William Ian Corneil Binnie

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision granting a constitutional exemption to Insite, a safe injection facility in Vancouver, from federal drug possession and trafficking laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is valid federal criminal legislation that applies to provincial health facilities, the federal Minister of Health's refusal to grant an exemption under section 56 of the Act violated the claimants' section 7 Charter rights.

The Court found the Minister's decision was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate in its effects, as it denied life-saving medical care to vulnerable individuals without a corresponding benefit to public safety.

The Court ordered the Minister to grant the exemption forthwith.

The Crown appealed from a sentencing decision declining to impose a $4.7 million fine on an offender convicted of customs fraud involving the same amount.

The Supreme Court held that under s. 734(2) of the Criminal Code, a fine may be imposed only where the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the offender is able to pay it.

Past receipt of illegally obtained funds may support an inference of present ability to pay, but it does not shift a formal evidentiary or persuasive burden to the offender, nor does it compel the sentencing judge to draw that inference.

On the record, the sentencing judge made no reviewable error in concluding she was not satisfied that the offender could pay the fine.

The Government of British Columbia and a class of consumers brought separate actions against tobacco companies regarding the health impacts of smoking and 'light' cigarettes.

The tobacco companies issued third-party notices against the Government of Canada, claiming contribution and indemnity based on negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, failure to warn, and statutory liability.

Canada brought motions to strike the third-party claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Canada's appeals and struck all third-party claims.

The Court held that Canada's alleged representations and design decisions regarding low-tar cigarettes were core government policy decisions immune from tort liability.

Furthermore, Canada did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' or 'supplier' under the relevant provincial statutes.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter at trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a planned robbery and relied on this to infer the accused's presence at the crime scene.

The Court of Appeal partially based its decision on R. v. Beaudry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The majority held that Beaudry does not apply to mistakes as to the substance of evidence, which are governed by R. v. Lohrer.

Furthermore, the majority found the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, as she did not rely on the existence of a planned robbery to infer the accused's presence at the scene.

The appellant, a status Indian living part-time off-reserve, earned interest income on term deposits at a caisse populaire located on a reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the income and refused to apply the tax exemption under section 87 of the Indian Act.

Applying the connecting factors approach from Bastien Estate, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the interest income was situated on a reserve because the contract was entered into on a reserve with an institution carrying on business there, and the income was payable there.

The appeal was allowed, and the income was declared exempt from taxation.

The appellant, a status Indian, earned interest income on term deposits at a caisse populaire located on a reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the income as taxable, and the lower courts upheld the assessment on the basis that the caisse generated its revenues in the 'commercial mainstream' off the reserve.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the connecting factors approach from Williams.

The Court held that the location of the debtor, the place of payment, the residence of the payee, and the source of the invested capital all pointed to the reserve.

The fact that the financial institution generated its revenues in the commercial mainstream was legally irrelevant to the location of the appellant's interest income.

The income was therefore exempt from taxation under section 87 of the Indian Act.

The claimants, who were members of a Métis settlement in Alberta, registered as status Indians to obtain medical benefits.

Consequently, their membership in the Métis settlement was revoked pursuant to the Metis Settlements Act, which precludes status Indians from settlement membership.

The claimants challenged their exclusion under ss. 15, 2(d), and 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Metis Settlements Act is a genuinely ameliorative program protected by s. 15(2) of the Charter, as its object is to enhance and preserve Métis identity, culture, and self-governance through a dedicated land base.

The exclusion of status Indians serves this object.

The Court also dismissed the s. 2(d) and s. 7 claims, concluding the legislation is constitutional.

The tax debtor owed tax to the federal government.

The Minister of National Revenue issued requirements to pay to the appellant bank, seeking to intercept funds from cheques drawn by the tax debtor on his trust account and deposited into a joint account held by the tax debtor and a third party.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was not liable to make a payment to the tax debtor personally.

When the bank received the cheques for deposit into the joint account, it acted as a collecting bank for the joint account holders, not as an agent for the payee.

Therefore, the requirements to pay under s. 224(1) of the Income Tax Act were not triggered.

The parties separated and consented to an accounting and valuation of their assets under the Manitoba Family Property Act.

Before the valuation, the husband made an assignment in bankruptcy and was subsequently discharged.

The valuation later confirmed the wife was entitled to an equalization payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the equalization claim was a debt provable in bankruptcy and that the husband was released from the claim upon his discharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving.

The Crown and the appellant entered into a plea agreement for a lesser charge of careless driving.

However, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Criminal Justice Division subsequently repudiated the agreement, concluding it was contrary to the interests of justice.

The appellant alleged this repudiation breached her s. 7 Charter rights as an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repudiation of a plea agreement is an act of prosecutorial discretion, reviewable only for abuse of process.

Finding no evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or trial unfairness, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The applicant brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence, consisting of 11 publications, to be added to its application for leave to appeal.

The underlying case involved the failure to immediately disclose a Mary Carter-type settlement agreement.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that affidavit evidence is generally not helpful in determining whether a legal issue is of public importance under section 43 of the Supreme Court Act.

The Court found that the proposed materials merely illustrated the straightforward nature of the legal issues and provided no additional assistance to the leave panel.

The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting his 12-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's pre-trial statements and that Crown counsel's conduct rendered the trial unfair.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider a miscarriage of justice not raised in the Notice of Appeal, the trial's shortcomings did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's reasons did not show improper use of statements, and Crown counsel's questions did not cross the threshold of impermissible leading questions.

The appellants, the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, appealed a decision regarding the enforcement of sponsorship debts against eight sponsors whose relatives received social assistance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government has a duty to collect the full sponsorship debt, it retains a limited discretion to defer enforcement based on a sponsor's circumstances.

In exercising this discretion, the government owes a minimal duty of procedural fairness to notify the sponsor, allow them to explain their circumstances, consider those circumstances, and notify them of the decision.

The Court found that Ontario's debt collection policy did not improperly fetter its discretion and met the requirements of procedural fairness.

The accused was convicted of robbery based entirely on DNA evidence found on a Halloween mask left near the scene.

At trial, the investigating officer improperly gave bad character evidence about the accused, which the trial judge did not address in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the Crown had not proven the error was harmless.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge's express statement that he relied 'entirely' on the DNA evidence meant the improper character evidence played no part in the convictions, making its admission a harmless error.

The respondent and his partner engaged in consensual erotic asphyxiation.

The partner consented in advance to being choked into unconsciousness and to the sexual activity that would occur while she was unconscious.

The trial judge convicted the respondent of sexual assault, finding that a person cannot legally consent to sexual activity while unconscious.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the Criminal Code requires a conscious, operating mind throughout the sexual activity to provide valid consent, and advance consent to unconscious sexual activity is not recognized in law.

Masterpiece Inc. and Alavida Lifestyles Inc. both operate in the retirement residence industry.

Masterpiece Inc. used several unregistered trade-marks containing the word 'Masterpiece' in Alberta prior to Alavida applying to register 'Masterpiece Living' as a proposed trade-mark in Ontario.

Masterpiece Inc. applied to expunge Alavida's registration on the basis of confusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered the expungement of Alavida's trade-mark, holding that the location of use is irrelevant to the confusion analysis, that a proposed mark must be assessed based on all potential uses under the registration rather than actual use, and that the high cost of the services does not negate the likelihood of initial confusion.

The Court also cautioned against the unnecessary use of expert evidence in trade-mark confusion cases.

The appellant advanced funds to a corporation controlled by a fraudster.

The fraudster used the funds to purchase shares, which he and his spouse pledged to the respondent bank in exchange for an increased credit limit.

The appellant obtained a tracing order for the fraudulently obtained funds, excluding assets in the hands of bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank acquired a valid security interest under the Personal Property Security Act and qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, thereby defeating the appellant's equitable claim to the proceeds of the shares.

The Information Commissioner of Canada sought judicial review of refusals to disclose records located in the offices of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Transport, as well as the Prime Minister's agenda held by the RCMP and PCO.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Ministers' offices are not 'government institutions' under the Access to Information Act.

The Court established a two-part test to determine if records in a Minister's office are 'under the control' of a government institution: whether the record relates to a departmental matter, and whether the institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy.

Applying this test, the requested records were not under the control of the respective government institutions.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister is not an 'officer' of a government institution under the Privacy Act, meaning his agenda is exempt from disclosure as personal information.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant government appealed a decision upholding the certification of a class action brought by elderly residents of long-term care facilities.

The residents alleged the government artificially inflated accommodation charges to subsidize medical expenses, claiming breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and a section 15 Charter violation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, striking the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and bad faith, finding that the government did not owe a fiduciary duty or a private duty of care to the residents in these circumstances.

However, the Court allowed the unjust enrichment and Charter claims to proceed to trial, and declined to decertify the class action.