Mary Elizabeth Cremer

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm contrary to section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.

The victim sustained serious facial injuries including a 5-inch gash requiring 18 stitches and a 2-inch cut requiring 3 staples, resulting in permanent scarring and nerve damage.

The assault occurred in a restaurant when the accused threw beer and glass bottles at the victim during an altercation.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months of probation with conditions including anger management and substance abuse counselling, a no-contact order, and a weapons prohibition.

The court rejected the defence proposal for a conditional sentence, finding that denunciation and general deterrence required incarceration despite the accused's difficult background and mental health issues.

The applicant, Ahman Ottley, sought to exclude evidence (drugs and a gun) obtained from searches of his car and residences, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and 9 (arbitrary detention).

The court addressed a preliminary issue regarding the disclosure of confidential informant (CI) information, finding that the judicial summary provided was sufficient for the defence to make full answer and defence.

The court then found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for Mr. Ottley's arrest, based on CI information, police surveillance, and a prior "found in" incident.

Consequently, his section 9 rights were not violated.

The search of his car incident to arrest was deemed lawful and reasonable, as it was connected to the investigation, thus not violating his section 8 rights.

Finally, the searches of his residences, authorized by a warrant, were also found to be reasonable, as the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at those locations.

As no Charter breaches were found, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant, Cynthia Kirschner, was found guilty of careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from a collision where Kirschner, making a left turn at an uncontrolled intersection, failed to yield to an oncoming e-bike, resulting in the rider's death.

The court determined that Kirschner's conduct fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, concluding she failed to see the e-bike despite clear visibility and did not take evasive action.

Arguments regarding the e-bike's modifications or sun glare were dismissed as not excusing the defendant's duty of care.

The Crown applied to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Anthony Holtorf, in a criminal trial for criminal harassment and child luring.

The evidence consisted of a 2008 peace bond and a 2015 guilty plea, both related to similar incidents of approaching young, unsupervised girls.

The Crown argued the evidence was probative of mens rea and to rebut anticipated innocent explanation defences.

The defence argued the evidence was remote, dissimilar, and highly prejudicial.

The court, applying the R. v. Handy framework, found significant similarities in the pattern of behaviour, despite temporal gaps and minor dissimilarities.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence, in establishing a pattern of behaviour and intent, outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application to admit the similar fact evidence was granted.

This decision addresses the parole ineligibility period for the defendant, Cory Fenn, who was convicted of three counts of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought a 72-year parole ineligibility period, while the self-represented defendant requested the minimum 10 years.

The court imposed a 25-year parole ineligibility period for the murders of the intimate partner and one child, finding these acts to be part of a continuous criminal enterprise.

The sentencing for the third murder (of the second child) was adjourned pending the Supreme Court of Canada's decision on the constitutionality of consecutive parole ineligibility periods under section 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, particularly in cases involving domestic homicide and abuse of minors, citing the brutal nature of the offences and the defendant's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision asserting jurisdiction over s. 810 Criminal Code peace bond applications based on alleged misconduct in Greece, and alternatively, for insufficient particularization of the location of the alleged misconduct.

The court dismissed the applications, holding that Canadian courts have jurisdiction to issue s. 810 peace bonds to prevent future harm in Canada, even if the underlying conduct occurred abroad, as the purpose is preventive, not punitive.

The court also found that the particulars provided were sufficient for fairness in a peace bond context, distinguishing it from criminal prosecutions.

This criminal trial concerned Samuel Yzraiib, charged with aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, stemming from a fight at a mall.

The court considered video evidence, witness testimony, and forensic findings, which confirmed Yzraiib's involvement and possession of a knife.

The defence argued self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, contending that Yzraiib was defending himself against a larger assailant and other attackers.

The court found that Yzraiib's actions, including the use of a knife, were not unreasonable given the circumstances.

Due to the absence of clear evidence regarding the intent behind obtaining the knife and the incomplete video footage, the court concluded there was reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The defendant, Paul Weeden, was charged with aggravated assault and gun-related offences stemming from a shooting incident outside a Toronto club.

The central issue at trial was the identification of Weeden as the shooter.

The Crown relied on surveillance images, clothing evidence, a rented Dodge Dart, and intercepted communications.

The court found significant similarities between Weeden and the man in surveillance footage and found the intercepted communications to be powerful circumstantial evidence.

Despite some frailties in the Crown's case, the court concluded that the totality of the evidence established Weeden's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, Paul Weeden, sought to exclude evidence obtained by police, arguing violations of his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Police entered and cleared Weeden's apartment without a warrant, kicked in a locked bedroom door, and remained inside to "freeze" the apartment while awaiting a search warrant.

The court found that exigent circumstances justified the initial entry and the forced entry into the bedroom, and that no search occurred before the warrant.

However, the court determined that police violated Weeden's s. 8 rights by remaining inside the apartment after it was cleared, as exigent circumstances no longer existed.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court found the Charter breach was committed in good faith, the impact on Weeden's privacy was significant but mitigated by the limited nature of the intrusion, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits, particularly for drug-related charges, favored inclusion.

Ultimately, the evidence was deemed admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, Daniel Stojanovski and Darko Stojanovski, were found guilty by a jury of attempted murder and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life.

The charges stemmed from a cold-blooded shooting in a residential neighbourhood that left the victim, Nassundu Williams, an incomplete quadriplegic.

The Crown sought a life sentence, while the defence proposed 12 to 15 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of loaded handguns in a populated area and the catastrophic harm to the victim, and mitigating factors such as Darko Stojanovski being a first offender and both accused having family support and taking rehabilitative steps during pre-sentence detention.

Enhanced credit for pre-sentence detention, including additional credit for harsh lockdown conditions, was granted.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives.

