Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order that permanently stayed their action against a law firm (A&B) on the basis that it constituted an abuse of process for not having been added to an existing 'Main Action' involving the same factual circumstances.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in concluding that commencing a separate action was an abuse of process, as it is not always abusive to start a new action instead of amending an existing one, especially when distinct claims or privilege concerns are involved.

However, the Court upheld the procedural direction that the claims should proceed in a single action.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the permanent stay and replacing it with a temporary stay, allowing the appellants to bring a motion to add A&B as a defendant to the Main Action, with the ultimate determination of a permanent stay to be made by the motion judge hearing that application.

The appellant, Starkman Barristers, sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that referred their accounts for assessment under the Solicitor's Act.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the proposed appeal because the order was interlocutory, not finally determining the real issue between the parties.

The court reiterated that appeals from interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal that partially reduced damages awarded to the respondents at trial.

The appellants argued that the reduced award, falling below their pre-trial Offer to Settle, should significantly impact the trial costs.

The court, considering the divided success at trial, the unrealistic claims made by both parties, and the prolonged litigation, set aside the trial judge's costs award and ordered that the parties bear their own costs for the trial level.

The appellants were awarded agreed-upon costs for the appeal.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against the provincial government for its response to COVID-19 in long-term care homes, asserting claims in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter s. 7.

The motion judge certified the negligence claim against the Minister of Long-Term Care (MLTC) but struck the other claims.

This appeal and cross-appeal challenged that decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appellants' appeal (seeking to certify the struck claims) and the respondent's cross-appeal (seeking to decertify the negligence claim against the MLTC), thereby upholding the motion judge's original certification decision.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her claim under Rule 2.1.01(1) as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The original claim alleged obstruction of access to justice by court staff and Charter discrimination.

The motion judge found the claim unintelligible, incoherent, and an attempt to relitigate, noting statutory immunity for court staff.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01(6), finding the appellant's arguments lacked arguable errors and the appeal, like the original claim, made broad, unsustainable allegations with no prospect of success, consistent with Crown immunity principles.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant, Assignment Credit Corp., was ordered to pay costs to several respondents (MCAP Financial Corporation, Dorr Capital Corporation, and Cherniak Law Professional Corporation).

The court rejected the appellant's argument that prior costs agreements should stand, as they were made before the appellant's non-disclosure of a material fact (that the Mesbur Judgment was obtained on consent) was revealed.

This non-disclosure, which impacted the second issue of the appeal, justified an elevated costs award on a solicitor-client basis for the affected respondents.

The 167 respondents were denied costs due to their own failure to disclose the consent judgment and their underlying financial obligations.

Karen Bell appealed the dismissal of her defamation action against Garden River First Nation and two councillors.

The action arose from a Censure Motion passed by the Council, which stated Bell had shared "false information" in a Facebook post.

The motion judge found the statement prima facie defamatory but upheld the defence of justification, concluding the information was indeed false.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Bell's motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it irrelevant, and affirmed the motion judge's interpretation of the Censure Motion.

The Court agreed that the specific quoted information in Bell's Facebook post was false and misleading, thereby upholding the defence of justification.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Oslyn Lewis, appealed the dismissal of his action for a real estate commission, which was granted by a motion judge on summary judgment due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in finding no tolling agreement, in not allowing him to adduce evidence of psychological incapacity, and in applying the discovery rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision.

The court affirmed the strict test for tolling agreements, found the fresh evidence regarding incapacity insufficient and inconsistent with the appellant's prior actions, and distinguished the case from situations involving running accounts for limitation purposes.

The appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant sought a review of a chambers judge's order that partially lifted an automatic stay pending appeal, arguing the judge erred in finding financial hardship without sufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion for review, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the chambers judge's exercise of discretion under Rule 63.01(5).

The court affirmed that the chambers judge correctly applied the factors for lifting a stay, including financial hardship, ability to repay, and appeal merits, and that the appellant's own admission regarding the minimum amount owed supported the decision.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order staying proceedings due to the appellants' unauthorized possession and review of the respondents' privileged documents.

