SCC 2011

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.

The parties divorced in 1984 and the husband was ordered to pay spousal support, which was varied to $2,000 per month in 1991.

In 2008, the husband applied to terminate spousal support, citing his retirement and a market downturn that negatively impacted his assets.

The trial judge reduced support to $1,500 per month, and the Court of Appeal further ordered that support be gradually reduced and terminated.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the wife's appeal and restored the 1991 order.

The Court held that the husband failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act because he provided no evidence of his financial circumstances at the time of the 1991 order, nor did he prove that his investment losses were crystallized rather than temporary market fluctuations.

The parties entered into a comprehensive separation agreement that was incorporated into a 2003 court order, providing the wife with indexed spousal support with no termination date.

The wife had multiple sclerosis and was unable to work.

In 2007, the husband applied to vary the order under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, arguing the wife should seek employment.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal reduced and terminated support, finding the wife capable of working.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the original order, holding that the proper test for variation under s. 17 is whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the order was made.

As the wife's medical condition had not changed since 2003, there was no material change to justify varying the order.

The appellant taxpayer engaged in a series of transactions, including a horizontal amalgamation of sister corporations, to preserve the paid-up capital of a subsidiary's shares that would have been cancelled in a vertical amalgamation.

The amalgamated corporation subsequently redeemed shares and paid out the preserved paid-up capital to its non-resident shareholder as a tax-free return of capital.

The Minister assessed the taxpayer for withholding tax, applying the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to reduce the paid-up capital and deem a portion of the redemption a taxable dividend.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the taxpayer's appeal, holding that the transactions constituted an abusive avoidance transaction that circumvented the purpose of section 87(3) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant union disputed an arbitrator's award regarding the calculation of vacation benefits for casual employees who became permanent.

The arbitrator concluded that time as a casual employee was not to be included.

On judicial review, the chambers judge found the arbitrator's reasons insufficient and unreasonable, but the Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, clarifying that under the Dunsmuir reasonableness standard, the adequacy of reasons is not a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision nor a question of procedural fairness.

Instead, reasons must be read together with the outcome to determine if the result falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner received complaints that the respondent disclosed private information in contravention of the Personal Information Protection Act.

The Commissioner took 22 months to extend the 90-day statutory time limit for completing the inquiry.

An adjudicator subsequently found the respondent had contravened the Act.

On judicial review, the respondent argued for the first time that the Commissioner lost jurisdiction by failing to extend the time limit within the initial 90 days.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the adjudicator implicitly decided the timelines issue, and this decision was reviewable on a standard of reasonableness because the tribunal was interpreting its home statute.

The Court found the adjudicator's implied decision to be reasonable and restored the order.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring s. 144 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases inoperative in relation to a requirement to pay issued under s. 126(4) of the Employment Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding a conflict of legislative purposes between the federal provision, which aims to recover overpayments summarily without regard to provincial exemptions, and the provincial provision exempting income replacement benefits from seizure.

The provincial provision was held to be constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant employer appealed a decision setting aside an arbitrator's award.

The arbitrator had found that while the employer breached the collective agreement regarding vacation entitlements, the respondent union was estopped from grieving the practice due to its long-standing acquiescence.

The Court of Appeal held the arbitrator's application of estoppel was reviewable on a standard of correctness and set it aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that labour arbitrators are not bound to apply equitable doctrines exactly as courts do, and their application of such doctrines is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.

The arbitrator's decision to impose an estoppel was reasonable given the labour relations context.

The appellant brutally assaulted two individuals while in a state of toxic psychosis caused by voluntary drug consumption.

He was convicted of aggravated assault at trial, as the judge applied s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which precludes self-induced intoxication as a defence for violent offences.

The appellant appealed, arguing he should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under s. 16.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a toxic psychosis resulting exclusively from self-induced intoxication is not a 'mental disorder' under s. 16, but rather falls under the self-induced intoxication provisions of s. 33.1.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard appeals regarding a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal finding of pay inequity between a largely female group of employees and a largely male comparator group.

