Susan M. Chapman

The appellant, a former foreign exchange trader, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for fraud and breach of contract, and dismissing his counterclaim for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant had executed multiple unauthorized foreign exchange trades resulting in approximately $5.4 million in losses, which he concealed using fictitious credits.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, applied the wrong standard of proof for fraud, and erred in finding the employer could rely on his misrepresentations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the correct standard of proof applied, and that the employer's alleged carelessness was not a defence to fraud.

The plaintiff brought an action in Ontario against Ontario and non-Ontario defendants, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of mining opportunities in Peru.

The non-Ontario defendants brought a motion to stay or dismiss the action on jurisdictional and forum non conveniens grounds, and challenged the validity of service ex juris.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding a real and substantial connection to Ontario, that Ontario was the appropriate forum, and that service ex juris was valid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, clarifying that the real and substantial connection test is the exclusive framework for determining assumed jurisdiction over out-of-province defendants, subsuming remedy-specific tests.

The appellant sued the respondent bottled water supplier for psychiatric injury after finding dead flies in an unopened replacement bottle of water.

The trial judge awarded damages, but the Court of Appeal overturned the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the respondent owed a duty of care and breached it, the damage was too remote.

The Court established that for psychiatric injury to be compensable in negligence, it must be reasonably foreseeable that a person of ordinary fortitude would suffer serious injury from the breach.

The appellants brought a motion to review an order requiring them to post security for costs.

They argued the motion judge misapprehended evidence regarding the corporate appellant's indebtedness and asset valuation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motion judge's reliance on the public record and financial statements over unconfirmed assertions and a late-produced tax bill.

The appellants were ordered to post security for costs within thirty days.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action.

The trial judge found that the obstetrician negligently failed to obtain informed consent for a mid-forceps delivery, which caused the infant's brachial plexus injury and brain damage.

However, the trial judge concluded that even with proper disclosure, the doctor would have recommended the forceps delivery and the mother would have consented.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings on causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding error.

The appellant obstetrician prescribed the fertility drug Clomid to the respondent mother, who subsequently gave birth prematurely to twin girls with severe disabilities.

The jury found the appellant negligent for failing to properly inform the mother of the risks of twinning and premature birth associated with Clomid, and that she would not have taken the drug if properly informed.

The trial judge held that the twins had a valid cause of action against the appellant and that the parents could recover future care costs for the twins beyond the age of 18.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the jury's verdict on causation and the parents' entitlement to future care costs.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the twins' claims, holding that the appellant owed no duty of care to the unborn children when prescribing a fertility drug to the mother, as his duty was solely to provide the mother with sufficient information to make an informed choice.

The appellant hospital appealed a motion judge's order refusing to approve a 1998 infant settlement and granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the claim for damages.

The plaintiff sought the amendment based on new expert evidence indicating her life expectancy had increased by 30 to 35 years since the settlement was reached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly focused on the best interests of the child under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and reasonably relied on the uncontradicted expert evidence regarding life expectancy.

The appellants were plaintiffs in a proposed class action arising from a factory fire.

The motion judge certified the class action but limited the class to those evacuated, effectively excluding the appellants.

The appellants appealed to the Divisional Court as of right under s. 30(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, arguing the order was a refusal to certify as to them.

The Divisional Court held that because the order certified a proceeding, an appeal lies only with leave under s. 30(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that an order redefining a class is still a certification order, and the statutory appeal routes do not rely on the final/interlocutory distinction.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding no negligence by the respondent radiologist and ultrasound technician regarding a fetal ultrasound that failed to detect a congenital abnormality.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by reserving on a motion to strike the jury, failing to instruct the jury on the 'wrongful life' claim, and excluding OHIP billing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to reserve on the jury motion, holding that the jury's finding of no negligence rendered the legal distinctions between wrongful birth and wrongful life moot, and agreeing that the OHIP billing evidence was irrelevant.

The appellant physician engaged in a sexual relationship with a patient starting in 1992 while continuing to treat her.

