Pierre E. Roger

The accused, charged with historical sexual offences including gross indecency and indecent assault, contested the voluntariness of a statement he made to police.

He argued that he was not properly informed of the reasons for his arrest or his right to counsel under s. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter, as the police initially only mentioned one complainant and used the term 'sexual assault' rather than the specific historical charges.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the accused, an intelligent man who was aware of the historical complaints, understood the extent of his jeopardy.

The court concluded that the Crown proved the voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt and ruled the statement admissible.

Motion by the prosecution at the close of its case seeking admission of the evidence of five complainants as similar fact evidence across multiple historical sexual offence counts arising from conduct by a parish priest toward boys in the early 1970s.

Applying the governing similar fact evidence framework, the court found no collusion proven on a balance of probabilities and held the improbability of the recurring lap-sitting conduct gave that evidence sufficient probative value to outweigh prejudice.

However, the court refused to admit the evidence cross-count on the further issue of sexual or indecent circumstances, finding those proposed inferences weak and highly prejudicial.

The motion was therefore granted only in part.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order to allow a witness to testify via videoconference at an upcoming trial.

The witness suffered from severe back pain and had limited ability to travel or remain seated for long periods.

The court granted the motion, finding that the balance of convenience favoured videoconference testimony and that any concerns regarding cross-examination or assessing credibility could be addressed by the court's directions.

The applicant bankrupt brought a motion arguing that a previous family law costs award of $25,280, which was ordered to survive bankruptcy, was released because the respondent creditor failed to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.

The court held that while the failure to file a proof of claim prevented the respondent from sharing in the bankruptcy distribution, it did not release the debt under section 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The costs order survived the bankruptcy discharge, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the motion.

The applicants sought a declaration that their homeowner's insurer had a duty to defend them in an underlying personal injury action.

The underlying action arose when a tree fell on a man at an uninsured property owned by the applicants.

The plaintiffs in the underlying action alleged the applicants were negligent in failing to hire a competent contractor to remove the tree.

The court held that this allegation could potentially fall within the 'personal actions anywhere in the world' coverage of the policy for the applicants' insured home, triggering the duty to defend.

The court ordered the insurer to defend the action with appropriate safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest, finding the request for independent counsel premature.

Following dismissal of a Rule 21.01 motion seeking determination of whether damages from a motor vehicle accident included aggravation caused by a later soccer-related incident, the court addressed costs of the motion.

The moving party on the underlying motion had been the plaintiff, but the defendant was entirely successful.

The court applied the principle that costs generally follow the result and rejected arguments that entitlement to costs should be deferred to the trial judge or awarded in any event of the cause.

The court found the defendant’s bill of costs reasonable with a reduction of 12 associate hours and fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs were ordered payable within 120 days.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to amend their statement of claim and to compel answers to certain refused questions arising from examinations for discovery in an action alleging negligence and breach of contract relating to an oil tank leak at their residential property.

The proposed amendments included pleading that the defendant sold the oil tank and breached obligations under the Sale of Goods Act.

The court held that the amendments did not introduce a new cause of action but rather advanced alternative legal bases and particulars arising from the same factual matrix already pleaded.

Accordingly, the amendments were permitted despite limitation period arguments.

The court also ruled on several discovery refusals, ordering answers to questions relevant to the defendant’s knowledge of corrosion risks and similar tank issues, subject to proportionality considerations.

Les demandeurs sollicitent l’autorisation d’interjeter appel du refus d’une injonction Mareva visant les biens de la défenderesse.

Ils soutiennent que le juge de motion a appliqué le critère erroné de la « forte apparence de droit » plutôt que celui d’une « simple apparence de droit ».

Le tribunal conclut qu’il existe des décisions incompatibles concernant le critère applicable aux injonctions Mareva et que la question revêt une importance suffisante pour justifier l’autorisation d’appel.

Le tribunal accorde donc l’autorisation d’interjeter appel et rend une ordonnance provisoire restreignant certains transferts d’actifs afin de préserver l’objet de l’appel.

La demande de sursis est toutefois refusée puisque l’injonction Mareva initiale avait été refusée.

The defendants brought a motion for further security for costs in two related actions involving corporate and foreign plaintiffs alleging ownership of certain inventions.

The court held that entitlement to security for costs had already been determined in an earlier order and that the only remaining issues were the appropriate form and quantum of additional security.

The plaintiffs proposed an undertaking rather than posting funds, but the court rejected this form of security due to the risk that an Ontario costs award might not be enforceable in Oregon because of potential sovereign immunity.

Assessing the anticipated costs of a lengthy and complex trial, the court fixed additional security at $585,000.

The plaintiffs were ordered to post the security by irrevocable letter of credit or by payment into court.

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant moved for production of the plaintiff's workplace harassment complaint file from a non-party employer, contending the records were relevant to damages, causation, and income loss.

The court held that while the records were confidential under workplace policy and privacy legislation, the plaintiff failed to establish common law privilege under the Wigmore criteria.

Applying the non-party production fairness analysis, the court found it would be unfair to require the defendant to proceed to trial without the documents because of their importance, the risk of trial delay, and the limited efficiency of obtaining the equivalent information otherwise.

Unredacted production was ordered from both the plaintiff and the employer, with a limited further examination for discovery permitted.

The parties attended a reference to deal with jointly owned properties and related accounting issues arising from the division of the proceeds of sale of jointly owned properties, following a trial order.

The Master addressed various post-separation adjustments, including carrying costs for the matrimonial home, a rooming house, and a trailer.

The Master found that post-separation adjustments for costs incurred prior to trial were subject to res judicata and should have been raised at trial.

