Michael R. Gibson

The accused, M. T-S., was found guilty by a jury of one count of sexual assault against his former intimate partner, C.U. The assault involved penetrative sexual intercourse without consent, occurring in the presence of their young daughter.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the abuse of an intimate partner, the significant impact on the victim, the presence of a child during the offence, and the offender's criminal record.

Mitigating factors were limited to the offender's physical disability (amputee) and the time spent on bail.

The Crown sought a four-year imprisonment sentence, while the Defence proposed 30 months.

The court applied sentencing principles, including proportionality, individualization, denunciation, and deterrence, and considered the 3-5 year starting point range for penetrative sexual assaults.

The court also addressed the relevance of potential immigration consequences, concluding they did not warrant a reduced sentence given the egregious nature of the offence.

M. T-S. was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, along with ancillary orders for DNA, sex offender registration, no-contact, and a weapons prohibition.

This case involves competing interim parenting motions in a high-conflict family litigation.

The Respondent Mother unilaterally relocated with the child from Hamilton to Woodbridge, alleging family violence.

The Applicant Father sought the child's return to Hamilton and joint decision-making, denying abuse.

The court, facing conflicting affidavit evidence and a young child, adjourned the Applicant Father's motion until a s.30 assessment was completed.

The court ordered that the child reside primarily with the Respondent Mother and granted the Applicant Father supervised parenting time, adjusting the schedule to reduce transit time.

The decision emphasized the child's best interests, the difficulty of interim mobility motions, and the need for caution with conflicting affidavit evidence.

The appellants appealed a certification order for a class action arising from an infection control lapse at an endoscopy clinic.

The plaintiff sought compensation for the enhanced risk of infection and the psychological trauma of receiving a public health notification, despite testing negative for any blood-borne diseases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the certification order, finding that a claim for damages based solely on an increased risk of harm, without actual injury, is not a legally viable cause of action.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that precluded them from suing the respondent for personal injuries sustained by the applicant at her workplace.

The Tribunal found that both the applicant's employer and the respondent were Schedule 1 employers under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, and that the applicant was injured in the course of her employment while returning from a smoke break.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, well-reasoned, and consistent with the evidence, the law, and Board policies.

The plaintiff, Debt Aid Consulting Inc., a debt relief marketing company, sued the defendant, Financial Rescue LLC, a competitor, alleging breaches of the Collection and Debt Settlement Services Act, the Business Names Act, and the Competition Act, and tortious interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff sought declarations that the defendant was not entitled to conduct business or advertise in Canada, and damages for lost business and increased advertising costs.

The court found that the defendant's activities were marketing services and did not fall within the definitions of a "collection agency" or "debt settlement service" under the CDSSA.

The court also found no evidence of false or misleading representations under the Competition Act or the elements required for intentional interference with economic relations.

The action was dismissed with costs.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy for substantially interfering with the reasonable enjoyment of another tenant.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness regarding the service of N5 notices and disputed the LTB's factual findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness as the appellant had the notices well before the hearing, and holding that disagreements with factual findings do not constitute errors of law.

The Court also noted that the appeal was not moot despite the complainant tenant having passed away after the hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal regarding the interest payable on compensation for expropriated land.

The appellant argued that interest should run from an earlier date based on a redevelopment use and at a higher rate of 12% due to delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's factual findings that the productive use of the land was as a rental building and ceased only upon formal expropriation.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's discretionary refusal to award a higher interest rate, as it had not been pleaded, and declined to consider a new claim for compound interest.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision declaring its commercial lease properly terminated and directing a writ of possession.

The tenant argued the landlord's notice of termination was deficient under s. 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act and that the landlord failed to provide 30 days' notice of re-entry.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that under s. 18(1) of the Act, the landlord had the right to re-enter without formal demand because the tenant had been in arrears of rent for more than 15 days.

The court also upheld findings that the tenant's failure to pay deposits under the related Agreement of Purchase and Sale constituted a material breach.

The appellant sought to appeal an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The Divisional Court held that an order dismissing a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory, not final, and therefore requires leave to appeal under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court declined to grant leave, finding no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This endorsement addresses a motion by the Applicant to re-open a family law trial to introduce fresh evidence regarding the Respondent's alleged property ownership in Bangladesh, and a determination of costs for the original trial.

The court dismissed the motion to re-open, finding it was brought too late and the proposed evidence was not diligently adduced, which would prejudice the Respondent and necessitate re-doing the trial.

Despite dismissing the motion, the court awarded the Applicant $50,000 in costs, citing the Respondent's litigation misconduct during the trial, including presenting unreliable and potentially fraudulent evidence.

