Melanie J. Webb

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death, after driving the wrong way on a highway and causing a fatal head-on collision.

The accused argued that his drink had been spiked with a 'club drug' at a nightclub, resulting in involuntary intoxication and total memory loss.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible and found that his erratic driving was consistent with his blood alcohol concentration of 148 to 173 milligrams.

The court concluded the accused voluntarily consumed alcohol and found him guilty on all counts.

The appellant, a home renovation contractor, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and theft.

He had persuaded an elderly, vulnerable homeowner to enter into contracts totaling over $300,000 for renovations on a house worth $400,000, grossly overcharging her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fraud conviction, finding that the overcharging, combined with taking advantage of the victim, constituted 'other fraudulent means'.

However, the court set aside the theft conviction, ruling that because the victim intended to part with her money (albeit induced by fraud), the appellant could not be convicted of both theft and fraud for the same funds.

The appellant appealed his convictions and seven-year sentence for historical sexual offences, including indecent assault and buggery, committed against four complainants between 1968 and 1978.

He argued the trial judge made unreasonable credibility findings and failed to address evidentiary conflicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable and adequately explained.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though a lifetime SOIRA order was reduced to 20 years on consent.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings arising from a fatal wrong-way collision, arguing that the negligent loss of his hospital blood sample prevented him from testing for additional drugs and impaired full answer and defence.

The court held that the Centre of Forensic Sciences, while storing the sample on behalf of police, had a duty to preserve it and breached that duty through unacceptable negligence when the sample was improperly sealed and leaked during shipment for independent testing.

Applying the lost-evidence framework, the court found a breach of s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the court held that the missing testing results would only have had a realistic possibility of assisting the defence and were not necessary to advance the involuntary intoxication theory.

A stay was therefore refused.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and uttering a threat to cause death.

The complainant died before trial.

Her preliminary inquiry testimony and a videotaped statement to police were admitted into evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, over-relying on the complainant's demeanour, and applying different levels of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the videotaped statement was not necessary and constituted an inadmissible prior consistent statement.

The court also found the trial judge placed undue weight on demeanour evidence not subject to cross-examination and applied an uneven standard of scrutiny.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were set aside.

Five police officers appealed their convictions for attempting to obstruct justice and perjury arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent efforts to conceal it.

The officers argued various trial errors, including Charter violations regarding the use of their preliminary inquiry testimony, improper jury instructions, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

The Crown cross-appealed the 45-day conditional sentences.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the sentences demonstrably unfit for police officers committing perjury and obstruction of justice, and substituted 3-year custodial sentences, but stayed their operation due to the passage of time.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of sexual assault after forcing a masseuse to perform oral sex while he was on duty.

He appealed his conviction and 15-month custodial sentence, arguing that his police memo-book notes were unlawfully seized in violation of his Charter rights and that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in police notes, no violation of the right against self-incrimination, and no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed a proposal by the Registrar to revoke his registration as a real estate broker.

The Registrar's proposal was based on the appellant's criminal conviction for sexual assault against an employee and his failure to disclose a collateral property management business on his renewal applications.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the appellant's past conduct, taken together, afforded reasonable grounds for belief that he would not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty.

The Tribunal directed the Registrar to carry out the proposal to revoke the appellant's registration.

This was a summary conviction appeal in which the appellant sought appellate relief from sentence.

In an addendum to reasons released the same day, the court clarified that the sentence appeal was allowed.

The disposition was varied to a suspended sentence with one year probation.

Summary conviction appeal by a police officer convicted of assault with a weapon for baton strikes delivered during a G20 arrest.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge failed to consider mens rea, applied too strict a necessity standard under the excessive-force justification provisions, or erred in excluding case-specific police opinion evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the trial judge applied the correct legal principles and made fact findings entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was allowed because the sentencing judge erred in treating the appellant's lack of remorse, derived from his plea and testimony, as aggravating.

