Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The applicant pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sought interim judicial release pending sentencing on humanitarian grounds to visit terminally ill family members.

The court determined that section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code applied, not section 679 or 525.

The court denied bail, finding that the applicant's history of breaching court orders raised primary and secondary ground concerns, and the gravity of trafficking fentanyl necessitated detention on the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

During an impaired driving investigation, police found the accused unresponsive in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with open alcohol nearby.

The officer searched the vehicle and a personal bag inside, discovering drugs and a scale.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing the search violated her s. 8 rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the search was lawfully authorized under s. 42(1) of the Liquor Licence and Control Act, 2019, as the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol was being stored illegally and was genuinely searching for it.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault, raising three grounds: that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the nature and extent of the complainant's injury, that the trial judge erred by commenting on the appellant's review of Crown disclosure in assessing credibility, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determinations, holding that the trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence that the blow was accidental and to prefer the complainant's evidence, which was corroborated by the attending officer's observation of blood on her face.

Any minor factual errors in the narrative did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

This sentencing decision concerns two co-accused, Tafari Bezabeh and Justin Harker, convicted by a jury of attempt murder and first degree murder arising from two closely connected shootings in Toronto on June 19, 2022.

The court reviews the facts, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the applicable case law, ultimately imposing life imprisonment for both offences, with no parole eligibility for 25 years on the murder count and a concurrent life sentence for attempt murder.

The decision emphasizes the need for denunciation and deterrence in the context of planned, public gun violence.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of extrinsic discreditable conduct, including cell phone images of the accused in possession of handguns and ammunition seized from a townhouse, in a murder and attempted murder trial.

The court applied the `Handy` test, admitting the cell phone images and ammunition due to their high probative value regarding identity, party liability, and planning, which outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded the admission of two specific handguns seized from the townhouse, as they were not the murder weapons and their probative value was minimal compared to the already admitted evidence and potential for prejudice.

The defendant, Robert Konashewych, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights (solicitor-client privilege) and s. 8 rights (unreasonable search and seizure) by police.

The alleged breaches arose from police taking possession of a presumptively privileged letter and other documents provided by his former spouse.

The court found a s. 7 breach due to police inaction regarding the privileged document but determined it did not warrant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) as the consequences were minor and did not impact trial fairness.

The court also found no s. 8 breach, as the documents were voluntarily provided by a private citizen, not obtained through state search or seizure.

The application for a stay was dismissed, but the privileged letter was ruled inadmissible unless privilege was waived.

In a trial for possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown sought to qualify a police sergeant as an expert witness on the sale and distribution of drugs.

The accused opposed the qualification, arguing the officer lacked special knowledge and was biased because he belonged to the same drug enforcement unit as the investigating officers.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the officer had the requisite experience and understood his duty to be fair and impartial.

The court held that being from the same police service did not automatically disqualify the expert, and admitted the evidence.

A young offender was convicted of manslaughter for his role as a lookout during a fatal shooting in a fast food restaurant washroom.

The Crown sought the maximum three-year sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, while the defence sought a sentence of time served with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court denied enhanced credit, finding no exceptional circumstances, and sentenced the offender to two years and nine months in closed custody, less time served, followed by two years of probation.

The accused was charged with multiple drug and firearm offences following the execution of a search warrant at an apartment unit.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused resided in the unit and possessed the contraband found inside, as well as marijuana found in the hallway.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's testimony, but ultimately found the Crown's circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused resided in the unit or possessed the marijuana in the hallway.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault with a weapon arising from an altercation with his landlord.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly found corroboration, and applied uneven scrutiny to the defence evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The court found the sentencing judge erred by failing to give adequate weight to the Crown's position that a conditional sentence was appropriate, and replaced the 60-day intermittent jail sentence with a 9-month conditional sentence.

During a trial for second degree murder arising from a gas theft where the attendant was struck and dragged by a vehicle, the accused sought to have dangerous driving causing death left with the jury as an included offence.

The accused admitted to driving the vehicle but denied knowing he had struck the victim.

The court analyzed sections 662(3) and (5) of the Criminal Code and concluded that section 662(3) strictly limits the available included offences on a murder charge to manslaughter or infanticide.

The request to leave dangerous driving causing death as an included offence was dismissed.

The accused faced charges of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching arising from historical allegations by his step-daughter.

The trial turned entirely on credibility and reliability because the Crown case rested on the complainant's evidence alone, while the defence relied on contradictions, delayed disclosure, collateral impeachment evidence, and the mother’s evidence about opportunity.

