Michael R. Dambrot

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging the Crown breached its s. 7 disclosure obligations.

The accused argued the Crown failed to disclose that a key witness admitted to ongoing involvement in pin-pad frauds shortly before testifying.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's disclosure was otherwise exemplary, the omission was inadvertent, and the accused suffered no prejudice because the defence successfully elicited the witness's criminal conduct during cross-examination.

During a trial for second degree murder where the accused allegedly drove his SUV onto a sidewalk and killed the victim following a nightclub altercation, defence counsel requested that the defence of provocation be put to the jury.

The trial judge refused the request, finding no air of reality to the defence.

The judge concluded there was no evidence that an ordinary person would be deprived of self-control by the insults exchanged, no evidence the accused actually lost self-control, and no evidence that the insults or the accused's reaction were sudden.

Following jury convictions for manslaughter, robbery, unlawful confinement, and use of an imitation firearm arising from a fatal robbery, the court determined a dangerous offender application under the pre-July 2, 2008 regime.

The court found the statutory prerequisites for both dangerous offender and long-term offender status were met but exercised discretion to designate the offender a long-term offender.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, separation, and proportionality in light of extreme aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, the court imposed concurrent custodial terms resulting in a ten-year net sentence after enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, plus a ten-year long-term supervision order.

Sentencing decision following convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of property obtained by crime, and firearms offences including possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm and attempted possession of a firearm without a licence.

The offender participated in a drug trafficking network connected to a large organized criminal operation and sought to obtain firearms through associates.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence due to the combination of illegal drugs and firearms, persistent commercial trafficking activity, and the offender’s association with an organized drug trafficking network.

Aggravating factors included the offender’s ongoing trafficking, lack of remorse, and efforts to acquire firearms, while mitigating factors included youth, a relatively minor criminal record, and factual admissions at trial.

Applying the principle of totality, the court imposed a global sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, together with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving historic intrafamilial abuse, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the credibility analysis failed to address contradictions and frailties in the complainant's evidence.

The court held that the trial judge was alive to the complainant's psychiatric history, substance abuse, delayed disclosure, and conflicts with other witnesses, and properly differentiated between allegations that lacked confirmation and those that had some independent support.

The court further held that a partial admission to the complainant's mother was capable of providing confirmatory support, while other corroborative details were given only slight weight.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal by the municipality and elected candidates that upheld the validity of a municipal election, the court determined the costs of the proceedings.

The court held that the unsuccessful challenging candidates were not entitled to have their costs paid by the municipality, despite claiming public interest litigant status.

However, the court ordered the municipality to pay the partial indemnity costs of the successful elected candidates, recognizing they were blameless parties drawn into expensive litigation due to mistakes made by municipal election officials.

The court also ordered one of the challenging candidates to pay the costs of a motion he unreasonably opposed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the respondent law firm sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of over $29,000.

The appellant, who was self-represented, sought costs of $3,000 to $4,000 despite being unsuccessful.

The Divisional Court awarded costs to the respondent but significantly reduced the quantum to $2,000.

The court noted that the respondent's counsel invested excessive time, sought an unjustifiably high rate, and had previously been criticized by other judges for unprofessional conduct and impaired judgment in acting for his own firm.

The applicant's motion to set aside a judgment quashing his application for judicial review was previously dismissed.

The court determined costs for that motion.

The Attorney General of Canada sought full indemnity costs, while the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $14,000 to the Attorney General and $7,000 to the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport.

The Ontario Harness Horse Association sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission to redistribute purse monies among racetracks.

The Commission had adopted a Framework to move purse funds from racetracks with profitable slot machine operations to those with more active wagering to re-invigorate horse racing.

The applicant argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction, claiming it conflicted with federal pari-mutuel regulations and interfered with existing contractual rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission had broad regulatory authority under the Racing Commission Act, 2000, that its actions did not conflict with federal regulations, and that its regulatory powers permitted incidental interference with existing contracts.

