Richard H.K. Schwarzl

A young person convicted of second-degree murder at age 17 was sentenced to 26.5 months secure custody followed by 36 months conditional supervision.

Upon release into the community in June 2012, the young person was subject to a Conditional Supervision Order (CSO).

In March 2013, the young person absconded from supervision for 168 days and was arrested on serious adult charges including armed robbery, aggravated assault, and drug trafficking.

A review hearing was held to determine whether the young person was in breach of the CSO and what remedy was appropriate.

The court found serious breaches and a significant increased risk to public safety, ordering the young person to serve the remainder of the sentence in custody.

The accused pleaded guilty to three drug trafficking offences involving the trafficking and possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The offences occurred in February 2012 while the accused was on bail for similar charges.

Police conducted surveillance and observed the accused selling cocaine to customers and subsequently seized approximately 1.04 kilograms of cocaine from two locations.

The accused was a commercial-grade trafficker operating a criminal enterprise.

The court imposed a sentence of 5.5 years consecutive to the sentence the accused was already serving, with concurrent sentences on the other two counts.

A 17-year-old accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference after engaging in sexual activity with a 12-year-old complainant.

The sole issue was whether the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age pursuant to section 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused asked the complainant her age and she stated she was 16.

The complainant presented herself as older through her appearance, behavior, social circle, and online presence.

Upon learning her true age, the accused immediately terminated the relationship.

The court acquitted the accused on both counts, finding he had taken reasonable steps to ascertain age and the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not meet his obligations under section 150.1(4).

The accused was charged with two counts of uttering threats contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from a telephone call made to a caseworker at the Ontario Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) on June 19, 2012, in which the accused made references to parking a fertilizer bomb in front of a police division and discussed the law of provocation in the context of his long-standing dispute with Peel Regional Police Services.

The Crown argued that the utterances constituted threats made with criminal intent.

The accused admitted making the utterances but contended they were expressions of frustration and hyperbole, not genuine threats.

The trial judge found that while the words were objectively threatening, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused uttered them with the requisite criminal intent.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol on December 11, 2012.

The first trial date was set for October 3, 2013, but the case was not reached that day due to insufficient court resources.

A second trial date was set for January 3, 2014.

The total delay was 12¾ months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while there was some prejudice to the accused, the overall delay was reasonable in the circumstances, with the institutional delay falling within acceptable ranges for the region.

The Crown applied to admit a videotaped statement made by the complainant, Ms. Jacqueline Lawton, to Peel Regional Police on August 5, 2012, pursuant to the rule of past recollection recorded.

The witness testified that she had blurred and groggy memories of the events due to consuming vodka and medication, but recalled certain details such as the windshield being smashed and her subsequent actions.

The court found that the witness did not have a genuine loss of memory but rather a selective memory, deliberately choosing not to recall certain events.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The charges involved two counts of assault arising from incidents on October 3 and October 13, 2012.

The trial was scheduled for August 2, 2013, but was adjourned when the complainant failed to appear despite being subpoenaed.

A second trial date was set for December 4, 2013.

The total delay from the date of the alleged offences to the second trial date was 13¾ months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay was substantial, it was not unreasonable when all factors were considered holistically.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after failing a roadside screening test and providing breath samples that exceeded the legal limit.

The trial focused on two issues: whether the breath tests were obtained as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, and whether the police violated the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable given all the circumstances, and that the accused's Charter rights were not violated.

The accused was found guilty.

A youth was charged with thirteen offences including sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against two younger brothers.

The accused was initially arraigned on counts of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

During trial, both counsel discovered that section 150.1(3) of the Criminal Code exempted the accused from prosecution on those counts because he was aged twelve or thirteen at the time of the alleged offences and did not fall within the statutory exceptions.

The Crown entered a stay on those counts.

The accused was then arraigned on two counts of sexual assault and brought a motion to stay proceedings on the basis of abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown acted in good faith, no evidentiary findings had been made at the first trial, all witnesses remained available, and proceeding with the sexual assault counts did not undermine trial fairness or the integrity of the judicial process.

The accused was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a damaged motor vehicle parked in a gas station lot.

