Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: R., Respondent
-and-
Amber Tasker, Applicant
BEFORE: Justice Spencer Nicholson
COUNSEL: M. Herberholz/A. Posliff for the Federal Crown
T. Donnelly for the Applicant
HEARD: March 12 and 13, 2026
REASONS RE BAIL PENDING SENTENCING
1I had intended to give these Reasons orally on Friday, March 13, 2026. However, the Crown raised a concern about the manner in which the proceedings had unfolded on Thursday, March 12, 2026. Specifically, the Crown complained of the lack of a formal “Myers” application by the defense for the hearing, the lack of a transcript from any previous bail hearings and the inability to properly prepare.
2Regardless of the Crown’s concerns, which I find to be valid, I advised the parties that I had not intended to release Ms. Tasker in any event. I gave a brief explanation for why that was my determination on the record. Ms. Donnelly, for the offender, indicated that she felt that I had applied the wrong legal test and wished to bring a “formal” Myers application.
3I indicated that I would entertain such an application at the next hearing date, March 25, 2026 at 10:00 am. However, I am concerned about the delays, notwithstanding the formal waiver of Ms. Tasker’s 11(b) rights.
4I have decided to release these written Reasons that explain why I was not prepared to release Ms. Tasker pending sentencing. I have re-written the Decision that I would have read into the record on March 13, 2026 had the Crown not raised its concerns. I have obviously added paragraphs 1-5 since I initially prepared these Reasons. I am also addressing my preliminary views of the proposed Myers’ application in paragraphs 20-22, which were also not in my original Reasons.. Finally, I have added paragraph 57, which was also not in my original planned Reasons.
5I note that I was not provided any significant guidance by either counsel with respect to the applicable provision of the Criminal Code that applied or any case law, although in fairness to the Crown, I do not believe that he was aware that the bail issue was being argued. Defence counsel relied on s. 679 of the Code and my “inherent jurisdiction”. I agree that I have jurisdiction, but as I explain below, I do not believe s. 679 of the Code applies.
6On January 5, 2026, Ms. Tasker pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
7Her sentencing has commenced, but arguments have not been completed. Although it was presented as a joint submission on sentence, I expressed my doubts that it, was in fact, a joint position. In any event, the Crown seeks a five year penitentiary sentence, less the Summers’ credit, which is agreed as of March 12th to be 680 days. The defence has brought a Duncan application, seeking to reduce the five year sentence for harsh custodial conditions and then deduct the 680 day credit.
8Whichever approach I take, Ms. Tasker is facing penitentiary time. That sentence may start as early as March 25, 2026 if I am in position to render sentence at that time.
9I note that I have not heard sentencing submissions and have an open mind with respect to sentence at this juncture.
10Ms. Tasker has been in custody since December 15, 2024 as a result of her arrest in this case. She requests an opportunity for interim judicial release pending sentence in order to “get her affairs in order”. In particular, she wishes to see her children, visit with her grandmother, who I am advised is in palliative care, and spend time with her terminally ill cousin, Corey, who was present in the courtroom yesterday. I am advised that Corey, tragically, is expected to have approximately 6 months to live. Thus, Ms. Tasker is unlikely to be released from custody prior to his death or her grandmother’s death.
11It is not unusual to permit offenders who have not been in custody to remain at large in the community pending sentencing, under certain terms and conditions suitable for the particular circumstances. However, it must be recognized that, although no transcript of the bail hearing was provided, it was deemed necessary to keep Ms. Tasker in custody pending trial in this matter for over one year. It is not clear which grounds were relied upon.
12Interim judicial release has been held to be the cardinal rule, not the exception in Canada. The Charter guarantees the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. However, this entitlement is largely based on the presumption of innocence, which I have already described has been displaced in this case by Ms. Tasker’s guilty plea.
13Defence counsel suggests that I find authority in s. 679 of the Code. Subsection (3) provides that a judge of the court of appeal may order the appellant be released pending the determination of his appeal if the appellant establishes that
(a) the appeal or application for leave to appeal is not frivolous;
(b) she will surrender herself into custody in accordance with the terms of the order; and
(c) her detention is not necessary in the public interest.
