Richard Steven Baldwin

A personal injury action arising from a fall sustained by the plaintiff while hunting in a deer blind on the defendants' rural property.

The plaintiff initially pleaded that the defendant Todd Drain was an occupier under the Occupiers' Liability Act but withdrew this allegation on the first day of trial.

The court determined that the withdrawal of the occupier allegation eliminated most claims against Todd Drain, leaving only a claim based on alleged misfeasance—specifically, that Todd Drain removed an artificial turf carpet from the deer blind floor, causing it to become wet and slippery.

The jury found that the artificial turf was present on the date of the accident, thereby dismissing the action against Todd Drain.

The decision addresses the interplay between the Occupiers' Liability Act and common law negligence, the proper formulation of jury questions, and the consequences of withdrawing pleadings mid-trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to allege that the defendant Todd Drain was an occupier within the definition of the Occupiers Liability Act.

The original claim, issued in 2018, was based on negligence arising from an incident on November 4, 2016, where the plaintiff was injured falling from a deer blind on property owned by the defendants' parents.

The defendant Todd Drain opposed the amendment, arguing it constituted a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the amendment relied on facts substantially pleaded in the original claim and represented merely an alternative legal route to establish liability rather than a new cause of action.

This costs decision follows a motor vehicle collision case in which the plaintiff, Ronald Busch, suffered serious injuries and sued the defendant, Cristy Mitton.

Mitton brought a third-party claim against the Ministry of Transportation for Ontario and Carillion Canada Inc. The main action settled for $210,000 plus interest, with costs to be determined.

The court found the Ministry's refusal to accept the settlement as reasonable to be entirely unreasonable, resulting in additional costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $282,251.79 in costs and the third parties $155,739.31, with reductions applied due to lack of evidence of actual legal rates charged.

The decision clarifies the approach to costs where third-party claims and late settlements are involved.

The court dismissed T.C.O. Agromart Ltd.'s claim against Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd. for damages arising from the collapse of a private farm bridge under the weight of a crop sprayer.

The court found that the accident was caused by the driver inadvertently steering the sprayer onto an unsupported overhang, not by any breach of the duty of care by Sutton Farms.

The bridge had been used safely for decades by experienced operators, and the risk of such an accident was not reasonably foreseeable.

The court also provided a detailed analysis of damages, but found no liability.

The defendants (Insurers) moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Freesen) claim for environmental property damage coverage.

The claim arose from an underground storage tank leak.

The Insurers denied coverage based on two exclusions: a storage tank exclusion and a non-compliance with statute exclusion.

The court granted summary judgment based on the storage tank exclusion, finding the policy's clear wording did not approve the tank as a covered location, despite disclosure in the application.

The court rejected the non-compliance exclusion argument due to insufficient evidence of willful non-compliance.

Costs were fixed at $17,500 for the defendants.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment that found an insurer liable for underpaid contents claim following a fire.

The insurer (appellant) argued that the insured's failure to submit a sworn proof of loss was fatal, that an appraisal process under the Insurance Act was mandatory, and that the trial judge erred in assessing the actual cash value (ACV) of the lost property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the insurer had waived the sworn proof of loss requirement and that relief from forfeiture was appropriate.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretion to decline an appraisal under s. 128 of the Insurance Act, noting that the court was in a position to assess the ACV and that an appraisal would cause further delay and expense.

The assessment of ACV by the trial judge was also found to be free of palpable and overriding error.

This decision addresses the costs award following a jury verdict in favour of the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff sought costs on an actual indemnity basis, arguing complete success and a more favourable Rule 49 offer to settle compared to the Defendants' "hardball" offer.

The court, applying Rules of Civil Procedure 57.01 and 49, found the Plaintiff was the successful party and that the Defendants' unreasonable settlement position warranted a higher costs award.

The court awarded the Plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis up to September 15, 2023, and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $284,800.73, emphasizing that the principle of proportionality had minimal bearing due to the Defendants' conduct.

The plaintiff, widow of the deceased, challenged the validity of her late husband's will, sought an equalization payment under the Family Law Act, and dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The defendant, the deceased's daughter and estate trustee, defended the will's validity and disputed the equalization and support claims.

The court found the will valid, dismissed the support claim, and provided findings for the calculation of the equalization payment, leaving the final amount for the parties to agree upon.

The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (Dominion) sought equitable contribution from Bay of Quinte Mutual Insurance Company (BOQM) for defence costs in an underlying claim.

The underlying claim involved allegations of negligent construction (covered by Dominion's policy from 2010-2013) and negligent misrepresentation by the vendors (covered by BOQM's homeowner's policy from 2020-2021).

Dominion had undertaken to defend the construction claims but explicitly excluded vendor-related allegations and property damage outside its policy period.

The court dismissed Dominion's application, finding that Dominion had no right to equitable contribution because its defence coverage was limited to claims within its policy period, and the risks covered by the two insurers were distinct and did not overlap in a manner that would trigger equitable contribution.

This appeal concerned a severe brain injury sustained by Megan Desrochers in an ATV accident.

The trial judge found Patrick McGinnis liable for negligence, with 10% contributory negligence by Megan, but dismissed claims against Grant and Catherine McGinnis.

Patrick appealed his liability.

The Desrochers cross-appealed the dismissal of claims against Grant and Catherine, both in tort and under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick's appeal, upholding his liability.

It also dismissed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Catherine's tort liability.

