Peter D. Lauwers

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 16, 2018.

However, no counsel appeared for the appellant at the hearing, and counsel for the respondent advised that a Notice of Abandonment was to be filed.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants sought an extension of time to appeal a decision by Sosna J. dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage action.

The respondent bank had obtained a default judgment and a writ of possession.

The appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal was well out of time.

Although the court found that the appellants intended to appeal within the appeal period and the delay was not long, the motion was dismissed on the merits.

The appellants had not paid the mortgage in months and were merely seeking to delay execution of the default judgment through the appeal process.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal from an order of Swinton J. dismissing her application for judicial review of a decision by Kurke J. refusing leave to appeal an interlocutory order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian.

The applicant, who was self-represented, challenged the appointment on the grounds that it violated her human rights.

The court dismissed the motion for extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal and significant prejudice to the respondent from the delay.

The court held that judicial review does not lie against a Superior Court judge's refusal of leave to appeal, and therefore no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, a corporation, sought permission to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The motion judge granted leave for the sole shareholder to represent the corporation.

The respondent moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the appellant lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

The motion judge found reasonable grounds for security for costs and ordered the appellant to post security in the amount of $6,906.95 before the motion for leave to appeal was sent to a panel for disposition, but declined to require security for the appeal itself pending leave being granted.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a costs decision of the Superior Court awarding $121,892 to the respondent municipality.

The applicant also sought a stay of enforcement of the costs award pending disposition of the leave application.

The respondent sought dismissal of the motion or, alternatively, sought permission to conduct a judgment debtor examination and take steps to preserve the status quo, citing concerns about a potential fraudulent conveyance of the applicant's matrimonial home interest to his wife prior to the action.

The motions judge granted the stay of enforcement pending determination of the leave application.

The appellant sought a stay of the provisions of a final matrimonial order requiring her to transfer her interest in the matrimonial home to the respondent and vacate the property pending appeal.

The motions judge granted the stay relating to the disposition of the matrimonial home, residency, and division of household contents, while maintaining the obligation to pay child support.

The court found that the appellant established plausible grounds for appeal, irreparable harm to the status quo of the living arrangements, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant.

The appellants sought a stay of a writ of seizure and sale pending an appeal of a vexatious litigants order, along with requests for six months to arrange financing and to lift a Certificate of Pending Litigation.

The appellants were self-represented and had previously had their pleadings struck for non-compliance with court orders.

The court identified three procedural problems: the appellants lacked leave from a Superior Court judge to bring the motion, no appeal had been brought from the underlying costs order, and the appellants had not sought leave to appeal a default judgment of which they were unaware.

The court granted a limited stay of execution of the writ of seizure and sale until thirty days after the appeal of the vexatious litigants order was heard, and encouraged the appellants to retain legal counsel or seek pro bono assistance.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following two field strip searches conducted by police in a motel room.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the strip searches violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal found that both strip searches violated the appellant's section 8 rights because they were conducted in the field rather than at a police station, and the Crown failed to establish exigent circumstances justifying the field searches.

However, the Court of Appeal did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a mixed commercial/residential property in Port Perry.

The agreement contained a mortgage assumption condition requiring approval from the mortgagee, Alterna Savings, on terms acceptable to the buyer.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the condition precedent had not been satisfied because the buyer failed to formally accept Alterna's approval by signing and returning the approval letter before the deadline.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the condition precedent was satisfied when Alterna sent its approval letter, and that formal execution was not required.

The court ordered specific performance subject to Alterna renewing its approval on substantially similar terms.

Appeal from conviction for drug-related offences and breach of recognizance.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence seized during a search warrant execution at his residence.

The trial judge dismissed the s. 8 Charter motion based on a redacted information to obtain (ITO).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the redacted ITO contained sufficient grounds to support the search warrant.

The court determined that the confidential informant information was insufficiently reliable, with weak credibility assessment, inadequate corroboration, and non-compelling information regarding whether the firearm would be at the searched location.

The court also found the ITO contained misleading language suggesting the target lived at the residence when he did not.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his claim that he was a tenant entitled to protections under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The respondent had changed the locks on the unit and disposed of the appellant's belongings.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's finding that the appellant was not a legal tenant and therefore not entitled to tenant protections.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $300.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of fraud over $5,000, one count of uttering a forged document, and one count of personation.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a deceased witness under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and second, that the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the individual counts in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence and that the jury charge, while not ideal, was adequate in the context of the trial as a whole.

