Peter Lindsay

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown did not dispute the accuracy of the breathalyzer readings but argued they should be admitted despite Charter breaches.

The court found two Charter violations: a section 10(b) breach due to failure to explain rights in the accused's language (Cantonese), and a section 8 breach due to the officer's failure to follow OPP protocol regarding potential sources of false positives on the approved screening device.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being stopped by police and failing an approved screening device test.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues: whether grounds existed for further testing despite the presence of mouthwash in the vehicle, whether the initial stop was arbitrary, and whether the accused's right to counsel was breached.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, but found multiple breaches of section 10(b) when police failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to speak with counsel of choice and made comments discouraging the exercise of that right.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusal to take a breathalyzer test following a traffic stop.

The Crown withdrew the dangerous driving charge at trial.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving and make a breath demand.

The officer's evidence contained significant discrepancies when compared to video evidence from the police cruiser, including mischaracterizations of the defendant's driving, minimization of the force used during the stop, and failure to account for the defendant's obvious language difficulties.

The court acquitted the defendant of the refusal charge, finding the breath demand was invalid.

Mr. Notaro appealed his conviction for driving with more than the legal concentration of alcohol, contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing the arresting officer failed to consider "fresh mouth alcohol" before administering a roadside screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a palpable and overriding error standard of review, found that the trial judge implicitly accepted the officer's awareness of the mouth alcohol issue and reasonably concluded that no circumstances warranted a delay or further inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs/100ml of blood following a traffic stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the accused had a blood alcohol level of 210 mgs/100ml based on approved instrument tests at the station.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, the delay in making the demand, the validity of the ASD test, and the adequacy of the right to counsel advice.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on the evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

She was stopped for an expired validation tag, and the officer detected alcohol and administered an approved screening device test which registered a fail.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples at the police station showing 160 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

The defence challenged whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable and whether the officer could rely on the ASD result.

The court found the Crown proved the samples were taken as soon as practicable and that the officer had reasonable grounds to rely on the ASD result.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Following a trial on Charter applications and the merits, the accused was found guilty.

The court dismissed Charter applications alleging breaches of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 9 (arbitrary detention) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that both officers had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test and that the test result was reliable.

The accused was sentenced to a fine of $1,750 plus victim surcharge (total $2,275), payable over one year, and an 18-month driving prohibition with a six-month suspension followed by 12 months of interlock device requirements.

The accused was charged with two impaired driving offences arising from a motor vehicle found stuck in snow on Highway 410.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that while the inference that the accused was the driver was probable, the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternative rational inferences existed, such as the accused being a passenger while the actual driver sheltered in a nearby tow truck.

Both charges were dismissed.

The appellant applied for leave to appeal a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant after excluding evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police officer delayed administering the approved screening device test due to concerns about fresh mouth alcohol.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court overturned the acquittal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding there was no evidence the officer had such a concern and therefore no Charter breach occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusal to provide a breath sample following a motor vehicle collision in Markham.

The Crown's case established that the defendant's vehicle drove directly off the road and crashed into a retail building with significant force.

The defendant testified that he had consumed three beers at a restaurant and had no memory of the accident.

The trial judge rejected the defendant's evidence regarding alcohol consumption and his claim of retrograde amnesia.

The court found the defendant guilty on all three counts based on the circumstances of the accident, observations of impairment by officers, and the defendant's unequivocal refusal to provide a breath sample.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit following a RIDE stop.

The trial judge excluded breath test results under s.24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of ss.8 and 9 because the officer had not personally self-tested the approved screening device before administering the roadside test.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the officer lacked reasonable grounds and that a self-test of the device was not a legal requirement.

The appellate court further held that the trial judge misapplied the framework in R. v. Grant when excluding reliable breath evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the breath test evidence admitted, and a conviction entered with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that directed a conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred by focusing on whether the arresting officer actually knew a test result was reliable, rather than whether the officer's belief was reasonable.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the appropriate remedy was a new trial, not a directed conviction, because a trial judge could conclude the officer's belief was unreasonable given his reliance on a rookie officer whose training was unknown.

The appeal was allowed in part, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an over 80 charge.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent after finding that the failure to conduct an annual inspection of the breathalyzer amounted to improper maintenance, raising a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results.

On appeal, the Crown argued that a 2012 Alcohol Test Committee position paper constituted new evidence justifying revisiting the Supreme Court's decision in St. Onge Lamoureux.

The summary conviction appeal judge rejected this argument but found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by elevating a recommendation for yearly inspections into a rule without a direct link to a malfunction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control and care and control over 80 after being found asleep in a running motor vehicle.

The Crown conceded care and control.

The trial judge found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to retain and instruct counsel of choice when the arresting officer failed to facilitate the accused's apparent request to contact someone, instead only offering duty counsel.

The trial judge also found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, with unexplained delays totalling over 25 minutes.

The evidence of impairment was found to be weak, with the accused appearing coherent and steady once fully awake.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

On a summary conviction appeal from an assault causing bodily harm conviction arising from a nightclub incident, the appellant argued that the trial judge compromised trial fairness by independently downloading a Google Street View image and using it to reject the defence explanation for an injury.

The court held that while judges may take judicial notice of indisputable facts from reliable internet sources, they must not conduct their own investigation or rely on material not fairly put to the accused.

Because the image was not put to the appellant and was used to support an adverse credibility finding, a reasonable observer would conclude that the fairness of the trial was compromised.

The argument that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof was rejected when the reasons were read as a whole.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant brought a motion pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis of a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level above the legal limit on January 26, 2013.

The information was sworn on February 13, 2013, and the trial began on February 21, 2014, but was adjourned due to witness unavailability.

The trial resumed on November 28, 2014, resulting in a total delay of 653 days.

The court found that the applicant had established a breach of section 11(b) rights and granted the stay of proceedings.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the grounds that her trial for impaired driving would not be heard within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled approximately 11 months and 3 weeks after the information was sworn.

The court applied the four-pronged test from R. v. Morin and found that while there was significant institutional delay (9 months and 24 days), the delay fell within the 8-10 month guideline established for criminal trials.

The court balanced the prejudice to the accused against the serious societal interest in trying impaired driving cases and dismissed the motion.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following an arrest on July 1, 2013.

The case proceeded to trial on September 15, 2014, at which point the defence brought a section 11(b) Charter application to stay the proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The court found that the total delay from the swearing of the information to the trial date exceeded 17 months, with approximately 11 months and 3 weeks attributable to Crown and institutional delay—well beyond the 8-10 month guideline established in R. v. Morin.

The delay was caused by Crown negligence in failing to notify a witness of the first trial date and late disclosure of a 911 call.

The accused demonstrated prejudice through additional work absences and increased legal costs from multiple missed trial dates.

Balancing the seriousness of impaired driving against the constitutional violation and prejudice, the court granted the stay.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded breath test evidence after finding a s. 8 Charter breach, concluding the officer failed to properly consider the possibility of fresh mouth alcohol before administering an approved screening device.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and incorrectly applied the governing legal principles regarding reliance on ASD results and the obligation to delay testing.

There was no evidentiary basis requiring the officer to suspect fresh mouth alcohol or delay the test.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction substituted, with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application because the arresting officer relied on an approved screening device (ASD) fail result after several error messages appeared.

The appellant submitted that the officer’s misunderstanding of the device’s error codes undermined reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent breath demand, contrary to ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that the Crown was not required to prove the ASD was functioning perfectly, only that the officer reasonably believed it was working properly.

The trial judge’s credibility findings regarding the officer were entitled to deference and supported the conclusion that reasonable grounds existed.