Wills, Estates, Trusts Law - OCA

The appellant, Bishop Girgis, appealed a lower court decision that interpreted and rectified a will to distribute proceeds from a property sale to the estate of the deceased's brother, rather than to the residuary beneficiary (Bishop Girgis).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the rectification on the basis that it gave effect to the testator's plain intention, despite disagreeing with the application judge's specific analytical path.

Costs were awarded against the appellant.

The First Nations moved to vary costs awards against the Estate of William Albin Herold, seeking to make Jeffrey S. Herold, the Estate Trustee, jointly and severally liable for over $190,000 in costs.

This motion was brought under Rule 59.06(2)(a) after the First Nations discovered that Mr. Herold had personally received a transfer of Lot 35, the property forming the basis of the Estate's claim to certain islands, a fact not disclosed during the original litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion regarding Supreme Court of Canada costs, stating it lacked authority, but granted the variation for its own costs awards.

The court found that the non-disclosure was a material fact, not a mere irregularity, and that Mr. Herold was the true litigant, satisfying the "person of straw" test for imposing costs on a non-party.

The appellant, as litigation administrator of her father's estate, appealed the dismissal of an action concerning an alleged unauthorized property transfer and a personal costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the property transfer was authorized, for valuable consideration, and that the action was statute-barred.

The court also dismissed the costs appeal, affirming the personal costs award against the appellant due to her unreasonable conduct and pursuit of litigation primarily for personal benefit based on unsubstantiated fraud allegations.

This is an appeal from the Divisional Court, which upheld a certification judge's decision that a class action claim for breach of fiduciary duty against investment advisors did not disclose a cause of action.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario examined whether the claim adequately pleaded an ad hoc fiduciary relationship, considering factors beyond just professional rules.

The Court found that the lower courts erred by narrowly interpreting the pleading, and that the claim, taken as a whole, sufficiently pleaded vulnerability, trust, reliance, and discretion, in addition to breaches of professional standards.

The appeal was allowed, declaring that the claim did disclose a cause of action for breach of a class-wide fiduciary duty, and the matter was remitted for redetermination of other certification criteria.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application seeking an accounting of her late mother's estate.

The application judge had dismissed the application on two grounds: that a 2019 consent order concluded the matter, and that further litigation would constitute an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decision, upholding the interpretation of the consent order and the finding of abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment holding appellants liable on guarantees related to a syndicated mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that personal and corporate guarantees were incorporated by reference into the investment agreements, despite investor unawareness and limiting clauses, based on objective contractual interpretation and trustee disclosure duties.

However, the Court varied the damages calculation, ruling that the interest rates specified in the Loan Participation Agreements (10% or 12%) should apply, not the 18% rate from the Loan Commitment.

The appeal was dismissed on liability but allowed on the interest rate calculation.

The moving parties, Henia Gefen and Harvey Gefen, sought a review of a single judge's dismissal of their motions to stay a motion judge's order.

The underlying order had declared Henia Gefen incapable of managing her property and instructing counsel, appointing a litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motions, finding no legal error or misapprehension of evidence in the single judge's decision.

The court also addressed costs, fixing Harry Gefen's costs at $5,000 and ordering Ronald B. Moldaver, K.C., Henia Gefen's counsel, to bear personal responsibility for costs related to the review motion he brought on her behalf without authority, disallowing him from charging Henia Gefen for these costs.

The appellants, beneficiaries of an estate, appealed a Superior Court order that declared they had no interest in a property, ordered them to vacate, and required them to pay occupation rent.

Their appeal primarily argued that the motion judge erred by failing to grant them an adjournment and by providing insufficient reasons for the denial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The court noted that it was not the appellants' first adjournment request, they had received legal advice, and the ongoing delay prejudiced other beneficiaries of the estate.

Costs were awarded against one appellant.

On appeal from a motion judge's decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether real estate sales commissions collected by a receiver of an insolvent brokerage firm constitute trust funds for the real estate salespersons who effected the sales, or form part of the assets available to creditors.

The motion judge found no trust existed, concluding that certainty of intention to create a trust had not been established.

The appellants (agents and their insurer) challenged this conclusion on two bases: that the motion judge erred in attaching significance to evidence weighing against a trust, and that he failed to attach sufficient significance to evidence supporting a trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in his weighing of evidence.

The court affirmed that formal trust agreements are not required for an implied trust to arise, but the absence of such provisions in the agent agreements, combined with financial statements showing commissions as assets rather than trust funds, supported the conclusion that no trust was intended.

The appellant appealed a sentencing order imposing 15 days in jail, to be served on weekends, for contempt of an order relating to the passing of accounts of his aunt's estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by considering that the appellant had not put forward a plan for adequate supervision of house arrest terms in concluding that a conditional sentence was not appropriate.

The court noted that the appellant had purged his contempt, was a lawyer with over 45 years of practice, was 73 years old with no prior convictions or contempt findings, and that his non-compliance arose from a failure to understand and appreciate the importance of complying with the order rather than callous disregard for court authority.