He was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and excess blood alcohol.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved care or control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code applied, as the accused occupied the driver's seat while intoxicated.

The accused failed to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities.

The court also found that even if the presumption had been rebutted, the Crown proved actual care or control beyond a reasonable doubt based on the realistic risk of danger presented by the accused's conduct and circumstances.

Verdicts of guilty were entered on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was stopped by police as he exited a licensed establishment that appeared on the Peel Police Last Drink Programme statistics.

The accused challenged the stop as an arbitrary detention violating section 9 of the Charter and challenged the video surveillance of his consultation with counsel as violating section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused.

The accused brought an application for the trial judge to disqualify himself based on an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused argued that the judge's prior professional relationships with both defence counsel and Crown counsel would prevent a fair trial.

The judge rejected the application, finding that prior collegial relationships and professional disagreements, without more, do not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge applied the legal test requiring substantial grounds and concluded that an informed person would not conclude the judge would decide the case unfairly.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide breath samples following a collision with a fire hydrant in Mississauga in the early hours of November 3, 2011.

The Crown established that the accused was intoxicated and in care or control of the vehicle.

The accused challenged whether the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code applied and whether the breath demand was valid.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, determining that he was occupying the driver's seat, presenting a realistic risk of danger, and that the breath demand was valid despite the accused's refusal to comply.

The accused was charged with two driving-related offences and required a Korean interpreter.

The defence challenged the competency of the proposed interpreter, Mr. Hu-Kal Kim, who held only conditional accreditation, having failed to achieve the passing grade of 70% on two of three accreditation tests.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the interpreter was competent to provide forensic interpretation services.

The court applied the five-part test from R. v. Tran and found that despite partial accreditation, the interpreter possessed sufficient competency based on his extensive experience in forensic interpretation since 1981, prior successful qualification voir dires, and specific expertise in drinking and driving trials.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised two Charter applications: first, alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the validity of the screening demand; and second, alleging a breach of section 9 rights regarding arbitrary detention.

The court found that the screening demand was properly made based on reasonable suspicion and that the detention was justified under section 498 of the Criminal Code as the accused was held until sober and safe to be released.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused, a chartered accountant, pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for his role in a large-scale tax evasion scheme involving false personal income tax returns and fraudulent charitable donation receipts.

Over six years (2003-2008), the accused prepared 487 false returns for numerous clients, resulting in false deduction claims totalling $3,674,000 and unpaid taxes of $1,045,111.21.

The accused received approximately $94,000 in compensation.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day, while the Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three to five years.

The court imposed a two-year penitentiary sentence with a $100,000 fine.

In a preliminary inquiry concerning importation and possession of Gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), the court discharged both accused on all four counts.

The Crown alleged that the accused knowingly transported a shipment containing GBL disguised as detergent, but the evidence showed only that they picked up and transported what appeared to be legitimate goods.

The court found insufficient evidence that either accused knew or ought to have known the cargo contained a controlled substance, and no evidence of a criminal conspiracy between them.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a blood sample following a motor vehicle collision.

At the hospital, the accused asserted his right to counsel of choice.

The police left a message for the lawyer but demanded a blood sample only three minutes later, which the accused refused.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that the police violated the accused's right to counsel by acting with unnecessary haste and failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his lawyer.

However, applying binding appellate authority, the court held that the refusal constituted the actus reus of the offence and could not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, though the court noted a sentence reduction could be considered if the accused is found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his teenaged employee while parked on a rural road.

The case turned on a credibility contest between the complainant and the accused, who denied being alone with her.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the complainant's evidence highly credible and reliable, while rejecting the accused's evidence as contradictory and untrue.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of stolen property after purchasing a dump trailer, a cargo trailer, and a skid steer from an individual known only as 'Chico'.

The accused claimed he did not know the items were stolen and believed he was getting a good deal from a man hiding assets during a divorce.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding him unreliable and noting numerous 'red flags' such as unreasonably low prices, missing VIN plates, and the accused's fraudulent registration of the trailers as home-made.

The court concluded the accused was willfully blind to the origins of the property and found him guilty on all counts.