However, the Court allowed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Grant's liability under HTA s. 192(2), finding that "negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle" includes the negligent transfer of care and control of the vehicle to an unfit person.

This is an appeal concerning the addition of a third party (Cruickshank Construction Limited) to a lawsuit and the application of limitation periods.

The defendants in the original action sought to add Cruickshank as a third party, alleging it was responsible for winter maintenance on Highway 401 where an accident occurred.

The motion judge allowed the addition, finding the claim was not statute-barred and that Cruickshank could not plead a limitation defence.

Cruickshank appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding a reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering the claim and in preventing them from pleading a limitation defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the discovery analysis, and affirming the judge's discretion to make a final determination on the limitation issue given the comprehensive record and the age of the litigation.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial where the defendant successfully dismissed the plaintiff's action regarding a furnace oil leak.

The court assessed the defendant's partial indemnity costs, considering factors under Rule 57.01, including the principle of indemnity, the complexity of the proceeding, and the conduct of the parties.

The court found the defendant's costs reasonable, making adjustments for a previously dismissed motion and a clerk's hourly rate, ultimately ordering the plaintiff to pay $98,696.65.

The plaintiffs sought prejudgment interest and costs following a third trial in a long-running personal injury action.

The court granted prejudgment interest on pecuniary damages from the date of the second trial's damage assessment (February 6, 2015) to the third trial's judgment (February 6, 2020), rejecting the Municipal Defendants' arguments for a lower rate or no interest on future losses.

For costs, the court fixed an award of $778,900 (fees, HST, disbursements) for the plaintiffs, excluding costs related to the first trial preparation and accident benefits claims, and denying interest on disbursements.

The court emphasized reasonableness and proportionality, declining to apply Rule 49.10(1) enhancements despite favorable offers from the plaintiffs.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision that it had a duty to defend the respondents under a professional liability insurance policy.

The respondents, an appraiser and his company, were sued for vicarious liability arising from the alleged negligence of another appraiser (Barkley).

The respondents sought coverage under their own insurance contract (Van Huizen contract).

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by conflating a master policy with individual insurance contracts.

The court clarified that the master policy merely sets out terms, while individual certificates evidence separate contracts.

The Van Huizen insurance contract only covered the professional negligence of the named insured (Van Huizen), not vicarious liability for another appraiser's actions.

Therefore, the appellant had no duty to defend under the Van Huizen contract.

However, the court declined to grant summary judgment to the appellant, noting that the question of coverage under the other appraiser's (Barkley's) insurance contract remained a live issue to be determined.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order increasing spousal support from $9,300 to $12,000 per month with a step-down and termination schedule.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking support at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and no termination date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no material error, serious misapprehension of evidence, or error of law.

The court confirmed that the motion judge properly considered the compensatory nature of support, the respondent's economic disadvantage from the marriage, and the parties' original separation agreement.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, with costs divided.

The plaintiffs, successful in their negligence claims but found 40% contributorily negligent, sought substantial indemnity costs from the defendants following an oil spill.

The court determined the appropriate hourly rates for counsel, disallowed fees for redacted dockets and administrative tasks, and reduced disbursements due to insufficient detail.

The plaintiffs' offer to settle triggered substantial indemnity costs from June 9, 2016, forward.

The court fixed the plaintiffs' total costs at $175,000, with Ultramar Ltd. being entirely responsible but entitled to recover 50% from Kilpatrick Fuels Limited and Joe Burns on its crossclaim.

This decision addresses two evidentiary motions brought at the commencement of the third trial in a motor vehicle accident case.

The defendant municipalities sought leave to call an additional expert witness despite non-compliance with a court-ordered deadline and to admit an excerpt from "The Driver's Handbook" as filed evidence.

The court granted leave for the expert to testify, balancing the need for court orders to have "teeth" against the interests of justice and the opposing party's ability to respond without undue delay.

However, the court dismissed the motion to admit the handbook excerpt directly, suggesting it could be introduced through expert testimony instead.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle owner, Ms. Barrett, had given consent for the driver to possess the vehicle, making her liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

Ms. Barrett contended she did not give consent to drive, only to retrieve items from the car.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether giving keys to retrieve items constitutes "possession with consent" under the Highway Traffic Act, considering the driver's state and the owner's knowledge.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and Ms. Barrett's request for summary judgment was also denied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of a third party claim arising from a tug-of-war injury.

The plaintiff was severely injured during a recreational tug-of-war at a campground when his arm became caught in a loop in the rope, resulting in amputation of his forearm.

The appellants sought contribution and indemnity from the third parties who participated in the game.

The motion judge dismissed the third party claim, finding that the third parties owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that the third parties did not fall within any of the circumstances that would impose a positive duty to act, and that the injury was not a reasonably foreseeable result of participation in a recreational tug-of-war game.

The appellant, Cornerstone Builders Ltd., appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent, 1652620 Ontario Inc. The motion judge awarded payment of monies due under a promissory note and struck out portions of the counterclaim.

The core dispute arose from a shareholders' agreement requiring a non-competition agreement upon cessation of shareholding.

After the appellant purchased the respondent's shares in 2011, a falling out occurred and the respondent's principal established a competing business without signing the non-competition agreement.

The appellant ceased making payments on the promissory note.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding errors in the motion judge's approach to the stay of execution, the adjournment of the summary judgment motion, and the striking of counterclaim allegations.