Patrice F. Band

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on trial delay in a transitional case under R. v. Jordan.

The applicant was charged with care or control "Over 80" driving while disqualified, and failure to comply with probation.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2016, and the delay application was argued on July 7, 2017.

The court calculated the net delay at 12½ months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the applicant had not established meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application was dismissed as not constituting a clear case for a stay.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle with over 80 ml of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

A police officer responded to a radio call about a possibly impaired driver and found the accused sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.

The accused failed a breath screening device and subsequently provided breath samples exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the accused occupied the driver's seat, which would engage the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court found the accused's evidence unreliable and internally inconsistent, while accepting the officer's credible testimony.

The court concluded the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was seated in the driver's seat, engaged the presumption, and the accused failed to rebut it on a balance of probabilities.

Guilty verdict entered.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit and while impaired by alcohol, following incidents on October 11, 2015.

The central issues involved Charter violations regarding warrantless entry into an underground parking garage, reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the right to counsel.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to enter the garage based on hot pursuit and exigent circumstances, that the arrest was lawful, and that the right to counsel was not violated.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt both excess alcohol and impairment.

The accused was charged with conspiracy and importation offences relating to a shipment of automotive tire-changing machines from Panama containing 50 kg of cocaine.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on the accused's involvement in arranging the shipment, intercepted communications, and his presence at the warehouse during the controlled delivery.

The accused testified that he was duped by his co-accused and had no knowledge of the cocaine.

The court found the Crown's circumstantial evidence did not eliminate reasonable doubt regarding the accused's knowledge of the illicit contents, despite credibility concerns about the accused's testimony.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused to police during a voluntariness voir dire.

The accused opposed admission, arguing the statements resulted from improper inducements or oppressive circumstances.

The court found no oppression, characterized certain inducements as minor, and determined the accused maintained meaningful choice throughout the interviews.

The court ruled the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused understood the seriousness of the situation and was selective in his responses to police questioning.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The trial commenced in January 2015 and evidence was completed in June 2016, with final submissions heard in November 2016.

The accused's application was brought following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the net delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling, it was justified by exceptional circumstances and the transitional exceptional circumstance applicable to cases substantially completed before Jordan was released.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and "Over 80" following a single-vehicle accident in a shopping plaza parking lot.

The central issue was whether the defendant or his partner was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

An independent eyewitness testified that she observed the defendant exit from the driver's side door and subsequently saw both occupants switch seats before police arrived.

The defendant's partner testified that she had been driving.

The court found the eyewitness credible and reliable, rejecting the partner's account as far-fetched and incredible.

The defendant was convicted as charged.

The accused was charged with importing approximately 500 grams of cocaine into Canada contrary to section 6 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act upon her return from Colombia.

The substance was discovered in her luggage during a secondary examination at Pearson Airport.

The Crown alleged the accused knowingly imported the controlled substance.

The accused denied knowledge of the substance in her suitcase.

The court applied the W.D. analysis to assess witness credibility and found that while the Crown's circumstantial evidence was considerable, the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt regarding her knowledge of the substance.

The court acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and possession of marijuana following a police pursuit initiated at a RIDE program.

The accused also brought a Charter application alleging excessive force and racial abuse by police officers.

The court found the accused guilty of failing to stop for police but acquitted him of dangerous driving and possession of marijuana.

The court rejected the accused's Charter application, finding he failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was subjected to excessive force or abuse.

Two young, first-time offenders pleaded guilty to smoking on board an aircraft and mischief to property following disruptive behaviour aboard a Cuba-bound flight.

The defendants consumed duty-free alcohol, became intoxicated, smoked in the washroom, and made a bomb threat that caused the aircraft to return to Toronto.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation and restitution, while the defendants sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed conditional discharges with 12-month probation, 100 hours additional community service, alcohol counselling, $500 fines for the aviation offence, and $7,500 restitution each to the airline.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after being pulled over on Highway 410 early in the morning.

The Crown admitted its case on the merits, and the sole issue at trial was whether the accused's right to counsel of choice had been breached.

