Peter Lindsay

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The Superior Court conducted a fresh analysis of the delays after finding that the trial judge had mistakenly omitted a two‑month period when calculating delay.

The court concluded that most delays were attributable to inherent time requirements of the case or institutional delay, with only one month attributable to the Crown.

The total unjustified delay of approximately eight months fell within the Morin guidelines and did not justify an inference of prejudice.

Balancing the limited delay, weak evidence of prejudice, and the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court found no Charter breach.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (impaired driving) on March 10, 2010.

The defence brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breaches of s. 11(b) (right to trial within a reasonable time) and s. 7 (right to life, liberty, and security of the person).

The total delay from charge to the second continuation date was approximately 21 months and three weeks.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, categorizing it into neutral intake period, institutional delay, Crown delay, and inherent time requirements.

The court found institutional delay of 13 months and 27 days, which exceeded the guideline of 8 to 10 months established in Morin.

Additionally, there was approximately 3 months of delay attributable to the Crown's tardy disclosure.

The court found no actual prejudice to the accused beyond presumed prejudice.

Despite the seriousness of drinking and driving offences, the court granted the stay of proceedings, finding the institutional delay alone was sufficient to breach the accused's s. 11(b) rights.

The accused, charged with impaired driving and driving over 80, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court analyzed the timeline from the swearing of the information to the trial dates, noting delays caused by the defence's change of counsel and refusal to proceed with a conditionally accredited interpreter.

The court found the institutional delay was approximately five and a half months, well within acceptable guidelines, and that the accused suffered no significant prejudice.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of driving over 80.

At trial, he raised a Carter defence, calling a toxicologist and a friend to testify about his alcohol consumption.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and convicted the appellant, noting the rigorous circumstances of the breath testing.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge violated the Boucher principle by using the breath test circumstances to assess his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the Crown called the Intoxilyzer technician to testify rather than relying solely on the certificate of analysis, the presumption of accuracy was not engaged, and the trial judge was entitled to consider all evidence, including the test results.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving after the trial judge excluded breathalyzer evidence, finding the officer lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge improperly altered the transcript of her oral reasons and erred in her legal analysis of reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal held that while altering transcripts of oral reasons is inappropriate, it did not affect the outcome.

Applying the Supreme Court's guidance in Shepherd, the Court found the officer's subjective belief was objectively reasonable given the appellant's erratic driving, flushed face, and admission of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for certiorari and prohibition based on alleged reasonable apprehension of bias and procedural unfairness by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's frustration with delays in a summary impaired driving proceeding and counsel's inability to cooperate was understandable and did not reflect bias.

The court remitted the matter to the Ontario Court of Justice for trial to proceed expeditiously.

The Crown appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for failing to provide the necessaries of life, which contributed to the death of her 22-month-old son.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly unfit given the enormity of the crime, noting that an 18-month sentence would have been appropriate under the previous regime.

However, because the respondent had already served her sentence, was out of custody, and had presented fresh evidence of rehabilitation and counselling, the Court declined to return her to custody and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, sexual touching, and incest against the complainant, appealed his convictions and 3.5-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge's comments regarding the complainant's cross-examination demonstrated bias and that the trial judge improperly treated his lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's comments, when read in context, merely acknowledged the painful impact of the cross-examination on the complainant and did not indicate a predisposition.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly recognized the absence of mitigation rather than treating lack of remorse as aggravating, and the appellant's health issues could be managed in custody.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissing his appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or material misapprehension of evidence in the lower court's reasons.

The court held there was ample evidence to support the conviction and rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, improperly rejected family members' evidence, improperly took judicial notice of the effects of alcohol, and failed to give adequate reasons for accepting the police officer's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge that while some of the trial judge's conduct was inappropriate, it did not compromise the appearance of fairness.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the lower court's assessment and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two robberies and two counts of using an imitation firearm.

The Court of Appeal found the convictions related to the 7-11 store robbery unreasonable, as the Crown's case relied on two highly unreliable witnesses who were crack cocaine addicts with spotty memories, and the store clerk's description did not match the appellant.

Those convictions were quashed.

However, the Court upheld the convictions for the Country Blenz Donut Shop robbery, finding that despite the unsavoury nature of the Crown's witness, the trial judge properly applied Vetrovec considerations and the evidence supported the conviction.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, which had upheld his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court erred in concluding that the trial judge acted reasonably in denying an adjournment to the unrepresented appellant.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's reasons without basis and failed to consider the importance of counsel given the Charter issues and the appellant's intention to testify.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by treating his task as merely choosing between the evidence of the appellant and the police officer.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with wilfully promoting hatred after police seized CDs containing hate-promoting lyrics from a table he was manning at a skinhead party.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding insufficient evidence that he sold the CDs.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the acquittal.

The Court held that while there was evidence of intent, there was no evidence the accused actually communicated the statements in the lyrics.

Furthermore, the Crown could not rely on a new theory on appeal that the CD covers themselves promoted hatred, as this would offend the rule against double jeopardy.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon, which arose from an incident involving a bondage fantasy.

The defence argued the complainant had consented while in an alcohol-induced blackout.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Crown's closing address was inflammatory and misstated evidence, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the expert evidence regarding blackouts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Crown overstated the evidence in some instances, the trial judge's instructions adequately corrected the errors and prevented prejudice.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made three reversible errors: improperly relying on consistency and demeanour to accept the evidence of an accomplice, erroneously treating the doctrine of recent possession as creating a presumption of fact, and improperly using post-offence conduct (disposing of a stolen cell phone) as probative of robbery when it was equally explained by the lesser offence of possessing stolen property.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on a youthful first-time offender who pleaded guilty to three armed robberies and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the trial judge.

The Court deferred to the trial judge's balancing of general deterrence and denunciation against significant mitigating factors, including the respondent's strict bail compliance for three and a half years and his successful rehabilitation efforts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding a bolus drinking defence and in her treatment of an expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were grounded in the evidence and she did not err in concluding the expert's opinion lacked a proper foundation after rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The court also affirmed that R. v. Heideman remains binding authority in Ontario regarding the requirement that an expert's report be probative of the blood-alcohol level at the time of the offence.

The respondents were charged with wilfully promoting hatred against the Roma people after participating in a demonstration outside a motel housing Roma refugee claimants.

The trial judge acquitted the respondents, finding the Crown failed to prove that the term 'gypsies' used in the demonstration was interchangeable with 'Roma'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered new trials, holding that the trial judge erred in law by focusing solely on the interchangeability of the terms rather than considering the totality of the evidence, and that he should have taken judicial notice of dictionary definitions linking the two terms.

The appellant, detained under a security certificate pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, appealed a Superior Court decision staying his application for habeas corpus.

He argued the Federal Court could not provide a timely remedy for his constitutional claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court properly declined jurisdiction because the Federal Court has concurrent jurisdiction, specialized expertise in immigration and national security, and an ongoing process that should not be circumvented.

The applicant appealed his conviction for assault, which arose from an attack by a group of skinheads on an unidentified black man.

The trial judge convicted the applicant based on a process of elimination, relying on the testimony of an accomplice and independent witnesses to conclude the applicant was the third participant in the chase.

The Court of Appeal found the independent evidence regarding the number of participants was too contradictory and unsatisfactory to form a safe basis for conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.