Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Crown acknowledged, after review of trial transcripts and an independent interpreter's assessment of audio recordings, that there were numerous and significant errors in the interpretation of the appellant's evidence during trial.

The appeal against conviction was allowed with the Crown's consent.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of touching for a sexual purpose against a child victim aged 9-11 years old.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and alleged errors in the assessment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were properly grounded in the evidence as a whole and that no reversible error occurred.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, with the victim surcharge being set aside.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant failed to appear at the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The Crown appealed from directed acquittals on charges of break and enter, pointing a firearm, and forcible confinement arising from an alleged assault on Alex Gingras.

The trial judge had granted a directed verdict motion at the end of the Crown's case.

The respondent did not appeal his convictions on other charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly assessed the credibility and reliability of the Crown witness and that there was evidence capable of supporting convictions on all three counts.

The court rejected the respondent's alternative argument that the verdicts would necessarily have been the same had the trial judge properly refused the directed verdict motion, as it could not assume the respondent would not have testified.

The appeals were allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a bar security head, had smashed the complainant's head against glass doors and punched him in the face, causing lacerations including one that severed the complainant's tear duct.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding causation.

The Crown appealed the sentence of suspended passing and three-year probation.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made critical errors regarding the essential link between the appellant's assault and the wounding injury, but determined the appellant was properly found guilty of the included offence of assault simpliciter.

The court substituted the verdict accordingly and affirmed the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of his daughter-in-law.

At trial, he advanced a non-insane automatism defence, claiming he was in a dissociative state when he shot the victim.

The sole ground of appeal concerned Crown counsel's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown violated the principle in Browne v. Dunn by failing to confront defence witnesses with inferences and arguments later urged to the jury.

The trial judge found one Browne v. Dunn violation and two material misstatements of evidence but rejected seven other defence arguments.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's rulings, finding the corrective instructions adequate and the other Crown submissions not improper.

The self-represented appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence regarding the condition of a brake system was fabricated, that evidence of prior audits was improperly admitted, and that evidence from an MTO investigation was improperly obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably rejected the fabrication claims, the prior audits were admissible to show a pattern of conduct, and the appellant could not raise Charter issues for the first time on appeal after failing to bring an application at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to treat a witness's gratuitous personal opinions and the manner in which he gave evidence.

The appellant also argued that the Crown asked an improper question during re-examination about a trip to Windsor shortly after the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were correct and the re-examination question was proper given the defence's cross-examination.

The appellant appealed convictions for two sexual assaults arising from a former intimate relationship and sought to replace concurrent custodial sentences with conditional sentences.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, did not materially misapprehend the complainant's evidence, and did not subject the appellant's testimony to uneven scrutiny.

On sentence, the court held that the second assault properly engaged a trust-based aggravating consideration within the parties' prior intimate relationship and that the sentences imposed were not demonstrably unfit.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a conviction and penitentiary sentence arising from a historical sexual assault in which consent was the central issue.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge improperly used prior consistent statements and post-offence conduct to bolster the complainant’s credibility, misapprehended evidence, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny, and gave insufficient reasons.

The court held that the impugned statements were admissible and were used only to assess consistency of conduct placed in issue by the defence, not for their truth.

The proposed fresh evidence relating to a post-trial statement by the complainant did not meet the admissibility test because it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on a youthful first offender convicted of sexually assaulting an unconscious 14-year-old complainant after heavy drinking.

The Court of Appeal held that, despite strong rehabilitative prospects, family support, and strict bail compliance, the gravity of the offence and the offender's callous post-offence conduct required a custodial sentence to give proper effect to denunciation and general deterrence.

Applying the conditional sentence framework and the demonstrably unfit standard, the court found the community-based sentence outside the acceptable range.

In light of the respondent's completion of 16 months of the conditional sentence before appeal, the sentence was varied to nine months' imprisonment followed by six months' probation.

The 18-year-old appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for a brutal robbery of an elderly store clerk.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence was just outside the range established in similar cases, particularly R. v. Borde.

The majority reduced the sentence to six years (effective eight years with pre-trial custody) to better reflect the principle of parity and the appellant's potential for rehabilitation.

MacPherson J.A. dissented, finding no error in the trial judge's sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a 1995 home robbery after being arrested over ten years later.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a six-month custodial sentence, but the sentencing judge rejected it and imposed an 18-month sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to explain how the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as required by R. v. Cerasuolo.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to the jointly submitted six months.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice upholding a committal order made by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the preliminary inquiry judge provided a careful analysis of the evidence which warranted the committal for trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence after inflicting a severe beating on the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that the offence required a lengthy penitentiary sentence, especially given the appellant's serious criminal record and prior convictions for similar offences of violence.

The court concluded that the trial judge made no error in principle, the sentence was not unfit, and the appellant remained a serious danger to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was fit given the severe trauma caused by the assault.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision declining to designate the respondent a dangerous offender and instead declaring him a long-term offender following a predicate sexual assault causing bodily harm and an extensive history of violent sexual offending.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in law by failing to make the required finding of substantial risk under s. 753.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and by selectively relying on evidence of treatability while ignoring significant contrary evidence.

The court emphasized that public protection is the governing objective and that a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community must rest on evidence amounting to more than hope or speculation.

The appeal was allowed, the long-term offender designation was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court.

The Crown conceded that the summary conviction appeal court acted upon the wrong set of rules in dismissing the appellant's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the summary conviction appeal court to be determined on its merits.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 117.04(1) of the Criminal Code, which authorizes search warrants for weapons on public safety grounds, arguing it violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the provision violates s. 8 because it lacks a requirement that the peace officer have reasonable grounds to believe that weapons are likely to be found on the person or premises to be searched, and that such grounds be presented to the issuing justice.

The Court found this omission allowed for overbroad searches and could not be saved under s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force or effect, with the declaration suspended for six months, and the search warrant for the appellant's residence was quashed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and other offences.

At his third trial, the Crown sought to introduce his personal diary as part of its case-in-chief.

The trial judge excluded the diary, ruling its admission would violate the accused's Charter rights against self-incrimination by tactically compelling him to testify.

The Crown called no further evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the diary was created prior to state intervention and its admission did not create a legal compulsion to testify.

The Court also found no abuse of process in the Crown's decision to call no evidence.