Maurice J. Mattis

The court sentenced B.O. for sexual interference and exposing a person under 16 to sexually explicit material, both involving his daughter, M.A. The court reviewed the circumstances of the offences and the offender, the harm to the victim, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 5 years for sexual interference and 2 years for exposing a child to sexually explicit material, with ancillary orders including prohibitions and registration requirements.

The decision applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Friesen and emphasizes the gravity of sexual offences against children, the importance of denunciation and deterrence, and the need for proportionality and parity in sentencing.

The accused, Elmi Ibrahim and Samatar Hamadu, brought an application to quash a search warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for premises at 2646 Victoria Ave East, Thunder Bay.

They argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds and contained misrepresentations regarding the primary residence of a key subject, 'Easy'.

The court, applying the Garofoli process, found that the redacted ITO, when read as a whole and considering the affiant's experience and corroborated confidential informant information, provided sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the location.

The court dismissed the application to quash the warrant, ruling the evidence admissible at trial.

Daniel Fagan pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded restricted firearm.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors (discharging the firearm in public) and significant mitigating factors (youth, first offender, guilty plea, remorse, and the impact of anti-Black racism on his life).

The Crown sought 3-3.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the gravity of discharging a firearm in public, imposing a custodial sentence of two years less a day (509 days after credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail terms), followed by two years of probation.

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The defendants, facing a first-degree murder charge, applied for a challenge for cause based on racial and unconscious bias during jury selection.

The court found the threshold for such a challenge was met, acknowledging the necessity of questioning jurors on these biases.

The ruling addresses the specific questions to be posed to potential jurors, refining the defence's proposed questions.

The judge emphasized that the key is a juror's commitment to setting aside biases to render an impartial verdict, rather than merely identifying the existence of bias.

A specific preamble and four questions were approved for the challenge for cause.

Shamar Bailey, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude his video-recorded statement to homicide officers under section 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that two strip searches conducted after his arrest violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the second strip search, conducted at 42 Division, was unconstitutional as it lacked objective justification, being based solely on the officer-in-charge's lack of knowledge about the thoroughness of the initial search.

Applying the Grant factors for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter-infringing conduct serious, the impact on the accused's privacy significant, and the utility of the evidence for the prosecution marginal.

Consequently, the court excluded the statement, concluding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant, Shamar Bailey, brought a motion to exclude statements made to a police sergeant, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

Bailey argued that a traffic stop conducted by Sgt. Lawson was a pretext or ruse to further a homicide investigation, rather than a legitimate Highway Traffic Act (HTA) stop.

The court found that Sgt. Lawson had a legitimate road safety purpose for the stop, based on information about erratic driving and a dangling fuel cap, even though there was also a dominant criminal investigative purpose.

The court reiterated that a dual purpose does not invalidate a stop if a legitimate regulatory purpose exists.

Consequently, the detention was found to be lawful under the HTA, and thus, the right to counsel was suspended.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Shamar Bailey and Kwami Garwood, in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence included a prior incident involving a firearm (Tragunna Lane Incident), firearm photographs found on a co-perpetrator's cellphone, a booking/release video of one accused, and ammunition found in another accused's residence.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect for each item.

The Tragunna Lane Incident, firearm photographs, and ammunition were found admissible.

The booking/release video was admissible only as edited still images to mitigate prejudice.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and one count of breach of probation involving a 16-year-old complainant, SB, whom he believed to be his biological daughter.

The accused admitted to sexual touching on March 1, 2021, but denied vaginal penetration and claimed consent.

He denied any sexual activity on March 3, 2021.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding him not credible.

The court found that the sexual activity on March 1, 2021, included non-consensual vaginal intercourse, supported by SB's testimony and medical evidence of vaginal tearing.

The court also found that sexual touching occurred on March 3, 2021, despite the accused's denial, supported by SB's testimony and photographs.

The court emphasized that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and that any ostensible consent was vitiated by his abuse of a position of trust and authority over a vulnerable young person.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

During a Zoom preliminary inquiry for two accused charged with first-degree murder, a screen capture of one accused was taken and uploaded to social media, violating section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court suspended the observer portion of the Zoom proceedings to prevent further violations, emphasizing the seriousness of such acts and the potential for witness intimidation.

To uphold the open court principle, arrangements were made for public observation in a physical courtroom with limited capacity due to COVID-19 protocols and police supervision, while the main proceedings continued virtually.

The applicant, charged with robbery using an imitation firearm, brought an application seeking a declaration that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were infringed and a stay of proceedings.

The application alleged that police improperly obtained identification information and lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest without relying on privileged information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no breach of section 8 Charter rights due to insufficient evidentiary foundation and concluding that the police had objectively reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, considering all accumulated evidence, including privileged information.

The appellant, Tola Paul, was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defences of self-defence and defence of others to the jury, finding no air of reality to these defences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by making factual conclusions and credibility assessments that usurped the jury's role in determining the air of reality of the defences.

The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find that the defences of self-defence and defence of others had an air of reality.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, Shayan Syed, sought bail release under s. 522(1) of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder.

The court considered the secondary ground for detention, focusing on the protection and safety of the public.

Despite a proposed house arrest plan with his mother as surety and electronic monitoring, the court found the applicant presented a high risk due to violent tendencies, unpredictability, a history of violence (assault, uttering threats, breaches of court orders), and unmanaged schizophrenia and psychosis exacerbated by drug use.

The proposed surety's credibility was severely damaged by her denial of a prior threat incident involving the applicant, to which he had pled guilty.

The court dismissed the bail application, concluding the applicant failed to satisfy the secondary ground.

In a first-degree murder trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of three wiretap excerpts, balancing their probative value against their prejudicial effect.

Two excerpts were excluded: one lacked sufficient link to the killing and carried significant prejudice by associating the accused with incarcerated individuals, and the other lacked probative value regarding a potential getaway vehicle or the shooting itself.

The third excerpt, which involved the accused discussing a homicide and police inquiries with his girlfriend, was admitted as highly probative of post-incident conduct related to his involvement in the shooting.

The Crown brought a motion to admit "recognition" evidence from the accused's former girlfriend, Dejaunte Blake, to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the relationship was not significant enough and the video quality was poor.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Leaney, found the witness was in a better position than the jury to identify the accused due to her intimate and regular contact with him.

The court admitted the evidence, ruling that concerns about video quality and prior inconsistent statements went to weight, not admissibility.

The Crown sought to admit "recognition evidence" from a hotel customer service representative to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the witness lacked sufficient exposure to the accused.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion, finding that the witness's limited prior interactions with the accused, reliance on a short, obscured video clip, and identification based on clothing and gait (rather than facial features or consistent observation of gait on stairs) did not place her in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the action as statute-barred, arguing the two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs contended that the discovery date of their claims, involving allegations of breach of contract and misappropriation of partnership assets, was later than asserted by the defendants, or that the precise date of discovery required a trial.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial, particularly regarding the credibility of conflicting accounts about when the plaintiffs became aware of the full extent of their claims, including the disputed receipt of a critical letter.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference and were properly reasoned.

The trial judge had provided ample justification for accepting the complainant's evidence and properly assessed conflicting testimony.

The court found no differential standard of scrutiny was applied to defence evidence and that the trial judge properly cautioned himself against treating the case as merely a credibility test.

The applicant, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 53.5 months.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court deducted defence-waived and defence-caused delays, bringing the net delay just under the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant failed to show the delay was unreasonable or that he took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings.

Furthermore, as a transitional case, the parties' reasonable reliance on the previous law justified the delay.

The application was dismissed.