Patrice F. Band

The Crown applied for an order to cease the cross-examination of a vulnerable adult complainant with significant intellectual disabilities during a preliminary inquiry.

The complainant had suffered a brain injury in childhood resulting in cognitive abilities comparable to a four or five-year-old child.

After approximately 30-45 minutes of cross-examination, the complainant experienced an emotional breakdown and subsequently threatened self-harm and to run away.

The court ordered the immediate cessation of cross-examination, finding that the complainant was no longer an appropriate witness to be cross-examined and that continued questioning posed risks to her safety and security.

The accused was charged with manslaughter in relation to the death of his 82-year-old mother and assault causing bodily harm in relation to his aunt.

During an argument at the front door of the family home, the accused pushed his aunt, which caused her to fall into his mother, resulting in his mother falling down concrete stairs.

His mother died in hospital several days later.

The Crown initially pursued a manslaughter charge based on transferred intent but later withdrew this charge after the pathologist's testimony.

The court found the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm against his aunt and unlawfully causing bodily harm against his mother, rejecting defences of consensual fight, self-defence, and defence of property.

The Crown brought applications to admit two hearsay statements from the complainant, who was unavailable to testify.

The first was a 911 call reporting a knife incident; the second was a sworn, cautioned, videotaped KGB statement describing both a knife incident and a hammer incident.

The court admitted the 911 call under the res gestae exception but excluded the KGB statement for failure to meet the principled exception to the hearsay rule as refined in R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found that while the KGB statement had procedural safeguards, it lacked sufficient substantive reliability due to the declarant's memory problems, significant criminal record, and material contradictions with medical records.

The accused was charged with firearms-related offences after police conducted a traffic stop and subsequent arrest.

The central issue was whether the accused was subjected to racial profiling.

The court found that while the initial traffic stop was lawful and not racially motivated, the subsequent arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the Charter breach against society's strong interest in prosecuting serious firearms offences on the merits.

The accused was charged with robbery and wearing a disguise in connection with an alleged robbery on October 28, 2016.

The Crown's case relied on hearsay evidence: a 911 call and a videotaped statement from a witness who claimed complete amnesia at trial.

The court excluded both pieces of hearsay evidence, finding that the 911 call did not satisfy the res gestae exception and that the witness's statement failed to meet the threshold reliability requirements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule as refined in R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found the witness's testimony at trial was not credible and that the corroborative evidence from other witnesses was tainted and unreliable.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates from April 2016 to September 2017.

The accused was found asleep in the passenger seat of a parked vehicle with a flat tire.

Police arrested him and demanded a breath sample, which he refused.

The accused argued he was not in care or control because he was a passenger, and that he had a reasonable excuse for refusing the breath sample due to health concerns.

The court found the accused not guilty of impaired care or control but guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on trial delay in a transitional case under R. v. Jordan.

The applicant was charged with care or control "Over 80," driving while disqualified, and failure to comply with probation.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2016, and the delay application was argued on July 7, 2017.

The court calculated the net delay at 12½ months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the applicant had not established meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application was dismissed as not constituting a clear case for a stay.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having over 80 ml of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

A police officer observed the accused's vehicle with no lights on, approached him at a gas station, and formed suspicion of impairment based on odour of alcohol, slurred speech, and staggering.

The officer made an approved screening device demand, but the accused inhaled rather than exhaled twice.

The officer arrested the accused for impaired operation.

The Crown relied on breath samples obtained approximately 65 minutes after the initial observation.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to incomplete and vague evidence, and that the breath samples were not obtained as soon as practicable due to an unexplained 9-minute delay for a phone call and a 13-minute gap at the police division.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle with over 80 ml of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

A police officer responded to a radio call about a possibly impaired driver and found the accused sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.

The accused failed a breath screening device and subsequently provided breath samples exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the accused occupied the driver's seat, which would engage the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court found the accused's evidence unreliable and internally inconsistent, while accepting the officer's credible testimony.

The court concluded the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was seated in the driver's seat, engaged the presumption, and the accused failed to rebut it on a balance of probabilities.

Guilty verdict entered.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit and while impaired by alcohol, following incidents on October 11, 2015.