The Master also determined that the applicant was not entitled to a credit for carrying costs of the matrimonial home post-separation, as they were offset by the respondent's potential claim for occupational rent.

Various other financial adjustments were ordered to be made from the proceeds of sale held in trust.

The bankrupt brought a motion under s. 178(1.1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act seeking an order that student loan debt be released from the statutory non-dischargeability provisions in bankruptcy.

The court considered whether the applicant had acted in good faith regarding the student loan obligations and whether the applicant had and would continue to experience financial hardship preventing repayment.

The evidence showed little effort to repay the loans and demonstrated ongoing employment and earning capacity.

The court found the applicant failed to establish both good faith efforts and continuing financial inability to repay.

The motion to discharge the student loan debt was dismissed.

The trustee opposed the automatic discharge of a bankrupt dentist under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Evidence showed that prior to bankruptcy the bankrupt spent approximately $228,000 from the sale of his dental practice despite advice to preserve funds for creditors, resulting in unsecured liabilities far exceeding available assets.

The court found several facts under s. 173 of the Act were established, including unjustifiable extravagance and conduct prejudicial to creditors.

Considering the integrity of the bankruptcy process and the bankrupt’s earning capacity as a dentist, the court determined that discharge should only occur subject to conditions requiring a significant repayment.

A conditional discharge was ordered requiring payment of $50,000, with the possibility of payment by agreed monthly installments.

The defendant moved to remove the plaintiff’s law firm on the basis of a conflict of interest, arguing the firm previously acted as its corporate counsel and therefore owed duties of loyalty.

The court found the defendant was technically a current client at the time the action was commenced, but the prior retainers were limited, sporadic, and of minor scope.

Applying the bright line rule from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held it was unreasonable in the circumstances for the defendant to expect the firm would not act against it in unrelated matters.

There was no risk of misuse of confidential information and no substantial risk that the representation would be materially affected.

The court concluded disqualification was not necessary to maintain the integrity of the administration of justice.

The defendants brought an unopposed motion seeking several forms of relief in a construction lien action, including vacating a claim for lien and certificate of action, ordering security for costs, and compelling production of financial records and responses to undertakings.

The court considered s. 44(2) of the Construction Lien Act and determined that, based on the defendants’ evidence and the absence of any responding materials from the plaintiff, there was no genuine issue requiring trial in relation to the lien claim.

The lien and certificate of action were therefore vacated without requiring any payment into court.

The court also applied Rule 56.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that security for costs was appropriate because the plaintiff corporation appeared to lack sufficient assets in Ontario.

Security for costs was ordered in the amount of $17,500 along with production obligations and costs of the motion.

The moving party sought an order under Rule 48.14(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure setting aside a registrar’s order dismissing his action for delay.

The underlying action between brothers sought recovery of more than $400,000 allegedly arising from loans dating back to the 1990s.

The court reviewed the contextual factors governing motions to set aside dismissal for delay, including explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the responding party.

The court found lengthy unexplained inactivity, insufficient evidence of inadvertence, lack of prompt action after learning of the dismissal, and a failure to rebut presumed prejudice arising from limitation issues and evidentiary concerns.

In the circumstances, it was not just to permit the action to proceed.

The plaintiff pedestrian sought leave to amend a statement of claim arising from a motor vehicle accident to add the defendant driver’s insurer as a defendant and to seek declaratory relief regarding insurance coverage.

The insurer denied coverage and argued that under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act a plaintiff cannot sue an insurer until judgment is obtained against the insured.

The court held that while the statute prevents a direct claim for payment before judgment, it does not preclude a claim for declaratory relief regarding coverage between interested parties.

Given the broad jurisdiction to grant declarations and the goals of efficient and proportionate litigation, the proposed amendments were legally tenable and would allow earlier resolution of the coverage dispute.

Leave to amend was therefore granted with the exception of a paragraph seeking a declaration that the insurer was obligated to pay any judgment.

A corporate plaintiff brought a motion seeking extensive third‑party telephone records, additional documentary disclosure, leave to amend pleadings to add claims arising from additional procurement requests, and extensions to litigation timelines in an action relating to federal procurement contracts.

The court applied Rules 26.01 and 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Limitations Act, 2002.

Leave to amend was partially granted only in relation to claims concerning a later procurement process and to further particularize an existing Charter damages claim, while proposed amendments relating to another procurement and new causes of action were refused as statute‑barred or untenable.

Broad disclosure requests relating to other bidders were rejected as irrelevant and disproportionate, but limited disclosure relating to the termination and re‑issuance of the relevant contract and documents relating to the permitted amendment were ordered.

Third‑party telephone record production was permitted subject to service and a temporary stay allowing the service providers to challenge the order.

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a motion seeking multiple discovery-related orders, including further production of documents, clarification of undertakings and refusals, and a second medical examination.

The court emphasized compliance with Rule 37.10(10) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring a refusals and undertakings chart and criticized the moving parties for failing to provide one.

Several document production requests were dismissed as irrelevant or disproportionate, while limited additional disclosure was ordered, including production of an unredacted medical file and updated affidavit of documents.

The plaintiff was also ordered to attend a neuropsychological independent medical examination.

The decision highlights proportionality and procedural compliance in discovery motions.

The defendant brought a motion seeking various forms of interim relief relating to possession and management of an Ottawa taxi plate that was the subject of a long-standing family dispute.

The moving party alleged breaches of a prior order governing rental payments and management of the taxi plate and sought additional orders including possession and other remedies.

The court found that the alleged breaches were disputed and that the existing order provided sufficient protection pending trial.

Leave was granted to amend the statement of defence to add a counterclaim under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the action was placed under case management with a timetable leading to trial.

Most substantive relief sought in the motion was dismissed, while procedural amendments and scheduling directions were granted.