The court held that delay alone could not support an adverse inference, but found significant credibility and reliability concerns in the complainant’s evidence, including inconsistencies on material and collateral matters.

Preferring the mother’s evidence on key contextual points and concluding the Crown had not met the burden of proof, the court acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed his voyeurism conviction, challenging the trial judge's finding of "explicit sexual activity" and the treatment of a witness's statement as an informal admission.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that one photograph unequivocally depicted explicit sexual activity and that the trial judge correctly considered the witness's "acknowledged evidence" as an informal admission in the context of a directed verdict motion.

This is a voir dire ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the accused, Anthony Alas, who was charged with second-degree murder.

The primary issue was whether the statements were the product of an atmosphere of oppression, specifically due to the police's alleged failure to provide the accused with stomach medication.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary, concluding that the accused's will was not overborne by police conduct or the circumstances.

The court considered the accused's mental state, the absence of threats or inducements (including any suggestion regarding his partner's potential arrest), and the presence of oppressive circumstances.

Despite some concerns about how the accused's medical needs were handled, the court determined that the overall police conduct was polite and accommodating, and the interview was calm and non-confrontational.

The offender was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation after fleeing from police during a traffic stop.

He was found with 2.5 ounces of cocaine and had a significant criminal record including three prior convictions for the same offence.

The court emphasized specific and general deterrence, sentencing the offender to 30 months in custody for the drug offence and 90 days concurrent for the breach of probation.

The accused brought pre-trial motions challenging police access to his contact information from municipal social services, a production order for his cell phone records, and the admissibility of gloves and ammunition seized during execution of a robbery search warrant.

The court held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his address and telephone number in the circumstances, and upheld the production order because the information sought would afford evidence respecting the robberies.

However, the court found the search warrant was not properly granted because the information to obtain did not establish reasonable grounds to believe the accused was one of the actual bank robbers whose clothing could be found in the searched locations.

The court further held that the Crown failed to establish lawful seizure of the gloves and ammunition under s. 489 of the Criminal Code, and that the ammunition evidence was inadmissible as discreditable conduct because its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value.

The accused applied under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude documents seized from a correctional facility pursuant to a search warrant seeking handwriting samples connected to alleged tax fraud offences.

The court held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents contained in institutional administrative files, but retained a limited privacy interest in personal papers stored in his jail cell.

Although a correctional officer lawfully seized the accused’s belongings under institutional authority in preparation for the warrant’s execution, the police officer exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing all property without first determining whether items fell within its terms.

This constituted a breach of s. 8.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the breach unintentional, the privacy impact minimal, and the evidence important to the prosecution.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence seized under a search warrant for computers and storage devices allegedly containing child pornography.

He argued the information to obtain the warrant lacked full, frank, and fair disclosure, that the warrant lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that the search was overly broad.

The court found that certain information in the information to obtain should be excised or amplified, including surveillance obtained through an unlawful entry onto private property and references to prior charges that had not resulted in conviction.

However, even after excision and amplification, sufficient grounds remained to support the issuance of the warrant.

Applying the section 24(2) framework, the court held the Charter breaches were not sufficiently serious to justify excluding the evidence.

The accused brought a motion under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code seeking severance from co‑accused in a joint fraud prosecution relating to a scheme involving unauthorized access to banking information and transfers of funds from customer accounts.

The applicant argued that a co‑accused might introduce evidence of the applicant’s prior fraud conviction involving the same financial institution, which could cause significant prejudice in a jury trial.

The Crown opposed severance, submitting that the concern was speculative and that any prejudice could be addressed through jury instructions.

The court emphasized the strong presumption favouring joint trials where charges arise from the same series of events and held that the risk of prejudice was not sufficiently established at this stage.

Because it was uncertain whether the evidence would be tendered or admitted at trial, the severance application was found to be premature and speculative.

Two accused were charged with sexual assault and gang sexual assault following allegations that the complainant was sexually assaulted by multiple men in an apartment over approximately thirty-one hours.

The trial judge found the complainant’s evidence unreliable regarding how she arrived at the apartment but accepted core aspects of her testimony concerning non-consensual sexual activity, supported by DNA evidence and contemporaneous reporting.

The court concluded that one accused engaged in multiple acts of non-consensual sexual intercourse and other sexual activity with the complainant and rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The second accused was found to have touched the complainant’s breast in a sexual manner without consent based on DNA evidence and credibility findings.

However, the Crown failed to prove that the accused were parties to each other’s assaults for the purpose of the gang sexual assault charges.