14I disagree that this section applies. This section specifically refers to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada. While I am satisfied that I have the jurisdiction to order Ms. Tasker’s release pending sentencing, I do not believe the test set out in s. 679(3) is applicable.
15However, I acknowledge that in the case of an appeal, similar to the circumstances before me, there has been a conviction and the presumption of innocence no longer applies. Clearly, judicial interim release is available despite a conviction, and I reiterate that we do not take all offenders into custody immediately upon conviction and prior to sentencing.
16On my review of the Code, the applicable section is s. 523(2). This subsection permits the trial or sentencing judge to vacate a detention order and impose a release order upon the detainee showing cause. Usually, this section is relied upon by the Crown to revoke bail pending sentence following a conviction. However, in R. v. Kochanska, 2020 ONCJ 385, after a guilty plea for drug trafficking, including carfentanil, fentanyl and heroin, the offender applied for bail pending sentence. Ghosh J. described that while the presumption of pre-trial release and the right to a reasonable bail is closely tied to the presumption of innocence, once the presumption of innocence is rebutted those primary imperatives are attenuated (see: paras. 18-20). He noted that a guilty plea or finding of guilt, while significant, is not a dispositive factor when determining pre-sentence release.
17Justice Ghosh then reviewed the secondary and tertiary grounds, which I find implies that he also would have considered the primary grounds had they been relevant. He ultimately declined to release the offender pending sentencing.
18In R. v. Across the Mountain, 2019 ABPC 234, Justice LaGrandeur, at para. 9, also relied upon s. 523(2)(a) and noted that a conviction in and of itself is not determinative of whether one should be in custody pending sentencing or not. It is a matter that is dependent upon the circumstances of the offence, including the gravity of the offence or offences, the seriousness of the circumstances of the offences, the inevitability of incarceration and potential length of incarceration, potential delay in sentencing and perhaps even humanitarian concerns.
19I am satisfied that these cases illustrate the proper approach and will conduct a similar analysis.
20Again, on a preliminary basis, I have difficulty understanding how s. 525 of the Code applies. The section according to its clear language, applies to an “accused…who is being detained in custody pending their trial”. Ms. Tasker has had her trial, or elected not to have it by pleading guilty. I do not believe s. 525 applies.
21In R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18, [2019] 2 SCR 105, the Supreme Court of Canada addresses how s. 525 detention review hearings should be conducted. The Court explicitly states, at paragraph 24, that the purpose of the s. 525 hearing is to prevent accused persons from languishing in pre-trial custody and to ensure a prompt trial. I do not know if Ms. Tasker had 90 day reviews, or waived them. However, I cannot understand how she could possibly be entitled to a s. 525 hearing post trial. She is no longer languishing in pre-trial custody. She has had her opportunity to have a trial and decided to plead guilty.
22Accordingly, unless defence counsel, or perhaps the Crown, can persuade me otherwise, I do not believe that this is the appropriate time to conduct what is intended to be a pre-trial procedure with respect to bail. There is, however, clear authority to address bail pending sentence under s. 523(2)(a), which I have done.
The Proposed Sureties:
23Two sureties are presented, Ms. Forbes and Ms. Bolton. They both testified as part of the application and were cross-examined by the Crown. Each of them submitted declarations of surety.
24Ms. Forbes is described as a close family friend of 15+ years. She is prepared to be a residential surety. She described being aware that Ms. Tasker had been convicted of possessing approximately 50 g of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and that when she was arrested she also was in possession of bullets. She also attached to her declaration a copy of Ms. Tasker’s criminal record. Her plan was to be in the presence of Ms. Tasker at all times while she was on release. The release plan also includes an ankle monitor.
25I note that Ms. Forbes pledged $500. I have no doubt that this represents a substantial sum to her.
