SCC 2012

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

In a criminal appeal involving a niqab-wearing complainant at a preliminary inquiry, the Court addressed how to reconcile freedom of religion with fair-trial rights.

The majority held neither an absolute ban nor an absolute permission rule is acceptable, and adopted a contextual four-step framework.

A witness may be required to remove a niqab only where necessary to prevent a serious trial-fairness risk that cannot be avoided by alternatives, and where the benefits of removal outweigh the harms.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted for application of that framework.

This appeal considered whether actuarial surpluses recorded in federal public-sector superannuation accounts were assets in which plan members held legal or equitable interests.

The Court held the accounts were statutory accounting records tracking Consolidated Revenue Fund transactions, not segregated asset pools.

It rejected claims based on proprietary entitlement, fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and alleged expropriation.

The Court further held the statutory amendments authorized debiting surplus amounts and did not require compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In a pair of extradition appeals, the Court held that surrender of Canadian citizens to the United States on terrorism-related charges did not unjustifiably infringe mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court reaffirmed that extradition generally constitutes a marginal limitation on the right to remain in Canada and that ministerial balancing under the established multi-factor framework attracts substantial deference.

It rejected arguments that weak foreign jurisdiction or feasible domestic prosecution should be near-dispositive limits on surrender.

The Court also held that procedural fairness did not require the Minister to obtain and disclose prosecutorial assessments about whether to proceed domestically.

The surrender decisions were found reasonable on the record, and both appeals were dismissed.

In this criminal appeal concerning terrorism convictions under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of key terrorism provisions, the fairness of the trial after appellate restoration of the motive clause, the reasonableness of the verdicts, and the sentence imposed on appeal.

The Court held that the challenged participation provision was not overbroad under s. 7 and that the legislative scheme did not establish a breach of expressive freedom on the record before it.

It further held that re-insertion of the motive clause caused no trial unfairness, the armed conflict exception did not apply on the evidence, and the convictions were reasonable.

On sentence, the Court affirmed correction of errors in principle and upheld the substituted life term with consecutive terms and extended parole ineligibility.

The appeal addressed whether a federal regulator had statutory authority to implement a market-based regime requiring negotiations over compensation for retransmission of local television signals.

The majority held the proposed regime exceeded statutory authority and conflicted with the copyright scheme governing retransmission rights and exceptions.

The dissent would have found a sufficient statutory basis and no operational conflict between the two statutes.

The appeal was allowed, with costs throughout.

In an insolvency appeal, the Court addressed when environmental remediation orders issued by a provincial regulator constitute provable monetary claims under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.

The majority held that orders not framed in monetary terms may still be compromised where the statutory and factual context shows sufficient certainty that compliance will ripen into a financial liability to the regulator.

Applying that framework, the majority found the remediation orders fell within the claims process and dismissed the appeal.

The dissenting judges would have required evidence approaching certainty that the province would itself perform remediation before treating most orders as contingent monetary claims.

This criminal appeal considered whether a roadside detention in a police cruiser and a related pat-down search violated Charter protections against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

A majority found the pat-down search unconstitutional because securing the accused in the cruiser was not reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

The majority nevertheless admitted the cocaine evidence under section 24(2) based on good-faith conduct and evolving detention-law context.

The conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with dissenting reasons favouring exclusion and acquittal.

The appellant challenged an appellate ruling that had quashed a labour board decision and remitted labour code complaints for reconsideration.

The Court held the board had considered the relevant statutory provisions and factual record, and its interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference on judicial review.

It reaffirmed that administrative decision-makers need not expressly address every possible interpretive nuance raised by parties.

Viewed as a whole and in light of the record, the board's reasons met the reasonableness standard.

The appeal was allowed, the appellate judgment was set aside, and the trial-level judgment was restored with costs.

This administrative law appeal concerned judicial review of a staffing tribunal decision rejecting an abuse-of-authority complaint under federal public service staffing legislation.

The Court held that the tribunal reasonably concluded there was no legal requirement to use a particular appointment process based on whether a position was new or reclassified.

It further held the reviewing court improperly assessed a different theory than the one advanced in the complaint and impermissibly reweighed the record on judicial review.

The appeal was allowed, with the tribunal decision restored.

In a criminal appeal, the accused challenged appellate convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from an attempted circumcision of a four-year-old child.

The appellate court had set aside acquittals on those counts and stayed a conviction for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The Court held that all elements of the charged offences were established on the record.

It declined to address whether the assault-with-a-weapon count should have been stayed because that issue was not raised.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation on the sole ground that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court held that the complainant's evidence, together with confirmatory admissions made during a police interview, provided an adequate evidentiary foundation for guilt.

The court agreed with the majority in the intermediate appellate court that the verdict was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed.

The Court held that the relevant service under the Human Rights Code was education generally, not a segregated special-education comparator class.

It found prima facie discrimination where a student with severe dyslexia was denied meaningful access to education after the closure of a diagnostic remediation centre and inadequate replacement supports.

The District failed to justify its conduct because it did not properly assess reasonable alternatives before cutting essential services.

The discrimination finding and individual compensation remedies were restored against the District, while broader systemic orders and provincial liability were set aside.

The Court considered whether a patent specification for erectile-dysfunction treatment satisfied disclosure obligations under s. 27(3) of the Patent Act where cascading claims ended with two individual compounds but did not identify the tested effective compound.

The Court held sufficiency must be assessed on the specification as a whole and not by isolating a single surviving claim under s. 58.

Because a skilled person would need further testing to determine which claimed compound worked, the specification did not enable successful use of the invention from the disclosure alone.

The appeal was allowed, the prohibition order was set aside, and the patent was held invalid for insufficient disclosure.

On a Crown appeal in a criminal matter, the Court addressed whether prior compelled civil discovery testimony could be used to cross-examine an accused at trial without violating s. 13 of the Charter.

A majority held that only prior testimony that is itself incriminating engages the constitutional protection, and that non-incriminating prior statements used solely for impeachment do not trigger s. 13.

The majority restored the conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and set aside the order for a new trial.

A dissenting minority would have barred the cross-examination, finding that compelled prior testimony assisting the prosecution in any way should remain protected.

The Court considered whether 2008 Criminal Code amendments limiting evidence to challenge breath test reliability applied to a trial concerning earlier events.

A majority held the amendments affected substantive rights because they eliminated the Carter defence as an independent route to raise reasonable doubt and therefore should not apply retrospectively.

The Court restored the trial acquittal and allowed the appeal.

A dissent would have treated the provisions as procedural evidentiary rules with immediate effect.

The Court considered constitutional challenges to Criminal Code evidentiary presumptions governing breath test prosecutions for blood alcohol levels over the legal limit.

A majority held that sections 258(1)(c), (d.01), and (d.1) did not infringe section 7 or section 11(c) but did infringe section 11(d), with section 258(1)(d.01), section 258(1)(d.1), and a severed version of section 258(1)(c) justified under section 1.

The Court allowed the appeal in part and upheld the respondent's conviction.

The court allowed the appeal and restored acquittals on impaired care or control charges.

The majority held that a realistic risk of danger is an essential element of care or control under s. 253(1), and that the trial judge's finding of no realistic risk was factual, not an error of law alone.

Because Crown appeals from acquittal are limited to errors of law alone, the convictions entered by the appellate court were set aside.