William B. Horkins

This criminal trial concerned a historical allegation of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The complainant alleged that the accused, her cousin, assaulted her when she was 5 and he was 15, disclosing the event 18 years later.

The case relied heavily on the conflicting testimonies of the complainant and the accused, with no corroborating physical or forensic evidence.

Applying the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, the court found that while the complainant's evidence was persuasive, and the accused's denial was lacking in some respects, collective concerns regarding the delayed disclosure, the complainant's evolving memory, and the absence of corroboration prevented the Crown from proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 24 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The primary source of delay was an 11-month period for forensic analysis of seized electronic devices.

The court found that while some defence delay existed, the Crown failed to demonstrate that the remaining delay was justified by "particular complexity" or that a concrete plan was implemented to minimize the delay.

Consequently, the prosecution was stayed.

The accused applied for costs against the Crown following a trial where he was convicted of theft and assault but acquitted of sexual assault.

The application stemmed from the Crown's delayed and initially redacted disclosure of a complainant's 911 call, which necessitated a formal disclosure application and caused a lengthy trial adjournment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the disclosure failures were systemic and inadvertent, they did not constitute a "marked and unacceptable departure from the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution" or result in "extreme hardship" to the accused, which are the high thresholds required for an award of costs against the Crown in criminal matters.

The accused brought an application for directions regarding the admissibility of digital communications exchanged with the complainant during their relationship.

The communications were described as evidencing a mutual understanding of shared sexual preferences.

The court was asked to determine whether these materials constituted private records subject to screening provisions and whether they constituted extrinsic sexual activity under section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that pre-June 16 communications were presumptively private records subject to screening and also constituted extrinsic sexual activity requiring leave.

June 16 communications were found to form part of the subject matter of the charge but were also private records requiring screening.

The court deferred the requirement for a pre-trial application, allowing the accused to seek leave during trial when evidence triggered the necessity to adduce the materials.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time contrary to section 11(b).

The accused was charged with impaired driving on May 8, 2019, and was scheduled for trial on October 3-4, 2019, resulting in approximately 17 months of delay.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court found that although the delay was concerning and disappointing, it did not constitute constitutionally intolerable delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

A sexual assault trial involving allegations of non-consensual sexual activity.

The Crown alleged that the accused engaged in sexual intercourse without the complainant's subjective consent.

The case hinged on whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity and, alternatively, whether the accused held an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The trial was divided into three phases: consensual foreplay on a couch, bedroom intercourse, and a second act of intercourse.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's lack of subjective consent and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and related allegations in June 2017, with trial scheduled for March 2019, resulting in a gross delay of 21.5 months.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging the right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

After deducting 1.5 months of defence delay, the net delay was 19.5 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The court found that systemic disclosure failures, particularly the late disclosure of a key witness's statement on the morning of trial, could not be justified as exceptional circumstances.

The charges were stayed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges were laid in December 2016 with trial set for December 2018, resulting in a total delay of 24 months.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Jordan, the court calculated net delay of 19 months after deducting five months of defence delay, exceeding the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The primary cause of delay was the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure of email communications.

Although the Crown made commendable efforts to mitigate the delay once the disclosure deficiency became apparent, the Jordan framework provided no relief.

The application for a stay was granted.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an alleged incident at a co-worker's birthday celebration.

The complainant had significant memory gaps due to intoxication and alleged she was sexually assaulted while unconscious or incapable of consenting.

The accused denied the allegations, providing a substantially different account of events.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework and found that while the complainant's evidence regarding the kissing incident was credible, the accused's alternative account was plausible and could not be rejected based on the evidence presented.

The Crown failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol level contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused claimed he was in his parked car in a private lot behind his apartment building to smoke, having moved it only to access a Wi-Fi signal.

He fell asleep in the driver's seat with the engine running.

The court found that the accused occupied the driver's seat, triggering a rebuttable presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a).

The accused failed to rebut this presumption on a balance of probabilities.

The court also found that even absent the presumption, a real risk of danger existed given the circumstances.

The breath tests were taken approximately 1.5 hours after the alleged offence, raising concerns about compliance with the "as soon as practicable" requirement, but the court found the delay was reasonable in all the circumstances.

The accused was convicted.

The accused applied under section 523(2)(b) of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order following the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and kidnapping arising from a violent group beating.

The Crown's case relied on identification evidence including a post-arrest statement, officer identification from surveillance video, and dock identification.

The court found that the preliminary hearing evidence revealed significant admissibility challenges to the Crown's key identification evidence, particularly regarding the voluntariness of the statement and the reliability of the officer's identification.

Although the objective gravity of the offence remained extreme, the apparent strength of the Crown's case was substantially diminished.

The court granted the application and ordered the accused's release on strict conditions, finding a material change in circumstances sufficient to reconsider the necessity of detention on the tertiary ground.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering into a dwelling and failing to comply with a Probation Order.

The court conducted a sentencing circle, an innovative restorative justice process involving the accused, his parents, Aboriginal Legal Services representatives, and counsel.