The respondent provided maintenance services to ten condominium corporations under two maintenance contracts.

The appellants terminated the winter maintenance contract but delayed notifying the respondent for several months to avoid jeopardizing completion of the summer contract.

The respondent performed extra unpaid work during this period in hopes of contract renewal.

The trial judge found the appellants breached the duty of honest performance by withholding termination information and accepting the unpaid work while knowing the contract would not be renewed.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the duty of honest performance does not require disclosure of termination decisions or restrict the exercise of contractual termination rights, and that the appellants' conduct, while potentially dishonourable, did not rise to the level of breach required under the good faith performance standard established in Bhasin v. Hrynew.

Hampton Securities Limited appealed a trial judgment in which the trial judge found that the employee, Christina Nicole Dean, was not indebted to Hampton for trading losses, was constructively dismissed, and was entitled to six months' notice in lieu of salary.

The trial judge also awarded damages for defamation and punitive damages, along with costs on a full indemnity basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld all findings, rejecting Hampton's arguments regarding the employment contract interpretation, constructive dismissal, the enforceability of the termination clause, the qualified privilege defence to defamation, and the appropriateness of punitive damages and costs awards.

The appellant corporation sought to overturn a lower court decision that dismissed its trespass claim and granted the respondent a declaration of title through adverse possession over encroachments created by a parking platform built on the respondent's land.

The platform's support timbers encroached onto the appellant's roadway and drainage area.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the respondent had established all three elements of adverse possession: actual possession for the statutory period, intention to exclude the true owner, and discontinuance of possession by the owner.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding a modified test for adverse possession in cases involving pre-existing easements and found that the encroachments were trifling and did not warrant injunctive relief.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision that it was obliged to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the respondent truck driver under an OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement on his personal automobile policy.

The respondent operated a tractor owned by his corporation and leased to a transport company under fleet insurance.

He suffered serious injuries when struck by an underinsured driver in Florida.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal sine die to allow the parties to enlarge the record with evidence regarding how Ontario-based truck drivers obtain underinsured coverage, recognizing that a ruling could affect thousands of commercial vehicle drivers and their families.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favor of Copperfin Credit Union against Rosalba Cupello on a personal guarantee of corporate indebtedness.

The appellant argued that Copperfin materially varied the loan agreement by advancing funds before obtaining all security documentation, thereby releasing the guarantor from liability.

The appellant also claimed a collateral agreement limited advances to $200,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the guarantee expressly protected the lender from liability variations, that no evidence supported the alleged collateral agreement, and that the entire agreement clause and parol evidence rule precluded such modifications.

This is a costs decision arising from a custody and access appeal concerning three children.

The father's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on all four grounds.

The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $25,000, representing 60-70% of her actual costs.

The decision addresses the presumption of costs in favour of successful parties in family law matters, the application of the Family Law Rules cost framework, and the impact of unreasonable conduct by both parties.

The court also addressed costs related to an unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Court, declining to award costs for that stage due to the confusing nature of family law appeal routes in Ontario.

The appellant appealed a costs award of over $300,000 made by the motion judge in family law proceedings.

The motion judge had awarded costs to the respondent following a successful motion to strike the appellant's answer on the basis that a constitutional issue was not properly pleaded.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the merits, which provided the appellant with the opportunity to amend his answer.

The respondent remained entitled to costs of the original motion, but the costs award was reduced from over $300,000 to $200,000.

The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by adopting a "close to full recovery" approach, giving undue weight to settlement offers in circumstances where settlement was not practically possible, inappropriately increasing costs based on the appellant's ability to pay and the respondent's financial need, and failing to apply the proportionality principle required by the Family Law Rules.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and his 12-month conditional sentence including eight months of house arrest.

The appeal raised three grounds: the validity of the search warrant, the admissibility of utterances made upon arrest, and jury instruction discrepancies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's validation of the search warrant, no error in admitting the spontaneous and voluntary utterances despite a Charter breach under section 9, and no legal error in the jury instructions.

The court upheld the conditional sentence as appropriate given the serious nature of the offence and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.