Health Law - SCJ

Following the settlement of a class action regarding negligent dental services and infection risks, Class Counsel brought a motion for approval of an additional fee of $185,000 for administering the settlement.

The court noted that the claims process resulted in a recovery of $472,450 for class members and OHIP.

Finding that Class Counsel provided competent and diligent services and would experience a deficiency in payment compared to their billable rates, the court approved the additional fee.

The respondent hospital brought a motion to compel the applicant physician to answer questions and produce documents regarding his financial income, which he had refused during cross-examination.

The cross-examination occurred in the context of the physician's motion to stay the hospital's decision to suspend his privileges.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the physician did not allege financial harm in his stay motion, relying instead on loss of professional satisfaction and reputation.

Therefore, the financial information sought was irrelevant to the issues of irreparable harm and balance of convenience.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of a $14,000,000 settlement in a medical negligence action involving a minor who suffered catastrophic brain damage.

The court approved the settlement, the allocation of damages, and the proposed contingency fees for plaintiffs' counsel, finding them fair and reasonable given the significant risks and complexity of the litigation.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for a sealing order, holding that it was contrary to the open court principle and that no compelling interest justified sealing the materials.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of a $9,750,000 settlement in a medical malpractice action arising from severe birth injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff.

The court reviewed the proposed distribution, including damages, costs, and legal fees calculated under a Contingent Fee Agreement.

Finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the minor plaintiff, and the reduced contingency fee of 27.5% appropriate, the court approved the settlement and the related guardianship application.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to add CML Healthcare Inc. as a defendant on the basis of misnomer in a medical malpractice action involving a delayed diagnosis of a brain tumour.

The plaintiffs originally named Oxford Medical Imaging as the owner of the imaging facility, but later discovered CML owned it at the relevant time.

The court found that the 'litigation finger' was clearly pointing at CML and that there was no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs were awarded costs of $3,000.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a Community Treatment Order and upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review to the Board's factual findings.

The court found ample evidence supporting the Board's conclusions that the appellant lacked sufficient insight to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions and that he would suffer substantial deterioration without the CTO.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her attending psychiatrist's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment for bipolar disorder.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its capacity finding and that she was denied procedural fairness due to late disclosure of documents.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's application of the capacity test and noting that procedural fairness requirements were met as the appellant's counsel at the Board hearing had an opportunity to review the documents and did not seek an adjournment.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their medical malpractice Statement of Claim to substitute Dr. Renato Natale for the pseudonym 'Dr. John/Jane Doe Gynecological Attending'.

The motion was brought after the presumptive expiry of the limitation period.

The court applied the 'litigation finger' test and found that a person with knowledge of the facts would be aware of the true identity of the misnamed defendant from reading the pleading.

Finding no undue prejudice to the proposed defendant, the court exercised its discretion to grant the amendment.

The proposed amicus curiae brought a motion on consent to be appointed as amicus for the appellant in an appeal from the Consent and Capacity Board, after Legal Aid Ontario denied funding.

The proposed amicus stated the appellant was incapable of self-representation and required an amicus to make written and oral submissions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed role was that of full-fledged counsel rather than a friend of the court, which is not the proper role of a court-appointed amicus.

The applicant, a medical cosmetic care business operated by a registered nurse, sought a declaration that it was exempt from COVID-19 shutdown regulations because it provided health care services.

The Thunder Bay District Health Unit had directed the business to close on the basis that it provided personal care services.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, applying principles of statutory interpretation to find that the applicant's services were aesthetic and cosmetic in nature, not medical.

The court held that the business did not share the common features of health care clinics and was therefore subject to the mandatory closure of personal care services under the shutdown regulations.

The Attorney General of Ontario requested in writing that the applicants' Charter challenge against various COVID-19 public health measures be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court declined to dismiss the application at this stage, noting that Rule 2.1 is a blunt instrument reserved for the clearest of cases.

Without a full record and legal argument, the court could not conclude that the application was plainly frivolous or vexatious on its face, and directed the parties to schedule a case conference.

The applicants, operators of an indoor fitness facility, sought an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the enforcement of capacity limits imposed by the local Medical Officer of Health during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court applied the elevated 'strong prima facie case' standard because the injunction would effectively determine the application and was mandatory in nature.

The court found the applicants failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the instructions were ultra vires, issued in bad faith, arbitrary, or contrary to the Human Rights Code.

The court also found the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm to themselves, and that the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in enforcing public health measures.

The motion was dismissed.

At a case management conference in a medical malpractice action, the self-represented plaintiff sought to bring motions to amend the Statement of Claim and for further documentary discovery, while the defendant sought a motion regarding the mode of discovery and a timetable.

The case management judge established a timetable for the exchange of motion materials and ordered that examinations for discovery be completed by August 31, 2021.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 7.08 for court approval of a $10,000,000 settlement in a medical malpractice action involving a minor who suffered severe birth injuries resulting in cerebral palsy.

The plaintiffs' counsel sought approval of a contingency fee of $3,136,500.

The court adjourned the motion, finding that it could not assess the reasonableness of the proposed fee without reviewing the time dockets for each professional who worked on the file.

The applicant sought to be appointed as the guardian for his cousin under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The respondent had been admitted to the hospital multiple times for suicidal ideation and was found incapable of consenting to medical treatment or administering his property.

The court granted the application, finding compelling medical evidence from the attending psychiatrist that the respondent required a substitute decision-maker.

The appellant, an involuntary patient with schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment.

The appellant argued the Board applied the wrong legal test and made unreasonable findings regarding his risk of violence and appreciation of the treatment decision.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the test from Starson v. Swayze and reasonably concluded that the appellant's condition prevented him from recognizing its manifestations and appreciating the consequences of his decision.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and incapacity to consent to treatment for an eating disorder.

Following the hearing, the appellant was discharged, regained capacity, and her community treatment order was terminated.

The respondent moved to admit fresh evidence of these developments and argued the appeal was moot.

The Superior Court allowed the fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no live controversy or special circumstances to justify hearing it.

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits, as the Board's decisions were reasonable and free of palpable and overriding error.

The applicants sought a declaration that a liver transplant waiting list rule adopted by Trillium Gift of Life Network, which requires a six-month wait for patients whose liver failure is caused by alcohol consumption, is unconstitutional.

The Province moved to dismiss the application against it, arguing that the application challenges the rule of the delegate, not the delegating legislation or any act of the Minister.

The court agreed, holding that under civil procedure rules, a challenge to the constitutionality of delegated legislation must be brought against the rule-making authority, not Her Majesty the Queen.

The application was dismissed against the Province without costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to proposed psychiatric and medical treatments.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to properly consider his religious beliefs, which he maintained were sincere and not delusions, thereby violating his rights under section 2(a) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board made an extricable error of law by failing to take into account Charter values when assessing whether the appellant's beliefs were sincere religious beliefs or manifestations of a mental illness.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Board for a rehearing.

The moving defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the medical malpractice action against him, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to correct a misnomer, seeking to replace 'John Doe' with the moving defendant.

The court found that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the moving defendant's potential liability for delayed care.

Both the summary judgment motion and the misnomer cross-motion were dismissed, with the issues left to be determined by the trial judge.