Michel Bastarache

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal that upheld the trial judge's dismissal of his motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial prejudice.

At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Crown conceded the first grounds of appeal.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the charges as laid against the accused.

The appellants borrowed money to purchase shares in foreign companies structured to avoid FAPI rules and provide tax advantages.

Over eight years, they received $600,000 in dividends and incurred $6 million in interest charges, which they deducted under s. 20(1)(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act.

The Minister disallowed the deductions, arguing the true purpose was to defer taxes and convert income into capital gains.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the test for interest deductibility is whether the taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of income at the time the investment was made.

The Court found the appellants had such an expectation, and the interest costs were deductible.

The respondent used $300,000 of equity in his law firm to purchase a house and then refinanced his law firm equity with borrowed money.

He deducted the interest on the borrowed money under s. 20(1)(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed and denied the deduction, arguing the true economic purpose of the borrowing was to buy a house.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legal relationships must be respected and the direct use of the borrowed funds was to refinance the respondent's capital account.

As this is an eligible use, the interest payments were deductible.

The appellant mother and respondent father, a professional basketball player, had a child from an extra-marital affair.

The trial judge awarded sole custody to the mother, finding the father's frequent travel and reliance on his wife for childcare weighed against him.

The Court of Appeal overturned the decision, granting joint custody to the father and his wife, and criticized the trial judge for not adequately considering the child's mixed racial heritage.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the Court of Appeal exceeded the narrow scope of appellate review by reweighing the evidence without finding a material error.

The Court also held that race is only one factor in determining the best interests of a child and that the Court of Appeal erred in adding the father's wife as a party on its own initiative.

The respondent lost its major customer due to a bribery scheme orchestrated by a consultant hired by the appellant, a rival supplier.

The respondent sued the appellant, arguing it was vicariously liable for the consultant's tortious conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was not vicariously liable because the consultant was an independent contractor, not an employee, based on a holistic assessment of the relationship.

The Court also held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to reopen the trial to admit fresh evidence from the consultant.

The appellant municipality sought to terminate what it alleged was an unlawful substitution of one legal non-conforming use for another after a bar formerly featuring country and western entertainment began presenting nude dancers.

The majority held that acquired rights in zoning matters protect the actual pre-existing use, but with some flexibility for reasonable evolution, subject to limits based on change in kind, remoteness from prior activities, and adverse neighbourhood effects.

On the evidence, the respondents’ pre-existing use was properly characterized as a nightclub offering food, drink, ambiance and lawful entertainment, and the change in entertainment format did not create a wholly different use.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquired right to operate the nightclub continued.

The appellant, a prime contractor, carried the respondent subcontractor's low bid for electrical work in its successful tender for a hospital construction project.

The appellant had assured the respondent that its non-IBEW union affiliation would not be an issue.

However, after the Ontario Labour Relations Board ruled that the appellant was bound to use only IBEW-affiliated subcontractors, the appellant refused to enter into a subcontract with the respondent and awarded the work to an IBEW subcontractor at the respondent's bid price.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a Contract A was formed when the appellant carried the respondent's bid, obligating the appellant to award the subcontract absent a reasonable objection.

The appellant's objection was unreasonable given its prior assurances and knowledge of the union issue.

The Court dismissed the appeal on liability and allowed the respondent's cross-appeal on damages, awarding $365,143 for lost profits.

The respondent's fishing vessel was seized for fishing without a licence.

While the vessel was detained, the Federal Court ordered its sale in a separate civil action, and the proceeds were held by the Receiver General.

The respondent was subsequently convicted of Fisheries Act offences, and the sentencing judge ordered forfeiture of $50,000 of the proceeds of the sale.

The Court of Appeal overturned the forfeiture, holding that physical detention of the vessel was a precondition to forfeiture under the Fisheries Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 72(1) of the Fisheries Act authorizes a provincial superior court to order forfeiture of the proceeds of a vessel's sale even when sold under the authority of the Federal Court.

The appellants sued the provincial Crown for environmental damage caused by waste asphalt buried on their farm during highway reconstruction in the 1960s.

The respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the six-month limitation period in s. 7 of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the disposal of waste asphalt on private land was an operational decision of a predominantly private character, not an act done in pursuance of a public duty.

Therefore, the usual six-year limitation period applied, and the action was not statute-barred.

The accused was charged with first degree murder.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented circumstantial evidence, while the accused called witnesses providing arguably exculpatory evidence.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed the accused to trial for second degree murder, refusing to weigh the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that while a preliminary inquiry judge must engage in a limited weighing of the whole evidence when the Crown relies on circumstantial evidence, the judge in this case properly considered the evidence as a whole and did not err in committing the accused to trial.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for first degree murder after forcibly confining his former partner and subsequently stabbing her tenant to death.