The court considered the serious nature of residential break and enters, the accused's Aboriginal background documented in a Gladue Report, his drug addiction, and his significant rehabilitative potential.

Despite the gravity of the offence and the accused's prior similar conviction six weeks earlier, the court imposed a suspended sentence with probation, crediting pre-trial custody at 1.5 multiplier as equivalent to an 8-month sentence.

The accused was charged with assault and sexual assault.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault and proceeded to trial on the sexual assault charge.

The complainant testified that the accused persistently coerced her into sexual intercourse despite her repeated refusals.

The court found that the complainant was a credible witness and that her evidence established that she never consented to the sexual act.

The court rejected the defence argument that the complainant's post-intercourse conduct was inconsistent with non-consent, finding that her disappointment and anger were consistent with having been forced into unwanted sexual activity.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The applicant, charged with Assault Causing Bodily Harm arising from an incident at a nightclub where the complainant allegedly fell down stairs, sought a Conditional Stay of prosecution on the basis that he required state-funded defence counsel to receive a fair trial.

The applicant had been denied Legal Aid and exhausted all appeals.

The court applied the Rowbotham test, examining whether the accused had exhausted legal aid efforts, lacked personal financial resources, and whether his right to a fair trial would be infringed without counsel.

The court found that the case presented significant complexity involving eyewitness identification and potential self-defence issues, and that the accused's ability to defend himself without counsel was insufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The court granted the Conditional Stay pending provision of state-funded counsel.

The accused was convicted of two counts of cruelty to animals under sections 446(1) and 445.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following a protracted trial.

The accused maintained approximately 107 cats in severely neglected conditions, resulting in widespread disease, suffering, and the eventual euthanization of all but one animal.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of four to six months imprisonment followed by three years probation, a DNA data banking order, and a lifetime prohibition on pet ownership.

The accused sought a non-custodial disposition.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, 100 hours of community service, and a restriction to no more than two domestic animals at any time, rejecting both custodial sentencing and the lifetime pet prohibition.

The accused, a 52-year-old operations manager at a brokerage firm earning approximately $70,000 annually, systematically stole approximately $175,000 from her employer over approximately 18 months by diverting deposit funds to her personal bank account.

The theft was motivated by financial and personal difficulties arising from matrimonial issues, leaving her solely responsible for supporting her two adult children pursuing post-secondary education.

The accused was of otherwise good character with a single prior conviction for impaired driving from 15 years prior.

She pleaded guilty and confessed to her criminal activity.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12 to 15 months and full restitution.

The accused sought a conditional sentence order to be served in the community.

The court rejected the conditional sentence option, finding that the seriousness of the breach of trust, the amount stolen, the sophistication of the scheme, and the lack of restitution necessitated a custodial sentence to satisfy the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was charged with five sexual assault offences involving three separate complainants, with allegations spanning from 2002 to 2003.

The trial proceeded on the basis of the complainants' evidence alone, with no corroborating evidence.

The court found that each complainant engaged in significant inconsistencies between their media interviews, police statements, and trial testimony.

Each complainant also deliberately withheld material information from police and Crown counsel, including post-assault contact with the accused that contradicted their claims of trauma and fear.

The court concluded that the complainants' credibility and reliability were severely compromised by their deceptive conduct, late disclosures, and contradictory evidence.

The court found that the evidence failed to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The accused was charged with cruelty to animals under sections 445.1(1)(a) and 446(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At the time of police intervention on April 24, 2011, the accused had at least 107 cats living in her home in filthy, disease-ridden conditions.

The cats suffered from malnutrition, dehydration, upper respiratory infections, urine and fecal scalding, alopecia, periodontal disease, and genetic defects from inbreeding.

The court found that the accused's conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

The mens rea of the offences was established on a modified objective test: the Crown proved that pain, suffering, and injury were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the accused's failure to provide adequate food, water, shelter, and care.

The accused's "colour of right" defence failed as no reasonable person could have believed the conditions were acceptable.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.

The accused was found passed out in a parked car with the engine running, lights on, seatbelt fastened, and an open beer in hand.

Police attended and arrested him.

The Crown charged him with impaired care and control and over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired care and control based on the totality of circumstances, including his coma-like state, strong smell of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and the vehicle's operational status.

However, the court dismissed the over 80 charge due to unreasonable delays in breath testing.

The court found a 17-minute delay in providing rights to counsel breached the Charter, but admitted the breath test evidence under section 24(2).

The court also found an unexplained 18-minute delay at the police station meant the tests were not taken "as soon as practicable," fatally undermining the presumption relating test results to the time of the alleged offence.

The accused was charged with refusing a roadside screening demand after being pulled over for traffic violations.

The Crown alleged the accused unequivocally refused to provide a breath sample.

The court found that while the accused was legally obliged to comply with the demand, she was operating under a mistaken understanding of her legal rights and was confused rather than defiant.

The accused repeatedly requested access to counsel, which was not facilitated.

The court found a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the refusal was complete and unequivocal, particularly given the accused's confusion, her requests for legal advice, and the availability of counsel that could have clarified her obligations.

The charge was dismissed.