William B. Horkins

The Crown applied pursuant to section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order to forfeit a collection of 16 shotguns seized by Toronto Police Service and for an ancillary general weapons prohibition order.

The seizure arose from a domestic dispute involving the respondent's wife reporting concerns about his mental state and suicide risk after discovering escort service numbers on his phone.

The respondent was apprehended under the Mental Health Act, assessed, and released.

At the hearing, the respondent provided evidence of his responsible gun ownership, compliance with all regulatory requirements, and mental fitness.

The court found that the Crown had not established on a balance of probabilities that it was "not desirable" in the interests of safety for the respondent to possess the firearms and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood-alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The central issue was whether a valid approved instrument demand was made by the arresting officer.

The officer inadvertently read the wrong breath demand—repeating the approved screening device demand instead of making the approved instrument demand.

Although the accused pointed out the error and the officer provided a loose explanation about going to the police station for a numerical reading, the court found this explanation insufficient to constitute a valid approved instrument demand.

The court applied strict compliance principles and dismissed the charge due to the inadmissibility of the Certificate of Analysis.

The accused brought a section 24(2) application to exclude breath testing evidence following a finding that the police violated his Charter right to counsel of choice.

The police followed standard institutional procedures that systematically channeled the accused to consult with on-call duty counsel rather than facilitating access to private counsel of choice as requested.

The court applied the Grant framework, balancing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court found that the systemic nature of the violation, the importance of the right to counsel of choice, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice outweighed society's interest in prosecuting the drinking and driving charge.

The breath test evidence was excluded and the charge dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 mg/100 mL of blood alcohol.

During a RIDE spot-check, the accused was directed to a secondary investigation area without explanation, and subsequently arrested after failing a screening test.

The accused sought to contact his counsel of choice but was ultimately directed to duty counsel instead.

The court found two Charter breaches: (1) a violation of section 10(a) for failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention when directed to the secondary area, and (2) a violation of section 10(b) for failure to adequately facilitate access to counsel of choice.

The court found that the Toronto Police Service's institutional practice of controlling access to counsel and channeling accused persons to duty counsel, combined with inadequate resources and efforts to locate private counsel, resulted in the accused being denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice from counsel of his choice.

A peace officer with the Toronto Police Service applied for a General Warrant under section 487.01 of the Criminal Code to compel the Ministry of Health to release information about a missing person who had been absent for approximately six months.

The missing person suffered from significant mental health issues and the applicant sought the warrant to assist the family in locating the individual.

The court denied the application, finding that the statutory preconditions for issuing a General Warrant were not satisfied.

Specifically, the application failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal offence had been or would be committed, and did not demonstrate that the warrant would produce information concerning an offence.

The court also noted that civil processes under provincial legislation may have been available alternatives.

The accused was convicted of child luring after engaging in online chat and text message exchanges with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The exchanges became progressively sexual and were clearly leading towards an intended live sexual encounter.

The Crown sought a 15-month jail sentence, while the accused sought a conditional sentence or shorter imprisonment.

The court imposed a 12-month sentence of imprisonment followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA Data-Banking Order, a SOIRA Order, and a prohibition order under section 161 for five years.

The accused pleaded guilty to eight counts of fraud, one count of possession of proceeds of crime, and one count of assault.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence in the upper range of 4 to 6 years.

The court found the accused to be an incorrigible serial con-artist with an extensive criminal history of similar fraudulent conduct.

The frauds involved a constellation of interrelated schemes totaling over one million dollars in losses, including breach of trust frauds against two women and various commercial frauds.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years imprisonment, with concurrent sentences on individual counts.

The accused was charged with weapons offences related to possession of an illegal handgun.

He brought an application to exclude the gun from evidence, alleging that police conduct violated his Charter rights.

The officer stopped the accused based on suspicion that he might be one of two Fountain brothers, one of whom might be wanted.

After clarifying the accused's identity and confirming no warrants existed, the officer continued to detain the accused to complete a field investigative report (FIR card).

When a third party suddenly interjected, the accused's demeanor changed and he adopted a blading stance.

The officer, concerned for safety, conducted a pat-down search and discovered the gun.

The court found an unlawful detention during the FIR process but held that the pat-down search was lawful as it was conducted in response to exigent circumstances triggered by the accused's sudden threatening posture.

The gun was admitted into evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

In a sexual assault prosecution, the Crown sought to present its case through the complainant's earlier-recorded statements (911 calls and a police interview) because the complainant was absent from trial and unwilling to attend.

The court considered whether these hearsay statements could be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, which requires both necessity and reliability.

While the court found the necessity criterion marginally satisfied based on reasonable diligent efforts to locate the complainant, it rejected the application on reliability grounds.

The court found that the circumstances surrounding the statements, combined with the absence of any opportunity for cross-examination, created identifiable dangers that were not sufficiently overcome by confirmatory evidence.

The court emphasized that the live issues of consent and use of force could be significantly affected by cross-examination, and that the evidence could not be deemed inherently trustworthy.