The sentence was suspended and set aside.

The appellant appealed from two orders arising from estate proceedings following her former spouse's death.

The appellant sought to advance claims against the estate for arrears in spousal support, ongoing spousal support, return of property, and unjust enrichment.

The lower court had imposed a requirement that the appellant obtain leave of the court before advancing any claims, based on a prior order made in bankruptcy proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the lower court erred in extending the reach of the bankruptcy order beyond the bankruptcy proceedings and in imposing a vexatious litigant requirement without a formal declaration.

The court allowed the appeal in part, set aside the March 15, 2017 order, and directed the estate trustee to bring a motion for directions to establish a timetable for administration of the estate and determination of the appellant's claims.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against the estate of their first cousin, Dr. Sherman, and others.

The appellants claimed that Dr. Sherman owed them an ad hoc fiduciary duty to look after their financial interests and that he breached this duty by failing to honour an option agreement that would have allowed them to acquire shares in the family businesses.

The motion judge dismissed the action on two grounds: first, that no genuine issue requiring trial existed regarding the fiduciary duty, and second, that the action constituted an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate issues already determined in a prior unsuccessful action against Royal Trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.

The trustees of the estate of Anne Emily Janicek brought an application for advice and directions regarding the construction of the will's provisions concerning the sale of the "Home Farm." The will provided that the farm could be purchased by any of the testatrix's children, or a combination thereof, at 75% of appraised fair market value within one year of death, with an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to be concluded within that period.

If no such agreement was reached, the trustees could sell the farm at their discretion.

The trustees received competing individual offers from four children within the prescribed period but were uncertain which to accept and sought court guidance.

The application judge ordered that the trustees could sell the farm to whomever they chose at any price in their sole discretion.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding the will did not require the trustees to sell to him and that the trustees had acted appropriately.

Justice van Rensburg dissented, finding the application judge erred by failing to address whether the trustees had frustrated the appellant's purchase attempt and by failing to apply principles of will interpretation to determine the testatrix's intention regarding competing offers.

The appellant, the only son of the deceased, appealed an order by the application judge that the deceased did not create a life interest in the family home in his favour.

The deceased's will expressed a wish that the son use the family home as his home "for as long as he wishes," but also provided that the home be transferred to his three children jointly.

The appellant lived in the home but failed to maintain it, resulting in disrepair and tax arrears.

The application judge concluded that the deceased did not intend to create a life interest and ordered the home sold.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error and dismissed the appeal.

An appeal from a Superior Court order striking out a notice of objection to the passing of accounts in the estate of Lidia Iaboni.

The appellant, Carlo Iaboni, objected to the respondents' administration of his parents' estates on grounds of alleged misappropriation of funds.

The motions judge struck the notice of objection on three bases: lack of merit, abuse of process (attempting to relitigate a dismissed action), and being time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motions judge and noting that the appellant's factual allegations were not substantiated.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision denying probate of a 2012 will and dismissing the probate application.

The trial judge found suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the will, determined that the appellant failed to prove the testator's testamentary capacity, and held that the appellant failed to establish the testator's knowledge and approval of the will's contents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision on all grounds, finding that the suspicious circumstances displaced the presumption of testamentary capacity, placing the burden on the appellant to prove capacity.

The court also rejected the appellant's application to admit fresh evidence on appeal, finding the due diligence requirement was not met.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a review motion and appeals in a family law matter involving guardianship and estate issues.

The court awarded costs to the successful party, Michael Childs, on a partial indemnity basis.

The costs were to be paid from the assets of the incapable person (Eileen Childs) through her guardian, BMO Trust Company, with the amounts to be offset against any inheritance received by the unsuccessful parties.

Shareholders of two successive corporate ventures to develop oil and gas fields in Russia sued defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, and conspiracy.

The defendants had induced the plaintiffs to invest US$50 million in a sham public company (Magellan) by falsely representing that another investor (BDW) had committed to investing US$70 million.

When the fraud was discovered, the parties reorganized under a new company (Koll), but the defendants continued to deceive the plaintiffs about asset values and IPO prospects to induce further investment.

The trial judge awarded full compensatory damages to the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the court upheld liability for pre-June 2006 conduct but set aside liability for post-June 2006 conduct based on unpleaded fraudulent misrepresentation claims regarding IPO-related statements, while maintaining liability for wrongful garnishment of remaining Magellan funds.

An appeal from a Superior Court judgment concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a testator's will.

The deceased's will permitted his common law spouse to remain in his home on the condition that only she and two tenants occupy the residence.

The lower court found that the spouse breached the will's terms by allowing her family to live at the property, terminated her right to remain, and removed the co-estate trustee for conflict of interest.

The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, finding no factual or legal error and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

An appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order was dismissed on consent of both parties.

The appellant, 144673 Ontario Limited carrying on business as Whiskey A Gogo, and the respondent, the Estate of Freddie Romanoski, agreed to the dismissal of the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.