Michael R. Dambrot

The applicant trade unions sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing their application to declare Cadillac Fairview a related or successor employer under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The Board had found that the amalgamation of two corporations did not erode bargaining rights and that there was no sale of a business.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision was reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion under Rule 45.02 for an order preserving a sum of money held as cash collateral.

The appellant argued that its obligations under a Letter of Credit Agreement were discharged because the respondent entered into a forbearance agreement with the principal borrower, materially altering the guaranteed loan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreement was for a standby letter of credit, not a guarantee, and thus the law of guarantees did not apply.

Furthermore, the cash collateral was not a specific fund to which the appellant had a proprietary claim, and the appellant had implicitly ratified the forbearance agreement by participating in the borrower's insolvency proceedings without objection.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) which concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to order a consolidated hearing under s. 25(2) of the Consolidated Hearings Act.

The court found that the prerequisites for leave were met, as the correctness of the OMB's decision was open to serious debate and the matter was of sufficient importance.

Leave to appeal was granted and the appeals were ordered to be consolidated with an existing appeal.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dismissing its appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had struck a summons issued by the defendant to examine the plaintiff as a witness on a motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim for defamation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, confirming that under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, no evidence is admissible on a motion to strike a pleading for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The defendant employer brought a motion for leave to appeal a partial summary judgment order that refused to dismiss the plaintiff employee's breach of contract claim.

The defendant argued the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the motion judge erred in finding a triable issue regarding when the claim was discovered.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's decision was entirely fact-based and did not involve matters of such importance that leave should be granted under Rule 62.02(4).

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board refusing to order pre-hearing disclosure of police investigation records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it premature as the administrative proceedings were not complete and no exceptional circumstances existed.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Board, as an impartial adjudicative body, lacks the statutory authority to compel third parties, such as police officers, to provide pre-hearing disclosure.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation because he failed to promptly report the assault to police.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review as the applicant had not exhausted his statutory appeal rights.

Treating the matter as an appeal, the Court found no error of law in the Board's decision, noting the Board properly exercised its discretion under s. 17(2) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act based on the applicant's delay in reporting the incident.

The respondents brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to vary an order that refused to strike certain material from the applicant's application record.

The material in question referenced a 'without prejudice' settlement offer made during a tax dispute.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the motions judge erred in his application of the test for settlement privilege.

The court held that the communications met the three-part test for settlement privilege and that the applicant failed to demonstrate a compelling or overriding interest of justice to justify an exception to the privilege.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal a motion judge's dismissal of its motions for summary judgment and determination of a question of law.

The underlying action involved claims of misfeasance and negligence related to the closing of zoning applications.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the municipality was immune from suit under s. 20(1)(a) of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, finding there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and that the issue was of general importance.

Leave to appeal on the limitation period issue was denied.

The appellant successfully defended a claim for trespass and damage to property at trial, but the trial judge dismissed the claim without costs and without giving the appellant an opportunity to make costs submissions.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while a trial judge has discretion to refuse costs, procedural fairness requires hearing submissions first.

The court considered the matter afresh and awarded the appellant costs of the trial on a partial indemnity scale, as well as $7,000 for the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order of a motions judge that reversed a master's interlocutory order permitting the appellant to file a supplementary affidavit after cross-examinations were completed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in law by failing to apply the deferential standard of palpable and overriding error to the master's discretionary decision.

The court reinstated the master's order, holding that the supplementary affidavit was highly relevant, adequately explained, and caused no non-compensable prejudice.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel which had quashed her appeal from a Hearing Panel's dismissal of her motion challenging jurisdiction.

The Law Society argued the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction because the Appeal Panel's decision was not a final order under section 49.38 of the Law Society Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the right of appeal is statutory and limited to final dispositions of disciplinary proceedings.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The moving party sought leave to appeal two interlocutory orders: one temporarily staying the action pending the resolution of related tax proceedings, and another striking claims of conspiracy and misfeasance in public office with leave to amend.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions and no conflicting decisions warranting leave.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding her liable under a conditional sales contract for a motor vehicle.

She argued the trial judge erred by admitting business records and hearsay evidence without compliance with the notice requirements of section 35 of the Evidence Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 27(1) of the Courts of Justice Act permits the admission of relevant hearsay in Small Claims Court proceedings, and that section 35 of the Evidence Act is an enabling provision that does not restrict other statutory avenues for admitting business records.

The evidence was found sufficient to establish liability.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of neglect of duty for delaying a detainee's right to counsel for 90 minutes after the initial justification for the delay (officer safety) had passed.

The Hearing Officer imposed a reprimand, but the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services substituted a six-month reduction in rank.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Commission's decision unreasonable, as it failed to consider mitigating factors and wrongly concluded that a reprimand was an unavailable penalty for a Charter breach.

The appeal was allowed and the reprimand restored.

The appellant tenant brought a motion to set aside an order that had set aside his Certificate of Perfection and dismissed his appeal from a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal.

The Divisional Court found no basis to set aside the order regarding the Certificate of Perfection, as it was filed late.

Although the motion judge erred in dismissing the appeal for improper perfection while a motion to extend time was pending, the Divisional Court upheld the dismissal because the appeal raised only factual issues, contrary to the requirement under s. 196 of the Tenant Protection Act that appeals be restricted to questions of law alone.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought declaratory or prerogative relief regarding whether she had elected to receive WSIB benefits and whether such an election was valid.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal had not yet decided these issues.

The Court emphasized that the Board should provide election forms to workers as soon as it becomes aware of an illness to ensure they seek legal advice promptly.

The appellants appealed a Motions Court Judge's decision refusing to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The respondents had claimed a remedial constructive trust based on alleged unconscionable conduct following the termination of a contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and vacated the CPL, finding no evidence of unconscionable conduct by the appellants and noting that the respondents' claim was essentially for breach of contract rather than an equitable cause of action.

The appellant nurse appealed a decision of the Fitness to Practise Committee of the College of Nurses of Ontario, which found her incapacitated due to a mental condition and suspended her Certificate of Registration.

The appellant argued the panel relied on a psychiatric assessment based on incorrect information and fabricated evidence.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of reasonableness simpliciter and found that the panel's credibility findings and reliance on the psychiatric assessment were reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.