26Ms. Forbes described not having any concerns that Ms. Tasker would obey her rules. This concerns me because Ms. Tasker’s criminal record includes five failures to comply with court order convictions. Despite being aware of Ms. Tasker’s prior convictions, and her high incentive to flee given the fact that she is facing an imminent penitentiary sentence, Ms. Forbes remained undeterred. That demonstrated a certain nonchalance to what I believe is a real concern.
27I note that Ms. Forbes’ son resides with her. I believe that her son is the aforementioned Corey. They live in Ridgetown, which is a little distance from Chatham.
28Ms. Bolton has been a surety before. She is Ms. Forbes’ sister. She has the advantage of living in Chatham. She described that Ms. Tasker is best friends with her nephew and she has a good relationship with Ms. Tasker.
29Ms. Bolton described that while she is aware of Ms. Tasker’s previous criminal convictions, including the failures to obey court orders, Ms. Tasker has grown considerably since then. Ms. Tasker, according to Ms. Bolton, had prior issues with drugs and has put those problems behind her over the past couple of years.
30However, it must be considered that Ms. Tasker has been in custody for over one year where, presumably, the lure of illegal drugs has been less possible to give in to. I glean from her record that over the past four or five years, at minimum, she has had significant difficulty with drugs. I ask myself whether I can be assured that she is over her drug issues, or if they simply have been unavailable. I also note that Ms. Tasker’s most recent breach conviction is from February of 2025. She has not had a recent lengthy period where she has been free of trouble.
31Ms. Bolton works as a process server but is prepared to forego her employment to look after Ms. Tasker. She lives alone, although she has 11 rescue animals that she looks after.
32Ms. Bolton describes that she has called the police on a previous surety in the past and takes her responsibility very seriously. She does not allow alcohol or drugs into her household, or in her vehicle.
33Ms. Bolton, according to her declaration, has only known Ms. Tasker for 5 to 6 years.
34She has offered $1500.
Ms. Tasker’s Prior Criminal Record:
35Ms. Tasker has a relevant criminal record dating only back to 2020. There are four convictions for failing to comply with an order and a separate breach of a conditional sentence that was imposed for possession for the purpose of trafficking. It appears that she breached very soon after sentencing. Shortly after serving that time, she was convicted of possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000, as well as use of a fraudulent credit card. In early 2025, she was convicted of impaired driving and simple possession. Most recently, in February of 2025, she was convicted of failing to comply with the probation order from the possession charge and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000.
36Accordingly, a very important factor in my decision is Ms. Tasker’s proven record of breaching or failing to comply with court orders. This brings into question whether the court can be assured that, even with well-intentioned sureties, Ms. Tasker can be trusted to be released, particularly given that she knows that further jail time awaits.
Primary Ground:
37This deals with the risk of Ms. Tasker absconding.
38I repeat that Ms. Tasker’s prior convictions greatly concern the court. She has certainly ignored court orders before. I do have concerns that I can be assured of her appearance at the sentencing. Ankle monitors do not assure attendance or compliance with orders. The sureties may be well intentioned but ineffective in their vigilance.
39The illnesses of her grandmother and Corey do suggest a likelihood, perhaps, that Ms. Tasker will be motivated to spend her time on release in their company, but there are no assurances. I was given very little information about her relationship with her children or her ability to even see them if she wishes. It is accordingly difficulty to gauge whether she has sufficient connections to the community that fleeing will not be a consideration.
Secondary Ground:
40This deals with whether the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public. This includes whether there is a substantial likelihood that Ms. Tasker will re-offend while on release.
41Again, the strength, or lack thereof, of the sureties is a relevant consideration. Can the court be confident that Ms. Tasker will follow their rules? She has a proven track record of not obeying court orders. While the $500 and $1500 posted by her sureties is a lot of money, I am sure, to them, it is not a real deterrent to Ms. Tasker. How can I be sufficiently satisfied that she will obey the rules of her sureties when she has not felt so bound in the past?
42It must be remembered that Ms. Tasker was convicted of trafficking fentanyl. Fentanyl is a deadly drug. She could seek to obtain this drug while out, even briefly, from custody, I find that there is a real potential of harm to the community.