The applicant, Shelley Ottele, initiated an application challenging the validity of Powers of Attorney signed by her deceased father, Leo Racine, appointing Aimy Racine, and sought damages for fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.

This endorsement addresses two motions: the applicant's motion to stay proceedings pending an appeal, and the respondent Aimy Racine's motion for security for costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to stay, finding no persuasive basis.

The court granted the respondent's motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the applicant's underlying application was frivolous and vexatious and that she had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs, as required by Rule 56.01(1)(e).

The applicant was ordered to pay $75,000 as security for costs and $25,253.24 in costs for the motion.

The plaintiff commenced an action with a Statement of Claim making various outlandish allegations of criminal conduct against a police officer and police services.

The defendants, Waterloo Regional Police Service and David Clark, requested an order dismissing the action under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the pleadings unintelligible, implausible, and a continuation of harassment, dismissing the action as clearly abusive and vexatious.

The applicant purchased a condominium unit after relying on a status certificate that stated the corporation had no knowledge of circumstances that might result in an increase in common expenses.

However, the corporation had known for years about a major water main project and was actively tendering it when the certificate was issued.

The applicant sought declarations under the Condominium Act.

The court found the disclosure inadequate and declared the applicant's unit exempt from the special assessment for as long as he owns it.

The court also found the corporation's conduct oppressive but declined to award legal fee damages.

This is a sentencing decision for Hesham Aly, who was found guilty by a jury of fraudulent personation with intent to cause disadvantage, contrary to s. 403(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

Aly, a former social worker, impersonated two former colleagues and disclosed confidential client information from social service agencies to various organizations and media outlets, motivated by revenge after his termination and a human rights complaint.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the planned and deliberate nature of the acts, malice, sophistication, significant impact on victims and organizations, breach of trust, and betrayal of professional standards.

Aly absconded before sentencing.

The court sentenced Aly to 4 years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the egregious breach of trust and harm caused to vulnerable persons and community institutions.

S.G. was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The victim, A.B., was the common-law partner of S.G.'s son, and S.G. had groomed her through repeated massages, culminating in penetrative sexual assault.

The court found that S.G. intentionally inserted his penis into A.B.'s vagina without consent and engaged in thrusting.

Aggravating factors included a breach of trust, grooming of a vulnerable victim, significant impact on the victim, and a prior sexual assault conviction.

Mitigating factors were few, primarily an expression of remorse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing S.G. to 4 years imprisonment, along with a DNA order, a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, a communication abstention order, and a weapons prohibition order.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring him to pay a debt to the respondent bank, arguing he received the motion materials too late to prepare a defence.

The appellant failed to perfect the appeal and did not attend the hearing.

The Divisional Court found no basis to set aside the order, noting the appellant had admitted to owing the money before the motion judge and that inability to pay is not a defence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Judge-alone criminal trial on a direct indictment alleging sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving three complainants who described events occurring while they were under 16.

The court reviewed the reasonable doubt standard, the W.(D.) framework, delayed and incremental disclosure principles, and cautions against myth-based reasoning in sexual offence cases.

The evidence relating to two complainants raised reliability concerns preventing findings beyond a reasonable doubt on sexual purpose or commission of the offences.

The court accepted the evidence of one complainant beyond a reasonable doubt and entered convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, while acquitting on the remaining two counts.

This family law trial addressed multiple issues arising from a divorce, including the validity of a foreign divorce, ownership of foreign property, equalization of net family property (NFP), adjustments to NFP for asset depletion, child and spousal support arrears, and claims for occupation rent and post-separation adjustments for home expenses.

The court found the foreign divorce invalid due to lack of real and substantial connection to Bangladesh, and dismissed claims regarding foreign property due to unreliable and potentially fraudulent evidence from both parties.

The court adjusted NFP by adding back assets intentionally depleted by the respondent prior to separation.

Child and spousal support arrears were fixed, and ongoing spousal support was ordered.

The respondent's claims for occupation rent and post-separation adjustments for home expenses were dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to change a final order, seeking sole decision-making responsibility and the imputation of income to the respondent for child support purposes.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking sole decision-making responsibility and a reduction in child support due to a change in employment.

The court dismissed both parties' requests to change decision-making responsibility, finding no material change in circumstances despite their high-conflict relationship.

The court declined to impute income to the respondent, finding her underemployment was justified by reasonable educational needs, but adjusted child support based on her current and anticipated income.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the pre-trial determination of a question of law regarding whether the defendant tort insurer was entitled to deduct long-term disability settlement funds received by the plaintiff from a separate action against her disability carrier.

The court applied the 'silo' approach and found that the settlement was for an income replacement claim.

The court held that the defendant is entitled to deduct the settlement amount from the tort damages for income loss pursuant to s. 267.8(1) of the Insurance Act.