On January 1, 1994, a zero tolerance and mandatory revocation regime for sexual abuse of patients came into force under the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The appellant continued the sexual and professional relationship until 1998.

The Discipline Committee found him guilty of sexual abuse and revoked his certificate of registration.

The appellant appealed, arguing that by 1994 their relationship was 'spousal' and exempt from the regime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Discipline Committee reasonably concluded the regime applied because there was a concurrent sexual and physician-patient relationship, and there is no categorical 'spousal exemption' under the legislation.

The appellants, represented by pro bono counsel, were successful on appeal and sought costs.

The respondents opposed, arguing that pro bono counsel should not receive costs.

The Court of Appeal held that there is no prohibition on awarding costs in favour of parties represented by pro bono counsel in private actions.

The Court recognized 'facilitating access to justice' as a fifth purpose of costs awards.

Costs of $4,500 were awarded to the appellants.

The appellant sued her former family law lawyer for negligence, alleging he failed to adequately protect her equalization claim against her husband, who was a known flight risk.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while the lawyer breached the standard of care in some respects, his recommendation to settle was not an 'egregious error' and his delays did not cause the appellant's loss.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by applying the 'egregious error' test instead of the standard of reasonableness, and by using a segmented time grid analysis that failed to assess the lawyer's overall failure to advance the case to trial.

The plaintiff sued a doctor and an assessment company for bad faith, intentional interference with economic relations, and negligence arising from an independent medical examination report that led to the termination of her statutory accident benefits.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the report was protected by witness immunity and absolute privilege, and that they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the duty of care in the context of the statutory scheme and whether immunity applied to allegations of intentional injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the plaintiff's claims raised important policy issues and genuine issues of fact that required a full trial.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including forcible confinement, assault, and criminal harassment against a former girlfriend, and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give him credit for 18 months spent on bail under strict house arrest conditions.

The Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions is a relevant mitigating factor that must be considered, and the failure to do so is an error in principle.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 16 months' imprisonment.

The Crown brought an application under section 680 of the Criminal Code seeking a review of an order granting judicial interim release to the respondent pending his retrial for murder.

The respondent had been in custody since 1990 and was granted bail on strict terms following a successful appeal that ordered a new trial.

The Chief Justice found that the Crown's motion had arguable merit given the unique combination of factors and directed that a panel of the Court of Appeal review the bail decision.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction.

The trial judge had rejected his defence under section 43 of the Criminal Code after finding he dangled a child's legs out of a 9th-floor window.

The Court of Appeal found no inconsistent credibility findings and held that such conduct is clearly unreasonable and cannot amount to a section 43 defence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation.

The predicate offences occurred before the 1997 Criminal Code amendments introducing the Long Term Offender (LTO) designation.

At the sentencing hearing, the parties and the trial judge proceeded on the basis that the LTO designation did not apply as a matter of law.

The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender without properly considering the LTO criteria.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as it is possible to meet the criteria for both designations, and the LTO criteria cannot be eliminated simply because the dangerous offender criteria are met.

The appeal was allowed, the dangerous offender designation was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding an impaired driving charge.

At trial, the defence expressly conceded there were no Charter issues and did not object to the admissibility of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant attempted to argue that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, affecting the presumption in s. 258(1)(c).

The Court of Appeal held that this Charter argument was not open to the defence given their position at trial, and the non-Charter argument was answered by the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Rilling.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and his conviction appeal was previously dismissed.

He also filed an inmate notice of appeal against his sentence.

The Court of Appeal quashed the sentence appeal, noting that the sentence for first degree murder is fixed by law and therefore no appeal lies under section 675(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of attempted murder and the sentence imposed for a manslaughter conviction arising from a barroom shooting.

The Court of Appeal allowed the acquittal appeal, finding the trial judge erred by leaving self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code to the jury when there was no air of reality to the claim that the intervening bystanders were committing an unlawful assault.

The trial judge also erred by failing to instruct the jury on s. 27, which permits bystanders to use force to prevent an offence.

A new trial was ordered for the attempted murder charge.

The sentence appeals by both the Crown and the accused were dismissed.