Susan M. Chapman

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation.

The predicate offences occurred before the 1997 Criminal Code amendments introducing the Long Term Offender (LTO) designation.

At the sentencing hearing, the parties and the trial judge proceeded on the basis that the LTO designation did not apply as a matter of law.

The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender without properly considering the LTO criteria.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as it is possible to meet the criteria for both designations, and the LTO criteria cannot be eliminated simply because the dangerous offender criteria are met.

The appeal was allowed, the dangerous offender designation was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding an impaired driving charge.

At trial, the defence expressly conceded there were no Charter issues and did not object to the admissibility of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant attempted to argue that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, affecting the presumption in s. 258(1)(c).

The Court of Appeal held that this Charter argument was not open to the defence given their position at trial, and the non-Charter argument was answered by the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Rilling.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and his conviction appeal was previously dismissed.

He also filed an inmate notice of appeal against his sentence.

The Court of Appeal quashed the sentence appeal, noting that the sentence for first degree murder is fixed by law and therefore no appeal lies under section 675(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of attempted murder and the sentence imposed for a manslaughter conviction arising from a barroom shooting.

The Court of Appeal allowed the acquittal appeal, finding the trial judge erred by leaving self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code to the jury when there was no air of reality to the claim that the intervening bystanders were committing an unlawful assault.

The trial judge also erred by failing to instruct the jury on s. 27, which permits bystanders to use force to prevent an offence.

A new trial was ordered for the attempted murder charge.

The sentence appeals by both the Crown and the accused were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after sexually assaulting and strangling the victim.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in defining 'likely' in the jury charge on intent, allowing his former common law spouse to testify, and admitting good character evidence about the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the jury charge definition unnecessary but not prejudicial, and upheld the spousal testimony because the relationship had ended.

While the trial judge erred in admitting some good character evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions on grounds that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit telephone records, refusing cross-examination of the complainant under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding them sleeping in the same bed, and failing to provide a Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and concluding that a Vetrovec warning was not mandatory given the lack of reason to doubt the complainant's integrity.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for robbery and breach of probation after the sentencing judge rejected a joint submission.

The joint submission proposed a 12-month sentence, less 2-for-1 credit for pre-trial custody, plus three years of probation.

The sentencing judge instead imposed one year in addition to pre-trial custody and two years of probation.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in applying the governing principles, as the joint submission was not unreasonable and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to accord with the joint submission.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the elements of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge properly required the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, leaving only the possibilities of a planned murder or a spur-of-the-moment act.

The Crown appealed jury acquittals on charges of sexual assault and break and enter with intent to commit sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in leaving honest but mistaken belief in consent with the jury, because the evidentiary record disclosed no air of reality to the defence.

In the circumstances known to the accused, including prior rebuffed advances, the complainant's intoxication, sleep, passivity, and explicit verbal rejection, the accused was required by s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

Having taken none, the defence was statutorily unavailable and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was too light for a serious offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion given the very favourable pre-sentence report.

The applicants, charged with the second-degree murder of their infant son, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge had denied bail on the secondary ground, citing concerns that the applicants might gain access to their surviving child and that their proposed sureties would not enforce a no-contact order.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's concerns but concluded that detention was not the only way to protect the surviving child, who was in the custody of the Children's Aid Society.

The Court found that a strict no-contact condition, along with undertakings from family members, would adequately protect the child.

The Court held that detention was not necessary on the secondary ground and directed further submissions on release terms.

The applicants, charged with the second-degree murder of their infant son, sought a review of a decision denying them bail.

The motion judge had denied bail on the secondary ground, citing concerns for the safety of the applicants' surviving child.

The Court of Appeal found that the surviving child, currently in the custody of the Children's Aid Society, could be adequately protected through strict release conditions prohibiting any contact.

The court concluded that detention was not necessary on the secondary or tertiary grounds and ordered the applicants' release subject to conditions.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentence was at the upper end of the range, there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion given the extremely serious consequences of the appellant's actions and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of first-degree murder in the death of the mother's husband.

The son admitted to killing the deceased but claimed self-defence, defence of his mother, or provocation, citing a history of severe domestic abuse by the deceased.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance money.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, party liability, the use of co-accused statements, the standard of proof for reasonable doubt, and the need for a Vetrovec warning for unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The son also argued the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and concluding that the cross-examination, while aggressive, did not compromise trial fairness.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized materials during the execution of a search warrant.

The warrant was partially invalid as it authorized a search for a 'pedophile collection' based only on suspicion.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 489(1) of the Criminal Code and the plain view doctrine, and alternatively under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the seizure was unlawful as it amounted to an exploratory search, violating s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach serious and the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The appellant, a 42-year-old school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual touching of a 13-year-old complainant he met on a chat line while pretending to be a 17-year-old.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable, the jury charge was unbalanced, and the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding child witnesses and in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the jury charge fair overall, and a custodial sentence appropriate given the predatory nature of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the section 16 defence of not criminally responsible.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the law and correctly focused the factual debate on whether the appellant's depressive disorder had reached a psychotic level.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the period of parole ineligibility to ten years because the appellant's potential dangerousness was linked to the course of his illness.

The Crown appealed the 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for two counts of sexual assault against a four-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by fixing the sentence length without regard to whether it would be served in the community or in jail.

The Court imposed an additional conditional sentence of 12 months less one day, without house arrest, to reflect denunciation and deterrence and to allow for continued treatment.

The Court declined to interfere with the trial judge's discretion regarding a s. 161(1) order and declined to impose a s. 109(1) firearms prohibition as the issue of whether the offence involved violence was not raised at trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that he forcibly confined the deceased while causing his death.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in several aspects of the jury charge, including the definition of forcible confinement and instructions on self-defence, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury charge and concluded that there was sufficient circumstantial and expert evidence from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the deceased had been forcibly confined.

The appeal was dismissed.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Discipline Committee's finding of professional misconduct against a physician for sexual impropriety.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court that the Committee misapprehended crucial evidence regarding the complainants' credibility and potential collusion.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to order a rehearing, noting the record contained evidence capable of supporting a misconduct finding, and to strike the Divisional Court's order that the College pay the costs of the initial Committee hearing.