43While, it is submitted that Ms. Tasker has changed significantly while in custody, I remain concerned with the recency of the criminal record. Although she has been in custody since December of 2024 without the ability to readily access drugs and although, I accept that much of her behaviour was owing to drug use, I cannot be confident that she will not seek out those drugs, as she apparently has in the past upon her release, perhaps for one last hurrah before serving her time.
Tertiary Ground:
44This is the most compelling of the grounds to deny bail to Ms. Tasker. This ground addresses whether her detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to the circumstances.
45This ground has been held not to be a residual ground and it may be applied even where there is no risk that the offender will not attend sentencing or no risk of re-offending. Public confidence is essential to the proper functioning of the bail system and the justice system as a whole.
46The strength of the Crown’s case must be considered deemed to be admitted with the guilty plea.
47Here, Ms. Tasker has been convicted of possessing nearly 50 g of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. While no longer at the high end of fentanyl possession cases, this is still a very significant quantity given that very little is deadly or needed to produce the desired effect by those with addiction.
48Fentanyl is a scourge on communities throughout Ontario. Chatham is no different. Minute quantities of fentanyl is lethal. Indeed, international trade has been impacted for the stated purpose of slowing down the importation of fentanyl. Those that traffic in fentanyl may well be responsible for loss of life, or at the very least, significant weakening of the fabric of the community.
49While there is no evidence of a firearm, Ms. Tasker had 6 bullets in her possession when arrested.
50I reiterate that no matter which position on sentencing I accept, Ms. Tasker is facing a significant sentence in the penitentiary.
51The perspective to consider must be that of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of bail, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case. The reasonable person is a thoughtful person, and not one prone to emotional reactions, one who is making an assessment of the case based on inaccurate knowledge of the circumstances, or one who simply disagrees with our society’s fundamental values.
52I am confident that the society wide consensus is that fentanyl is a special type of problem that requires significant action to address. The hypothetical reasonable person must be considered to be highly attuned to the problems associated with fentanyl, caused in large part by those that traffic in fentanyl.
53Here, the reason that Ms. Tasker wishes to be released are, in my view, humanitarian. She wishes to say farewell to members of her family who she reasonably believes will die while she is in custody. That is a compelling reason for wanting to be released and I want to emphasize that I am extremely sympathetic to Ms. Tasker’s children, her grandmother and her cousin Corey.
54However, where Ms. Tasker has been convicted of trafficking such a dangerous and prevalent drug such as fentanyl, I find that a reasonable member of the community would lose confidence in the administration of justice should she be released. I repeat, she is not presumed innocent. She has a proven track record of not following court orders. There is no question that there would be a great hue and cry for justice should Ms. Tasker abscond. If members of the public had a voice in this decision, I find that they would object to her release, despite the compassionate grounds that she cites.
Disposition:
55Ms. Tasker, I am aware that you are very upset about your children, your grandmother and your cousin. I accept the emotion that was on display during the hearing from all of your family, and yourself, was genuine and not performative.
56However, I decline to grant you a release prior to sentencing. You do not enjoy the presumption of innocence. The gravity of the offence is too significant, in my view. Most importantly, your proven track record simply does not provide me with the confidence, notwithstanding able and willing sureties, that you will follow their rules, or my rules, should you be released.
57We will resume the sentencing hearing on March 25, 2026, at 10:00 am. While I wish to ensure that Ms. Tasker has been given a fair opportunity to seek bail pending release, feel that she has been given that opportunity, perhaps unfairly to the Crown, who was caught off guard. I am eager to proceed with the sentencing in this case without further delay. Court resources are not infinite and even if she has waived 11(b), the issue of bail pending sentence should not occupy a disproportionate amount of those resources. If defence counsel wish me to revisit my decision on bail pending sentence, they should have clear authority or I will summarily dismiss the application and proceed to hear sentencing submissions.
“Justice Spencer Nicholson”
Justice Spencer Nicholson
Date: March 16, 2026