presumption following Parliament's December 18, 2018 amendments to the Criminal Code, which substantially revised the driving offence provisions.

The court held that the presumption of identity continues to apply to prosecutions under the former section 253(1)(b) and that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit (Over 80) contrary to s. 253(1)(b) and impaired driving, arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The trial addressed four key issues: the voluntariness of utterances made to police, identification of the driver, whether breath tests were taken within the required two-hour window, and whether the defendant's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts.

The applicants, charged with drug-related offences, brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at their home.

The Information to Obtain (ITO) relied heavily on tips from two confidential informants.

The applicants argued the ITO lacked reasonable grounds and contained misleading statements.

The court excised certain erroneous statements but found that, based on the totality of the circumstances and the Debot criteria, the remaining information provided sufficient grounds for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant.

The court also held that even if a section 8 Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home and personal computer, arguing that there were no reasonable grounds for the warrant's issuance and that the search violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The defendant raised three grounds: typographical errors in the Information to Obtain, staleness of information due to a two-month delay, and insufficient corroboration of the evidence.

The court found that the errors were inadvertent and correctable, that the delay was not fatal given the nature of digital evidence and forensic retrieval capabilities, and that sufficient corroboration existed.

The motion was dismissed and the warrant was upheld as valid.

The applicants challenged the constitutional validity of step six of the Garofoli procedure, arguing it violates section 7 of the Charter by preventing them from making full answer and defence.

The applicants contended that judicial summaries of redacted information in an Information to Obtain (ITO) do not provide sufficient disclosure to know the case they must meet.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that step six does not breach section 7 rights because it is a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on admissibility, not a trial on guilt or innocence, and the procedure appropriately balances the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the near-absolute privilege of confidential informants.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion seeking to excise from an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant references to the unlawful search of a third party's vehicle in which cocaine was found.

The search had been previously determined to be unlawful by another justice.

The Crown opposed the excision, arguing the defendants lacked standing to challenge a third party's search.

The court held that while the defendants could not challenge the lawfulness of the third party search itself, they could seek excision of evidence obtained through a judicially determined Charter breach to prevent the state from benefiting from illegal police conduct.

The court granted the motion and excised all references to the stop, arrest, and seizure from the third party's vehicle.

The defendant was charged with driving in excess of 80 milligrams.

The information was sworn on January 11, 2016, and the trial was scheduled to commence on November 2, 2017—approximately 22 months later.

The trial was the third scheduled trial date.

The first trial date was not reached.

The second trial date commenced but was abandoned when defence counsel requested a mistrial after an incident with a police witness.

The defendant brought a Charter section 11(b) application alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court found the delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate delay arising from exceptional circumstances.

The charge was stayed.

This is a preliminary inquiry ruling on committal following a shooting incident on November 17, 2016, in which two defendants were jointly charged with multiple offences including attempt murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown sought committal on all charges; the defence conceded committal on most counts but contested the attempt murder charges and one aggravated assault count.

The court applied the well-settled test for committal, requiring assessment of whether sufficient evidence exists to permit a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit both defendants on attempt murder, based on the nature and location of gunshot wounds to vital areas, the number of shots fired, evidence of planning and coordination, and the circumstances of the shooting.

The court also committed both defendants on aggravated assault and various firearm-related offences.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused was feigning to blow and did not provide a suitable sample despite being given seven opportunities.

The accused brought Charter arguments under sections 8 and 9 to exclude evidence of his refusal.

The court found violations of both sections 8 and 9 but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) after balancing the Grant factors.

On the substantive charge, the court found the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample and convicted him as charged.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault following a trial.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 9 to 12 months, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 90 days to be served intermittently, followed by one year of probation with conditions including no contact with the victim, attendance at sexual offender treatment, and a 500-meter exclusion zone.

The court found that while the conditions for a conditional sentence were technically met, the gravity of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence required incarceration.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The charge was laid on December 12, 2015, with trial scheduled for January 15-16, 2017, resulting in a total delay of approximately 12 months and 4 days.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27.

Although the Crown failed to provide timely disclosure of the breath video (a critical piece of evidence in a refuse breath sample case), and defence counsel did not proactively pursue pre-trial procedures, the net delay fell well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

The court found that the defence failed to establish that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, and dismissed the application.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The applicant was charged with two drunk driving offences on May 18, 2015, with trial scheduled for October 24-26, 2016, resulting in a total delay of 17 months and 8 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets an 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice matters.

The court found that while the delay fell below the ceiling, the applicant failed to meet the onus of establishing that the case took markedly longer than reasonable.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, particularly by failing to pursue Crown pre-trials or judicial pre-trials, and that both parties had limited availability for trial dates.