In a Charter application brought by a person convicted of first degree murder seeking a declaration that evidence in homicide cases must be preserved for the lifetime of the offender, the respondent Attorney General moved to strike portions of affidavit evidence and parts of the amended notice of application and constitutional question.

The impugned affidavits contained second‑hand information about other alleged wrongful conviction investigations and lost evidence.

The court held the affidavit material could remain in the record for the limited purpose of illustrating the types of evidence that may be lost post‑conviction, but not to prove the truth of the allegations in those other cases.

However, paragraphs in the amended notice of application and notice of constitutional question relying on alleged loss of evidence in other cases were struck because the applicant lacked standing to advance constitutional claims based on those matters.

The motion was therefore granted in part.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $58,000.

The plaintiff argued the defendants achieved only mixed success because one of their legal arguments failed and sought costs on that issue.

The court held that the defendants achieved complete success because the action was dismissed in its entirety and that unsuccessful arguments do not constitute divided success where they were reasonably advanced.

While the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, it granted the defendants their full partial indemnity costs for the motion.

Costs of $39,910.36 were ordered payable within 30 days.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on multiple drug and firearm offences arising from a large police investigation into organized drug trafficking.

The Crown relied heavily on intercepted private communications interpreted through expert testimony regarding drug and firearms terminology.

The accused admitted some drug possession but asserted that coded language referred to marihuana rather than cocaine and that references to firearms concerned a paintball gun.

The court rejected the accused’s explanations as implausible and inconsistent with the surrounding evidence, including expert interpretations, seizure evidence, and contextual communications.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused trafficked crack cocaine, attempted to obtain an illegal firearm, possessed a firearm, possessed cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possessed proceeds of crime, but was not guilty of trafficking in marihuana.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his sentence of life imprisonment.

The appellant attacked his former partner with a baseball bat.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding his alibi defence, by leaving aiding and abetting as an alternative basis for liability, and by discharging a juror without a formal inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and the juror discharge proper.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal domestic attack and the appellant's lengthy criminal record justified a life sentence based on denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of driving 'over 80' causing bodily harm.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant was the driver of the van at the time of the collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge shifted the onus of proof, misapprehended evidence, and failed to disclose a proper basis for finding he was the driver based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge considered the evidence holistically and made no errors in concluding the appellant was the driver.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to two years less a day, plus two years of probation, after serving 599 days of pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give reasons for departing from the usual two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody under the law prior to the Truth in Sentencing Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in principle, removing the usual deference.

However, upon reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court found the ultimate sentence imposed was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a global sentence of five years for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration and leaving the scene of an accident.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to give appropriate weight to the gap principle, failing to consider his unstable health, and relying on a rejected finding of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court noted the appellant's extensive record of nearly three dozen prior related convictions and evidence of continued excessive alcohol consumption during the conviction-free period.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and sought leave to appeal his sentence of one year for fraud and forgery plus three years probation.

He requested a variation to an intermittent sentence of 90 days to allow him to earn money for restitution.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence imposed by the trial judge was within the range and not unfit, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment for trafficking in cocaine and 10 months concurrent for possession of proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred by over-emphasizing his role as a supplier and declining to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors, noting the appellant's higher level of culpability as a supplier.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his 15-month sentence for possession of child pornography, arguing it should have been in the 9 to 12-month range.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge considered all mitigating factors, including the appellant seeking treatment, and made no error in imposing a sentence that was not at the top end of the range.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s order discharging a young person charged in connection with a fatal shooting.

The application judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence and by assuming the trier of fact must accept or reject a witness’s evidence in its entirety.

The evidence, including the respondent’s actions in pursuing the victim and tripping him immediately before the shooting, was capable of supporting an inference that the respondent aided the principal offender with the requisite mens rea for murder.

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to commit the respondent to trial for first degree murder.

The discharge was quashed and the matter remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge with a direction to order committal for trial.