Peter Lindsay

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a).

The Crown conceded that impaired driving had not been established, and the accused was acquitted of that charge.

The trial proceeded on the dangerous driving charge.

The Crown alleged that the accused was engaged in a high-speed race with three other vehicles on Highway 7 at approximately midnight on April 6, 2013, and that he lost control while attempting to pass, resulting in a head-on collision with an oncoming vehicle.

The accused testified that he was following another vehicle that suddenly braked, causing him to lose control.

The trial judge found that while the Crown's theory was plausible, the evidence fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the key Crown witness's testimony, limitations in his observational ability, and the absence of expert accident reconstruction evidence.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for delay in trial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol on May 24, 2013, with the information sworn on June 19, 2013.

The trial was scheduled for July 21, 2014, approximately 13¼ months later.

The court found that while the overall delay fell within acceptable institutional guidelines for the Peel Region, the Crown's negligent and repeated failures to provide complete and accurate disclosure, combined with specific prejudice to the accused, constituted a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application to exclude breath sample evidence.

The appellant contended the trial judge gave insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding the officers' reasonable grounds for the breath demand, and erred in the section 24(2) analysis.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officers had reasonable grounds based on the appellant's driving, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

At trial, the accused challenged the reliability of the breath test results, arguing that the Intoxilyzer 5000C had not undergone its recommended annual maintenance for over 13 months.

The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in St. Onge-Lamoureux, finding that 'improper operation' under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code includes improper maintenance.

The failure to perform the annual maintenance rebutted the presumption of accuracy of the breath test results.

Without reliable breath test results, the Crown could not prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, pleaded guilty to robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and disguise with intent, and was sentenced to two years less a day following a joint submission.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation, including part-time employment and educational progress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not significantly alter the picture presented to the sentencing judge, who had already factored the appellant's high potential for rehabilitation into the lenient sentence.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under s. 839 of the Criminal Code from a summary conviction appeal judge's decision overturning a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the 10 months of institutional delay was within the Morin guidelines for a two-day impaired driving trial and did not warrant granting leave.

The accused was charged with stunt driving and failing to comply with a roadside breath demand.

The accused conceded guilt on the stunt driving charge.

On the breath demand charge, the court found that while the accused failed to provide a suitable sample after 13 attempts, there was reasonable doubt regarding his mens rea due to evidence of potential defects in the approved screening device (ASD).

The officer had not personally tested the device, it was calibrated outside the 14-day window, and the officer lacked recent training.

The accused was acquitted of the Criminal Code charge.

The defendant was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act and with failing or refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant conceded guilt to the stunt driving charge but contested the breath demand charge.

The court found the defendant guilty of stunt driving but acquitted him of the breath demand charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the failure to provide a suitable breath sample resulted from the defendant's knowing misconduct or from defects in the operation of the ASD device.

The accused was charged with Over 80 (driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The trial turned on Charter applications regarding the admissibility of breath sample evidence.

The court rejected the defence argument that reply evidence regarding the calibration date of the approved screening device should be admitted.

The court found no violation of the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel or section 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court concluded that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to rely on the approved screening device fail, and that even if there had been a Charter breach, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2).

The accused was found guilty of Over 80.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the appeal judge misapprehended the appellant's trial evidence by concluding he admitted to an assault.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and disclosed no error, including the proper use of the appellant's prior inconsistent statements to police and on a 911 call.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code arising from a collision on Highway 401.

The trial judge relied on a combination of breathalyzer readings below the legal limit and expert toxicology evidence indicating likely impairment, together with findings about the manner of the collision.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to breathalyzer readings, expert opinion, and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court held that while the trial judge did not err in evaluating the collision or the breathalyzer and expert evidence, the analysis of bolus drinking was flawed because it focused improperly on large consumption while driving and involved speculation about the location of a bottle of alcohol in the vehicle.

Given the central role of this reasoning to the finding of guilt, the conviction could not stand.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol in his system on November 11, 2011.

He brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to have the charges stayed due to delay in trial.

The total delay from the date the information was sworn to the end of trial was approximately 15.5 months.

The court found that while some delay was neutral time and a small portion was attributable to the defence, the Crown was responsible for 6.5 months of delay due to an inexcusable systemic failure regarding videotape disclosure.

The accused suffered significant prejudice to his right to security of the person and his right to a fair trial.

The court granted the application and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 110-118 mg/100 ml of alcohol.

The court found a Charter breach under section 8 because the arresting officer failed to adequately address the issue of mouth alcohol before administering the approved screening device test.

Although the officer was aware of the strong odour of alcohol and recent consumption, he incorrectly believed a 10-minute waiting period was sufficient and did not make further inquiries.

The court excluded the breath evidence as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in blood following a traffic stop on December 18, 2010.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 9.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that he was arbitrarily detained when directed to sit in the police car during computer checks, finding that while the detention may not have been reasonably necessary, the evidence should not be excluded under the test in R v Aucoin.

The court also found that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and the breath demand based on observed signs of impairment.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved roadside screening device during a Ride Program stop.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning the appellant’s attempts to provide a breath sample and improperly rejected the appellant’s explanation for failing to provide a sufficient sample.

The appellant also alleged breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms relating to his detention and a strip search conducted prior to being lodged in cells overnight.

The court held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and was entitled to draw reasonable inferences regarding the appellant’s conduct.

The court further found that the detention was not arbitrary and that the strip search was justified on the individualized circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The vehicle had been found in a ditch and the appellant, who possessed the keys and was highly intoxicated, attempted to have a tow truck driver pull it out without notifying police.

The trial judge inferred that the vehicle was operable and that the appellant intended to move it if extricated, creating a risk of danger.

On appeal, the appellant argued that these conclusions were speculative rather than reasonable inferences from the evidence.

The appeal court held that the inferences were logically available based on the proven facts and common human experience, and that the trial judge committed no error of law.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The Crown relied on a breathalyzer certificate as evidence.

The court found that there was an unexplained delay of between 30 to 60 minutes between the accused's arrest at 1:06 and when the breathalyzer test was administered sometime after 2:15.

The delay violated the requirement that breath tests be conducted "as soon as practicable" as established in jurisprudence.

Consequently, the Crown was deprived of the statutory presumption contained in the Criminal Code and could not rely on the certificate as proof of the truth of its contents.

The Crown called no toxicologist to establish what the reading would have been at the time of driving.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile while having excess alcohol in his blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the officer complied with the requirement that an approved screening device (ASD) test be administered "forthwith." The defendant was detained for approximately 19 to 21 minutes after the officer formed reasonable suspicion before being given an opportunity to comply with the ASD demand.

During this period, the defendant was not informed of the reasons for detention or provided with his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found multiple Charter breaches and excluded the breath test results, leading to dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, which permits the Crown to avoid calling expert evidence if breath samples are taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offense.

The trial judge found that there was an unexplained delay of approximately 36 minutes between the accused's arrival at the police station and the administration of the first breath test.

The Crown failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for this delay.

Consequently, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption and the charge was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

Trial counsel mistakenly believed roadside statements regarding alcohol consumption could be used to impeach the accused’s credibility, and therefore failed to pursue a Carter defence, obtain relevant disclosure, or retain toxicology evidence.

On appeal, expert evidence suggested the approved instrument may have lacked proper maintenance and that the accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving could have been below the legal limit.

The court held that counsel’s misunderstanding of governing appellate authority affected strategic decisions and constituted ineffective assistance.

The resulting prejudice created a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different.