Susan M. Chapman

Criminal appeal concerning destruction by a third-party sexual assault crisis centre of counselling notes made during the complainant’s initial disclosure before charges were laid.

The majority held that where destroyed material met the disclosure or production threshold, the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 was breached without any additional requirement to prove actual prejudice at the breach stage.

Applying both the Stinchcombe and O’Connor frameworks, the Court found the notes were likely relevant to credibility and cross-examination and would have been producible.

A stay of proceedings was restored because the deliberate destruction of the only independent contemporaneous written account caused irremediable prejudice and continuing the prosecution would damage the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault for allegedly burning her 3½-year-old granddaughter's face on a stove.

At trial, the unsworn child testified against the appellant, and both sides called expert witnesses regarding the burns, the child's memory, and child abuse.

The Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial, finding that while the child was properly permitted to testify, the trial judge erred by allowing an expert witness to testify that the child's behaviour indicated long-term abuse and to improperly comment on the child's credibility.

The Court also found errors in the Crown's cross-examination of a defence expert using unproven learned treatises.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which held there was no unreasonable delay in the proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing that most of the delay was waived, caused by the appellant, or attributable to the inherent requirements of the case.

The Court found no unreasonable delay regardless of whether appellate proceedings are covered by the Charter.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had allowed the accused's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The issue was whether the trial judge erred in excluding cross-examination of the complainant on a collateral matter tendered solely for credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion.

The Court found that the relevance of the proposed evidence was tenuous and its potential for prejudice and misleading the jury was significant.

The police installed an unauthorized electronic tracking device (a 'beeper') in the appellant's vehicle after a search warrant had expired.

They used the device to monitor his movements, which eventually led to evidence connecting him to the destruction of a communications tower.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the installation and monitoring constituted an unreasonable search in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the majority concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because it was real evidence, the police acted in good faith out of urgency to protect the public from a suspected serial killer, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The police installed a video camera without prior judicial authorization to monitor activities in a hotel room registered to the appellant, suspecting it was being used as a common gaming house.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the video surveillance violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding s. 8 was not violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the warrantless video surveillance violated the appellant's reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1.

However, the Court concluded that the admission of the videotape evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2), as the police acted in good faith based on a reasonable misunderstanding of the law prior to the Charter's full development in this area.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion and related offences.

Following their committal, their trial was delayed for almost two years, primarily due to institutional problems and a lack of resources in the judicial district.

The appellants moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the delay was clearly excessive and unreasonable, establishing a framework for assessing s. 11(b) claims that considers the length of delay, explanation for delay, waiver, and prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was directed.

The appellant was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a stolen vehicle and charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

At trial, he was acquitted on the basis that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence of having care or control while impaired is a general intent offence for which voluntary intoxication is not a defence.

The Court further held that the unavailability of the intoxication defence for this offence does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter, or alternatively, any such violation is justified under section 1.