Russell Silverstein

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing the deceased during an attempted robbery.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to define 'accident', failing to leave unlawful act manslaughter to the jury, and misdirecting the jury on the intent for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge was adequate, the failure to leave unlawful act manslaughter caused no prejudice as the jury was given a favourable alternative route to manslaughter, and the verdict was not unreasonable given the evidence.

The appellant appealed a 3-year sentence imposed for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the totality principle given his existing nine-year sentence for other sexual offences from the same time frame.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the additional three-year sentence infringed the totality principle.

Leave to appeal was granted, and the sentence was reduced to an additional one year of imprisonment to be served consecutively to the sentence the appellant was already serving.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of the proceeds of crime on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Crown conceded that the absence of mutual communication and confidence between the appellant and his trial counsel led to an inadequate and unfair defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the verdict unreliable, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of assault and assault with a weapon against his wife and son, based on his wife's unsworn videotaped statement to police, which she later recanted at trial.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's mid-trial comments about believing the son's videotaped statement created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the wife's statement should not have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's comments did create a reasonable apprehension of bias, necessitating a new trial.

However, the Court upheld the admission of the wife's videotaped statement, finding the surrounding circumstances provided sufficient threshold reliability despite the lack of an oath.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of his wife by cyanide poisoning.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior fraudulent behaviour.

The Court of Appeal found the admissibility of the bad character evidence to be borderline at best, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court concluded that the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the impugned evidence tipped the balance or that a new trial would produce a different verdict.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a shooting at a nightclub and sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 18 years.

He appealed the conviction on multiple grounds, including improper judicial intervention during cross-examination, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and misdirections in the jury charge regarding eyewitness identification, gunshot residue evidence, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in characterizing the youthful offender as an 'armed, dangerous drug dealer' without sufficient evidence, and reduced the parole ineligibility period from 18 to 15 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of spermatozoa, threats to the victim's children, and sexual sadism.

The appellant also challenged the jury instructions regarding sexual assault, forcible confinement, post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and the treatment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the admission of evidence or the jury instructions, concluding that the charge read as a whole properly instructed the jury on all issues, including the insanity defence and reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of second-degree murder and manslaughter in a gang-related shooting.

At trial, the francophone co-accused requested trials in different official languages, leading the trial judge to conduct a bilingual trial.

The trial judge also admitted out-of-court statements made by the deceased victim before his death under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the bilingual trial was permissible under the Criminal Code and did not violate the appellants' language rights.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's statements by improperly relying on extrinsic evidence and mere consistencies to establish threshold reliability.

The Court also found a significant error in the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt and the absence of evidence (the 'Miller' error).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal stabbing of his friend.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, arguing the deceased had suffered a psychotic breakdown and attacked him.

On appeal, the appellant raised ten grounds of error, including improper jury instructions on self-defence, reasonable doubt, and motive, as well as erroneous evidentiary rulings regarding hearsay and expert testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain hearsay evidence, the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, and the jury instructions were overall adequate.

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, the absence of evidence, and the W.D. framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions adequately conveyed the required legal principles, including that a state of doubt regarding the accused's testimony requires an acquittal, and that the jury must consider all evidence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

Following his arrest, he asserted his right to counsel but was unable to reach his lawyer.

Before he could consult counsel, police introduced an undercover officer to him and played a tape of his intercepted confession, prompting him to make incriminating remarks.

The trial judge admitted the statements, finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge applied the wrong test.

Applying a causal link approach, the Court found the police conduct amounted to elicitation in violation of s. 10(b).

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2), the curative proviso was not applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault after the complainant was attacked by three men outside a karaoke restaurant and struck in the eye with a broken glass.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification and party liability, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury charge and concluding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his four-year sentence.

The offences arose from an altercation at a party where the complainant was attacked with broken beer bottles.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the absence of a witness, the response to a jury question, and the use of the complainant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting that the charge as a whole properly conveyed the burden of proof.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding that the disparity between the appellant's sentence and his co-accused's conditional sentence was justified by their differing levels of involvement and personal circumstances.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question about reasonable doubt and by holding an in-chambers conference regarding the jury's request to clear the courtroom for the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's repetition of the original reasonable doubt charge was appropriate.

The court also held that the in-chambers conference was not inappropriate, caused no prejudice, and any irregularity was cured by section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to two murders committed by a principal.

The Crown relied on the principal's murder convictions to prove the principal committed the offences.

While the appellant's appeal was pending, the principal's murder convictions were quashed, and the principal subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal admitted the quashed convictions and the manslaughter pleas as fresh evidence.

The Court dismissed the appeal but substituted the appellant's conviction for the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to manslaughter, imposing a sentence of time served.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his infant daughter, who died from extensive intracranial bleeding.

The Crown alleged the death was caused by severe shaking, supported by extensive expert medical testimony.

The appellant appealed, seeking to introduce fresh expert evidence from a forensic neuropathologist and arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment, admitting certain expert evidence, and instructing the jury on reasonable doubt and conflicting medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer criteria, and the jury instructions adequately conveyed the necessary legal principles.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based on circumstantial evidence, including his foreknowledge that the murder weapon was a homemade gun.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of an affidavit from his trial counsel, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because the lawyer did not testify at trial to explain that he had informed the appellant about the gun.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to call the trial counsel did not result in a miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence against the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, challenging the trial judge's approach to dealing with DNA evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conduct of the voir dire or his charge to the jury, which were deemed fair and balanced.

The Court substantially agreed with the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The accused arrived at Pearson International Airport and was suspected by customs officers of having ingested narcotics.

He was detained in a 'drug loo facility' until he passed 84 pellets of heroin.

He was convicted at trial, but the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding violations of his Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the detention and 'bedpan vigil' were authorized by s. 98 of the Customs Act and did not violate the accused's rights under s. 7 or s. 8 of the Charter.