The Federal Court of Appeal had previously overturned the Tribunal's finding.

In an oral judgment, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals on the merits, finding no reviewable error by the Tribunal, and dismissed the appeal regarding the reduction of damages, adopting the dissenting reasons of Evans J.A. from the court below.

The Lax Kw'alaams Indian Band claimed an Aboriginal right to the commercial harvesting and sale of all species of fish within their traditional waters, arguing this right evolved from their pre-contact practices.

The trial judge found that while the pre-contact society relied heavily on fishing for sustenance, their only significant trade was in eulachon grease, and trade in other fish was not integral to their distinctive culture.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a modern commercial fishery in all species lacked sufficient continuity and proportionality with the pre-contact trade in eulachon grease.

The Court also affirmed that Aboriginal rights claims must be characterized based on the pleadings, rejecting a 'commission of inquiry' approach to determining pre-contact practices.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had set aside the accused's conviction for first degree murder and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the first degree murder conviction, adopting the dissenting reasons of MacPherson J.A. at the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and murder.

The respondents were convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim, who died a month later from a blood clot.

The victim had ingested cocaine shortly before death, raising a causation issue.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of attempted murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was an error of law and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the error could not be confidently dismissed as harmless.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, upholding the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging sexual harassment by the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal substantiated the complaint in part and awarded compensation, including $47,000 for legal costs under the statutory provision allowing compensation for 'any expenses incurred'.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Tribunal's decision should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, its interpretation of the statute to include legal costs was unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the Tribunal does not have the authority to award legal costs.

The complainant workers suffered from chronic pain and received a fixed compensation award from the Workers' Compensation Board.

They appealed to the Board's Review Division, arguing the policy was discriminatory under the Human Rights Code.

The Review Officer concluded the policy was not discriminatory.

Instead of seeking judicial review, the complainants filed new complaints with the Human Rights Tribunal.

The Tribunal refused to dismiss the complaints under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Tribunal's decision was patently unreasonable because it ignored the principles of finality and the rule against collateral attack, effectively allowing the relitigation of an issue already decided by a decision-maker with concurrent jurisdiction.

The appellant, a private investigator hired by the defence, attempted to discover the identity of a confidential police informant.

He was charged with obstruction of justice and extortion.

The trial judge acquitted him on all counts.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on all counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence is not bound by informer privilege and may independently investigate an informant's identity, such investigation must be lawful.

The Court ordered a new trial on the obstruction of justice and the first extortion count (against the police officer) due to errors of law by the trial judge, but restored the acquittal on the second extortion count (against the associates) as it was based on factual findings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the use of a third party suspect's criminal record.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that while the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that the third party's criminal record could only be used to test credibility, the error did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under the curative proviso.

The dissenting justices would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the error was significant and the evidence against the accused was not overwhelming.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the police had subjective and objective reasonable grounds to believe the occupants of the vehicle possessed illegal firearms.

Consequently, the arrest and subsequent search incident to arrest were lawful, and there was no violation of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The appellant was charged with possessing child pornography between 1999 and 2006.

He claimed he collected the materials to create an artistic exhibition about child exploitation.

The trial judge acquitted him based on the pre-2005 artistic merit defence and the post-2005 legitimate purpose defence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in law by applying the artistic merit defence to materials lacking artistic merit, and by using a purely subjective test for 'legitimate purpose'.

However, the Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction by making its own factual findings to substitute a conviction instead of ordering a new trial.

The appellants sued the respondent for defamation after the respondent posted an article on his website containing hyperlinks to other websites with allegedly defamatory information about the appellants.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a hyperlink, by itself, is content-neutral and merely refers to other content without repeating it.

Therefore, creating a hyperlink does not constitute publication of the defamatory material to which it links.

The appeal was dismissed.