Wendy M. Matheson

The applicant union sought judicial review of Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions finding that it had abandoned its bargaining rights for certain construction employees, thereby allowing a rival union's certification application to proceed.

The applicant argued the Board unreasonably departed from precedent by failing to focus on the union's intention to abandon its rights and by ignoring its 2021 negotiating efforts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board reasonably applied established principles, properly assessed the objective evidence of the applicant's prolonged inactivity, and correctly concluded that the bargaining rights had been abandoned by 2020 and could not be revived by subsequent conduct.

The applicant sought judicial review of an HRTO interim decision that disqualified his counsel, a former Associate Chair of the HRTO.

The HRTO adjudicator had raised concerns about conflict of interest and reasonable apprehension of bias because the applicant's file was opened during the counsel's tenure as Associate Chair, and the counsel had been involved in the adjudicator's hiring process.

The Divisional Court allowed the application for judicial review, finding the interim decision unreasonable.

The court held that the adjudicator improperly conflated conflict of interest with bias, and that the appropriate remedy for a bias concern was for the adjudicator to recuse herself, not to deprive the applicant of his counsel of choice.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of an Ontario Civilian Police Commission decision upholding a finding of discreditable conduct and a penalty of 80 hours' forfeited pay.

The misconduct stemmed from a $50 anonymous donation the applicant made to the 'Freedom Convoy' protests while on unpaid leave.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable for the Commission to conclude the protests were illegal and that the limitation on the applicant's freedom of expression was proportionate to the statutory objectives of maintaining effective policing.

The court also upheld the Commission's refusal to hear a new abuse of process argument on appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application at a summary hearing.

The applicant alleged he was terminated due to a perceived disability after being exposed to COVID-19.

The Tribunal found he was terminated for violating workplace policies by failing to inform his spouse, a co-worker, of his exposure.

The Divisional Court held the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and procedurally fair, noting that a full merits hearing is not an absolute right and the Tribunal reasonably relied on the termination letter.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of the lower court.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, ordered the appeal to be expedited, and reserved the issue of costs to the panel deciding the appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Parghi J. dated October 15, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division upholding findings of professional misconduct, a five-month suspension, and costs.

The misconduct related to his representation of a vulnerable family law client, filing an affidavit containing personal attacks on a judge, and maintaining a website about a dismissed Canadian Judicial Council complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the disciplinary actions reflected a proportionate balancing of the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and rejecting his s. 15(1) Charter and procedural arguments.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision upholding the Registrar's refusal to register him as a motor vehicle salesperson due to past misconduct involving sexually explicit and inappropriate messages sent to a former co-worker and a customer.

On appeal, the appellant argued procedural unfairness, alleging ineffective assistance by his paralegal and improper admission of hearsay evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for ineffective assistance of counsel and that the tribunal's admission of hearsay evidence, including the appellant's own admissions against interest, did not render the hearing unfair.

The moving parties sought an extension of time and leave to appeal two decisions of Stevenson J. The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, awarding costs of $4,350 to the responding party.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a prior decision of the Superior Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs fixed at $5,000 to the responding party.

The court noted it considered the responding party's original factum and compendium but not the subsequently provided amended versions.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a lower court decision dated October 21, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the total amount of $10,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dated September 18, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs fixed at $3,660 to the responding party.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing his complaint that the Toronto Police Association breached its duty of fair representation.

The applicant had been terminated following a refusal to sign a last chance agreement related to his alcohol use disorder.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision reasonable, noting the Association had supported the applicant for four years and reasonably concluded the employer's settlement offer was appropriate.

The court also dismissed allegations of bias and human rights violations.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to compel the production of law firm trust ledgers and unredacted bank statements from the respondents.

The underlying action involves allegations of a massive international civil fraud.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that the law firm trust ledgers were presumptively privileged and that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption.

The Court also agreed that the 'future crimes and fraud' exception to solicitor-client privilege did not apply to civil fraud.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred in presuming privilege over redacted entries in non-law firm bank statements without requiring the respondents to prove the privilege claim.

The issue of the unredacted bank statements was remitted to the motion judge.

The appellant, an operator of diagnostic imaging clinics, appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board upholding the Minister's requirement to reimburse over $1.1 million in facility fees.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by classifying the Ministry's sole witness as a 'litigant's employee with expertise' without giving the appellant prior notice or an opportunity to make submissions and call reply evidence.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a new hearing.

The applicant, a migrant farm worker, sought judicial review of decisions by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying his request for an extension of time to appeal a 2008 decision denying his WSIB claim.

The applicant argued the tribunal overlooked his diligence, miscalculated the delay, and failed to consider his vulnerability as a migrant worker.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the tribunal's decisions were reasonable, properly applied a holistic approach to the delay, and adequately considered the applicant's circumstances.

The Law Society of Ontario sought judicial review of a decision by the Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal, which had set aside a Hearing Division decision denying the respondent's application for licensing.

The respondent, a former lawyer whose licence was revoked following misappropriation and criminal fraud convictions, applied for reinstatement but the Hearing Division found he failed to prove good character.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the Appeal Division's decision unreasonable because it failed to apply the appellate standard of review, impermissibly reweighed evidence, and mischaracterized the Hearing Division's findings.

The Hearing Division's decision denying the licence was restored.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decisions that dismissed his discrimination application at a summary hearing.

The HRTO had found that most of his allegations were out of time and did not constitute a 'series of incidents' under the Human Rights Code, and that he had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review, finding that the HRTO misapplied the case law regarding a series of incidents and denied the applicant procedural fairness by restricting his submissions on available evidence.

The matter was remitted to the HRTO for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The applicant, a foreign-trained dentist, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing his discrimination claim against the National Dental Examining Board of Canada for being filed outside the one-year limitation period.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision unreasonable because it mistakenly calculated the applicant's delay in filing as eight months instead of five days, which improperly grounded its finding that the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The HRTO also unreasonably conflated the limitation periods for two separate claims of discrimination.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter remitted to the HRTO.