The custodial sentence was reduced to time served and replaced with 12 months' probation and community service.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding his employer of over $2.3 million and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and ordered to pay $1.3 million in restitution.

After serving his sentence, he appealed the restitution orders, arguing inability to pay and that the orders hindered his ability to obtain a record suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's failure to explain where the stolen funds went, his breach of trust, and his choice to prioritize significant discretionary spending over making restitution payments.

The appellant, a real estate broker facing revocation of his registration, brought a motion to exclude evidence of his prior criminal conviction for sexual assault and findings from his divorce proceedings.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal held that the criminal judgments were admissible under section 15 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, as they constituted judicially determined facts rather than mere summaries of previously admitted evidence.

The family court findings were admitted for the limited purpose of explaining the Registrar's investigation narrative.

The Registrar's cross-motion to admit pleadings and financial statements from those proceedings as public documents was dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to eight offences related to a large-scale ephedrine exportation business, including money laundering and tax evasion, and was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a custodial sentence instead of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the custodial sentence was fit for a sophisticated, large-scale fraud enterprise.

The moving party, a public complainant, sought leave to appeal a penalty decision that suspended a police officer for one day without pay for making an unlawful arrest during the 2010 G20 Summit.

The moving party argued that the arrest breached his Charter rights and that the appropriate penalty was of significant importance to the policing profession and the community.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission applied the test for leave to appeal and found that, given the circumstances of the unlawful arrest and detention, the issue of the appropriate penalty was of significant importance.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The accused, a Level 3 certified figure skating coach with 30 years of experience, was charged with five counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against three complainants: A.M., T.B., and K.M.T. The charges arose from allegations of inappropriate physical contact and comments made during figure skating instruction and coaching relationships spanning from 1996 to 2011.

The Crown alleged the accused engaged in inappropriate touching of students' bodies during instruction, made inappropriate comments about their physical development, and engaged in grooming behavior.

The accused denied all charges, asserting that his physical contact with students was necessary and incidental to teaching figure skating skills, and that his comments were made in appropriate coaching contexts.

The trial involved six days of evidence and focused heavily on credibility assessments of the complainants, their parents, and the accused.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not meet either branch of the test for leave to appeal under R. v. R.(R.).

The publication ban on the complainant's identity was continued.

The accused applied to exclude intercepted communications between them from use in a search warrant information, wiretap authorization affidavit, and at trial, arguing the communications were protected by marital privilege under s.4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that marital communications privilege is testimonial in nature and does not prevent the interception of communications or their use in investigative affidavits, though they generally cannot be compelled in court testimony without the recipient spouse’s consent.

The accused further argued that limiting the privilege to legally married spouses violated s.15 of the Charter by excluding common-law partners.

The court found the accused had not established that their relationship was analogous to marriage and therefore they could not benefit from the privilege in any event.

The application to excise the communications was dismissed and the intercepted communications were held admissible.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing the appellant's role and failing to give weight to his rehabilitation, despite a positive presentence report.

Considering all circumstances, including fresh evidence, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 18 months, recommending consideration for the temporary absence program.

The accused applied under ss. 462.34 and 462.341 of the Criminal Code for the release of $500,000 from seized currency subject to restraint and management orders to fund his legal defence in pending drug trafficking and murder proceedings.

The Crown and an intervening execution creditor opposed the application.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish that he had no other assets or means available and failed to demonstrate that no other person had a lawful ownership or possessory interest in the seized funds.

In particular, the intervenor held a registered restitution and civil judgment enforceable under the Execution Act, and another person potentially claimed an interest in the currency.

The statutory prerequisites for release of seized property were therefore not met.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his mother, as well as his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by failing to put forward the defence of intoxication, inadequately instructing on discreditable conduct, and failing to properly instruct on the requisite intent for murder and the elements of manslaughter.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidentiary foundation for an intoxication defence and no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-year parole ineligibility period was fit for a brutal second degree murder in a domestic context.