The preliminary inquiry judge found that s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, which classifies murder as first degree if committed while committing an enumerated offence (here, forcible confinement), does not require the victim of the murder and the enumerated offence to be the same person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while such an alleged error by a preliminary inquiry judge is jurisdictional and reviewable on certiorari, the judge did not err in his interpretation.

Section 231(5) only requires a close temporal and causal connection between the murder and the enumerated offence, not that the victims be identical.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent's liquor licence was suspended by the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch.

The respondent appealed to the Liquor Appeal Board, which upheld the suspension.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Board's decision, finding that its members lacked sufficient independence because they were appointed 'at pleasure'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the degree of independence required of an administrative tribunal is determined by its enabling statute.

Since the legislature unequivocally provided for 'at pleasure' appointments, there was no room to import common law doctrines of independence.

The respondent brought an action against the appellants and during an examination on discovery, the appellants requested the production of numerous documents.

The respondent sought a confidentiality agreement to prevent the documents from being disclosed to third parties, which the appellants refused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that there is an implied rule of confidentiality in Quebec civil procedure regarding information obtained at an examination on discovery.

The Court found that an examination on discovery is not a sitting of the court and that the implied rule of confidentiality protects privacy interests recognized in the Quebec Charter and the Civil Code of Québec.

The appellant underwent surgery to relieve facial neuralgia, which was unsuccessful and caused serious sequelae.

She sued the respondent physicians, alleging the surgery served no purpose and that she did not give informed consent because she was not told the specific surgeon who would perform the nerve sectioning, nor was she provided with a consulting neurologist's negative report.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the surgery was medically justified, the appellant was informed of the surgical team's roles, and she was sufficiently aware of the consulting neurologist's negative opinion before consenting to the risks.

The appellants sought a declaration that their comprehensive general liability insurer owed a duty to defend them in an underlying action arising from a fire at a tar sands plant.

The insurer denied coverage based on a 'turnkey exclusion' and a 'professional services exclusion'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the pleadings rule governs the duty to defend, but courts may consider extrinsic evidence explicitly referred to in the pleadings to determine the true nature of the claims.

The Court concluded that the claims against both appellants fell squarely within the turnkey exclusion, relieving the insurer of its duty to defend.

The appellant municipality contracted out garbage collection to subcontractors.

The union filed motions under s. 45 of the Labour Code to have the certification and collective agreement transferred to the subcontractors.

The labour commissioner and Labour Court granted the motions, finding a partial transfer of the operation of the undertaking.

The Superior Court quashed the decision, but the Court of Appeal restored it.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Labour Court's decision was not patently unreasonable and that s. 45 could apply to subcontracting where the transferee receives a right to operate part of the transferor's undertaking with sufficient autonomy.

Ivanhoe contracted out its janitorial services to Moderne, and the union's certification and collective agreement were transferred to Moderne.

When the contract expired, Ivanhoe engaged four new contractors, and Moderne dismissed its employees.

The union applied to transfer the certification to the new contractors, while Ivanhoe applied to cancel the certification.

The labour commissioner and Labour Court transferred the certification but not the collective agreement to the new contractors, and dismissed Ivanhoe's petition for cancellation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review is patent unreasonableness.

The Court found that the Labour Court's application of the organic definition of an undertaking and the theory of retrocession to find a legal relationship between successive employers was not patently unreasonable.

The refusal to transfer the collective agreement and the dismissal of the cancellation petition were also upheld.

The respondents, who were self-represented, hired a non-advocate to draft injunction proceedings.

The mis en cause moved to dismiss the proceedings because they were drafted by a non-advocate in contravention of the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the contract for legal services with the non-advocate was absolutely null for violating public order, this nullity did not extend to the legal proceedings themselves.

The proceedings constituted a distinct juridical act by the self-represented litigants, and dismissing them would improperly penalize the litigants and restrict their right to self-representation.

The appellant employee filed a complaint under the Employment Standards Act for unpaid commissions.

An employment standards officer rejected the claim without providing the employee an opportunity to respond to the employer's submissions.

The employee subsequently pursued a civil action for wrongful dismissal and the unpaid commissions.

The lower courts held the civil claim for commissions was barred by issue estoppel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the preconditions for issue estoppel were met, the doctrine should not be applied as a matter of discretion because the administrative decision was made in a manifestly unfair manner.

The parties separated after a 36-year marriage.

The husband's pension was equalized as property, and he paid spousal support.

Upon retirement, the husband applied to reduce spousal support, arguing that paying support from his pension income constituted 'double dipping' since the pension had already been equalized.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that to avoid double recovery, it is generally unfair to allow the payee spouse to reap the benefit of the pension both as an asset and then again as a source of income.

The payee spouse has an obligation to use the assets received on equalization in an income-producing way.

The Court reinstated the motions judge's order reducing spousal support.