The central issues involved Charter violations regarding warrantless entry into an underground parking garage, reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the right to counsel.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to enter the garage based on hot pursuit and exigent circumstances, that the arrest was lawful, and that the right to counsel was not violated.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt both excess alcohol and impairment.

The accused was charged with conspiracy and importation offences relating to a shipment of automotive tire-changing machines from Panama containing 50 kg of cocaine.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on the accused's involvement in arranging the shipment, intercepted communications, and his presence at the warehouse during the controlled delivery.

The accused testified that he was duped by his co-accused and had no knowledge of the cocaine.

The court found the Crown's circumstantial evidence did not eliminate reasonable doubt regarding the accused's knowledge of the illicit contents, despite credibility concerns about the accused's testimony.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused to police during a voluntariness voir dire.

The accused opposed admission, arguing the statements resulted from improper inducements or oppressive circumstances.

The court found no oppression, characterized certain inducements as minor, and determined the accused maintained meaningful choice throughout the interviews.

The court ruled the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused understood the seriousness of the situation and was selective in his responses to police questioning.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The trial commenced in January 2015 and evidence was completed in June 2016, with final submissions heard in November 2016.

The accused's application was brought following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the net delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling, it was justified by exceptional circumstances and the transitional exceptional circumstance applicable to cases substantially completed before Jordan was released.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and "Over 80" following a single-vehicle accident in a shopping plaza parking lot.

The central issue was whether the defendant or his partner was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

An independent eyewitness testified that she observed the defendant exit from the driver's side door and subsequently saw both occupants switch seats before police arrived.

The defendant's partner testified that she had been driving.

The court found the eyewitness credible and reliable, rejecting the partner's account as far-fetched and incredible.

The defendant was convicted as charged.

The accused was charged with importing approximately 500 grams of cocaine into Canada contrary to section 6 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act upon her return from Colombia.

The substance was discovered in her luggage during a secondary examination at Pearson Airport.

The Crown alleged the accused knowingly imported the controlled substance.

The accused denied knowledge of the substance in her suitcase.

The court applied the W.D. analysis to assess witness credibility and found that while the Crown's circumstantial evidence was considerable, the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt regarding her knowledge of the substance.

The court acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and possession of marijuana following a police pursuit initiated at a RIDE program.

The accused also brought a Charter application alleging excessive force and racial abuse by police officers.

The court found the accused guilty of failing to stop for police but acquitted him of dangerous driving and possession of marijuana.

The court rejected the accused's Charter application, finding he failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was subjected to excessive force or abuse.

Two young, first-time offenders pleaded guilty to smoking on board an aircraft and mischief to property following disruptive behaviour aboard a Cuba-bound flight.

The defendants consumed duty-free alcohol, became intoxicated, smoked in the washroom, and made a bomb threat that caused the aircraft to return to Toronto.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation and restitution, while the defendants sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed conditional discharges with 12-month probation, 100 hours additional community service, alcohol counselling, $500 fines for the aviation offence, and $7,500 restitution each to the airline.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after being pulled over on Highway 410 early in the morning.

The Crown admitted its case on the merits, and the sole issue at trial was whether the accused's right to counsel of choice had been breached.

The court found that police failed to fully inform the accused of her right to counsel and failed to facilitate her access to counsel of choice.

Instead, police funneled the accused toward duty counsel through a binary choice presentation, despite her clear indication that she wished to contact her boyfriend to obtain private counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, flight from police, and driving with excess alcohol (Over 80).

The trial involved both Charter and merits challenges.

The defendant alleged breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter regarding the breath demand and right to counsel.

On the merits, the defendant argued the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable and that the dangerous driving and flight from police charges were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the defendant guilty of Over 80 but acquitted him of dangerous driving and flight from police due to insufficient evidence and reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol content was over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The central issue at trial was whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and demand breath samples.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of the officers' evidence, alleging inconsistencies and omissions in their notes.

The court found that the arresting officer had sufficient grounds based on observations of the accused's driving (headlights off, missing tire, iPad under foot), her demeanor (unsteadiness, fumbling with documents), and the odour of alcohol.

The court rejected the defence's credibility challenges and found the officers' evidence credible and reliable.

The accused was convicted on both counts.