The court found that police failed to fully inform the accused of her right to counsel and failed to facilitate her access to counsel of choice.

Instead, police funneled the accused toward duty counsel through a binary choice presentation, despite her clear indication that she wished to contact her boyfriend to obtain private counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the sole issue was whether her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was breached.

The accused, who was hysterical and hyperventilating, wished to contact her boyfriend to obtain a private lawyer, but police refused to let her call him directly and instead funnelled her to speak with duty counsel.

The court found that the police failed to fully inform the accused of her right to counsel of choice and failed to facilitate that right, creating a false dichotomy between police calling her boyfriend or her speaking to duty counsel.

The court concluded that the s. 10(b) breach was serious and excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, flight from police, and driving with excess alcohol (Over 80).

The trial involved both Charter and merits challenges.

The defendant alleged breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter regarding the breath demand and right to counsel.

On the merits, the defendant argued the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable and that the dangerous driving and flight from police charges were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the defendant guilty of Over 80 but acquitted him of dangerous driving and flight from police due to insufficient evidence and reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol content was over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The central issue at trial was whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and demand breath samples.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of the officers' evidence, alleging inconsistencies and omissions in their notes.

The court found that the arresting officer had sufficient grounds based on observations of the accused's driving (headlights off, missing tire, iPad under foot), her demeanor (unsteadiness, fumbling with documents), and the odour of alcohol.

The court rejected the defence's credibility challenges and found the officers' evidence credible and reliable.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

A commercial truck driver appealed his convictions for failing to maintain and carry a daily log, failing to surrender the log to police upon demand, and careless driving.

The incident involved a fatal rear-end collision on Hurontario Street in Brampton that killed two occupants of a taxi.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's application of the burden of proof regarding the log exception and the verdict on careless driving as unreasonable.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reviewable error and that the trial judge's conclusions were the only reasonable conclusions available on the evidence.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The charge involved driving a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The application was heard following the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which established presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that while the net delay of 17 months and 21 days fell below the 18-month ceiling for provincial courts, the delay was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The defence demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, the case was straightforward to somewhat more than straightforward, and the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to address delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The offender was convicted after trial of aggravated assault for stabbing an unarmed man in the upper chest within two seconds of the start of a consensual fight.

The victim suffered a collapsed lung requiring hospitalization.

The offender had no prior criminal record at the time of the offence but had subsequent convictions for violent offences.

The sentencing hearing was protracted, involving psychiatric and psychological assessments that revealed significant intellectual deficits, personality disorders with antisocial and borderline features, and a moderately high risk of violent reoffending.

The court imposed a sentence below the typical range for such offences, considering the offender's rehabilitative potential, intellectual limitations, and family support.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial date was approximately 20.5 months, none attributable to the defence.

The delay resulted from delayed disclosure by the Crown and institutional delays.

The court found that the delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court trials.

The Crown failed to establish that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the case was straightforward, the jurisdiction was not plagued by systemic delays, and the Crown's reliance on the seriousness of charges was not reasonable given the disclosure failures.

The charges were stayed.

The accused Jankovic and Formusa applied for directed verdicts of acquittal following a trial on charges of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, involving a shipment of tire changing machines from Panama containing approximately 50 kg of cocaine.

Formusa was observed at the warehouse receiving the shipment and was arrested while unloading it.

Jankovic arrived in Canada shortly before the delivery and had communications with Formusa and Avanes.

The court allowed Jankovic's application for directed verdict, finding insufficient evidence to establish his participation in the conspiracy or knowledge of the controlled substance.

The court dismissed Formusa's application, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a conviction on all counts.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) travel history documents relating to the accused Drago Jankovic, which showed his arrival at Pearson International Airport on August 23, 2013, from Amsterdam.

The Crown relied on the common law business records exception to the hearsay rule, as it did not comply with the Canada Evidence Act.

The accused challenged admissibility on Charter grounds, probative value, and personal knowledge grounds.

The court admitted the documents as business records, finding they were created in the ordinary course of business, were necessary and reliable, and that the testifying CBSA officers had sufficient knowledge of the systems and procedures involved.