The parties were involved in a failed joint venture to establish a Schedule 1 bank.

The appellants, particularly Scott Penfound, obtained and accessed voluminous privileged emails and legal strategy documents belonging to the respondents from a shared file server.

The motion judge found a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, which the appellants failed to rebut by not providing evidence of the scope of their review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that significant, ongoing prejudice existed that could not be cured by a lesser remedy, especially given the client's direct access to the information and lack of transparency.

The appellants, former litigation counsel, appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion based on a limitations defence in a solicitor negligence claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal, or alternatively, that commencing an action earlier was not an appropriate means to remedy it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the claim was not time-barred, emphasizing that the respondents reasonably relied on their counsel's advice regarding the underlying litigation's legal errors, thus delaying discoverability of the negligence claim.

The appellants, four corporate entities and their principal, appealed a Superior Court decision that confirmed an assessment officer's assessment of four accounts from their former solicitors, totaling $148,120.95.

The appellants argued the assessment officer exceeded jurisdiction, erred in findings, and showed reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reviewing judge's decision, which had applied a deferential standard of review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The City of Toronto appealed a motion judge's decision that dismissed the City's summary judgment motion and granted reverse summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Robyn Graham and David Mitchell.

The original action stemmed from Ms. Graham tripping on a pothole, and the City argued the claim was barred due to late notice under the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The motion judge found a reasonable excuse for the late notice and no prejudice to the City.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal, affirming that the motion judge's grant of reverse summary judgment was procedurally fair and that her findings on reasonable excuse and lack of prejudice were supported by the evidence and applicable law.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal arising from a trial judgment concerning oppression and conspiracy claims related to a condominium corporation.

The appellants (original defendants) challenged the trial judge's findings that claims against one defendant were not statute-barred, the award of punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) cross-appealed the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's decisions on all contested issues, including the application of limitation periods, the appropriateness of punitive damages for egregious conduct, and the discretion in awarding substantial indemnity costs and prejudgment interest.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted against them for defaulting on a lease agreement for laboratory equipment.

The respondent had obtained an order to recover equipment and sought damages and delivery of remaining items.

The appellants argued a settlement agreement existed, which the motion judge rejected.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, dismissing arguments regarding a settlement, credibility issues, and damages assessment, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties sought a stay of a Court of Appeal decision requiring them to post security for costs of their appeal and trial costs, pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion was dismissed as the court found no serious issue of public importance, no irreparable harm (especially given the responding parties' undertaking to hold funds in trust), and the balance of convenience favoured dismissal due to the moving parties' history of delaying tactics.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring her to "top up" assigned long-term disability benefits to account for income tax deductions, arguing procedural unfairness and misinterpretation of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal found the "top up" order procedurally unfair as it was not requested by parties and misinterpreted the statutory trust and assignment provisions.

The court held that the assignment applies to net after-tax payments, and the respondent's insurer, as assignee, must bear the burden of addressing tax implications with the insurer and CRA.

The appeal was allowed, and the "top up" order was set aside.

The appellant, a corporation, sought permission to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The motion judge granted leave for the sole shareholder to represent the corporation.

The respondent moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the appellant lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

The motion judge found reasonable grounds for security for costs and ordered the appellant to post security in the amount of $6,906.95 before the motion for leave to appeal was sent to a panel for disposition, but declined to require security for the appeal itself pending leave being granted.

The applicant moved to set aside an order requiring security for costs of $10,000 before perfecting an appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a Superior Court decision dismissing the applicant's motion to set aside a referee's final report.

The Court of Appeal upheld the security for costs order, considering the applicant's history of multiple proceedings, many found to be unnecessary or inappropriate, and the weak merits of the appeal.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the intervenor.

The appellants successfully appealed a decision from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellants in the amount of $10,000.00 all inclusive, payable by the respondents.