The Crown brought an application for a section 487 Criminal Code search warrant and a section 487.02 assistance order to compel the accused to provide passcodes or PIN codes to unlock his cell phone.

The accused opposed the assistance order.

The court found that while section 487.02 may apply to accused persons, the proposed assistance order violated the accused's section 7 Charter rights, specifically the principle against self-incrimination and the right to silence.

The court declined to issue the assistance order, finding that use immunity did not adequately address the compelled active participation of the accused in his own prosecution.

Kenneth Johnson was convicted of manslaughter after being acquitted of second-degree murder.

The sentencing decision addresses the circumstances of the assault on his roommate, Richard Skupien, which resulted in Skupien's death from a ruptured spleen and rib fractures.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the attack on a vulnerable individual in his home, and the offender's lengthy criminal record.

Mitigating factors included the offender's remorse, strong family support, and particularly harsh pre-trial custody conditions due to frequent lockdowns at the Central East Correctional Centre.

The court imposed an eight-year sentence, reduced to two years and four months after applying credit for pre-trial custody and the onerous conditions.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to file their expert pathologist's report as a numbered exhibit, which the Crown opposed.

The report detailed the pathologist's critique of the Crown's expert and offered opinions on the timing of injuries, which could support the defence's theory.

The court denied the request, citing the convention against filing expert reports as exhibits, concerns about them acting as prior consistent statements, and the risk of overemphasizing expert evidence without the full context of cross-examination.

The judge also noted the imprecision of the scientific methods for aging injuries and the potential for misuse if the report was admitted without express caveats.

Andre Callaghan was found guilty of 15 counts, including discharging a prohibited firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of a high-capacity magazine, possession of a firearm with a removed serial number, careless storage, possession of firearms/devices while prohibited, dangerous driving, and failing to stop for police.

Counts 2, 5, and 7 were stayed.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his extensive criminal record (including prior gun and drug offenses, and breaches of prohibition orders), lack of remorse, and high-risk lifestyle.

Mitigating factors included family support, educational achievements in custody, and employment history.

The court declined enhanced credit for pre-trial custody conditions due to insufficient evidence of impact.

A global sentence of ten years was imposed, reduced to six years after credit for pre-trial custody, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime firearms prohibition and a two-year driving prohibition.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit preliminary hearing testimony of a witness, Mr. Nassirnia, as substantive evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (KGB application).

Mr. Nassirnia could no longer recall incidents he testified about at the preliminary hearing.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing evidence lacked sufficient reliability due to the witness's apparent lack of genuine recollection, having repeatedly refreshed his memory from a police statement.

The court found that the necessity requirement was met and that sufficient indicia of reliability were present, particularly the oath and opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, and the witness's availability for cross-examination at trial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, with a direction that Crown counsel should first attempt to refresh the witness's memory with his police statement at trial.

The Crown brought a blended application under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act and the principled exception to hearsay (KGB application) to cross-examine its own witness, Michelle Paul, on prior inconsistent statements and to admit those statements as substantive evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The witness had testified at trial but claimed inability to recall details from her prior police statement and preliminary hearing testimony.

The defence opposed, citing reliability concerns due to the witness's apparent intoxication during the police statement and arguing that some evidence constituted inadmissible propensity evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that certain details of the "Birthday Incident" were inadmissible propensity evidence, the "Phone Call" evidence did not materially differ from trial testimony, and the "Misinterpretation" evidence lacked legal relevance.

The court was not satisfied that the ends of justice warranted cross-examination or the substantive admission of the prior statements.

This ruling addresses a Crown application to admit two statements made by the accused, Kenneth Johnson, as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt in a murder trial.

The statements, one to police and one to his landlord, were alleged to be false and fabricated.

Applying the O'Connor framework, the court found a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude the statements were false and fabricated, and capable of supporting an inference of guilt, despite some reservations about the compelling nature of the inference for the landlord statement.

The court also considered and rejected the defence's request to exclude the evidence based on residual discretion, finding the probative value, though modest, was not outweighed by prejudice.

Alex James and Jesse Dawson were arrested on drug and firearms charges at James' apartment.

Police found a loaded handgun, marijuana, cash, and drug paraphernalia in James' bedroom, and another handgun, cocaine, and an electronic scale outside the apartment.

Both defendants denied knowledge of the weapons and drugs.

The court analyzed the evidence, including the defendants' credibility under R. v. W. (D.), and the law of possession under section 4(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found Dawson guilty of possession of a handgun and cocaine for trafficking, concluding he knew police were present and dropped the items while fleeing.

James was found guilty of possession of a handgun, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of proceeds of crime, as the court disbelieved his denial of knowledge regarding the items in his bedroom.

The applicant, Jesse Dawson, sought a stay of proceedings, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 7, 9, and 11(e) due to being detained for 40.5 hours before being brought before a justice, exceeding the 24-hour limit under section 503(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 503(1).

The court found that Dawson's rights under sections 7 (liberty) and 9 (arbitrary detention) of the Charter were violated, but not section 11(e) (bail) as the delay did not affect his bail hearing date.

The court denied the stay of proceedings, finding that the police conduct, while negligent, was not intentional or malevolent and did not constitute a systemic problem.

Instead, the court ordered judicial denunciation of the police conduct and a potential reduction in sentence if Dawson is convicted, as appropriate remedies.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a stabbing incident at a restaurant.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to introduce two statements made by the accused during police interviews.

The court found that the second statement, which comprised virtually the entire Crown case, was not made voluntarily.

The statement was obtained through interrogation techniques characteristic of the Reid technique, including the presentation of fabricated evidence, manipulation of the accused's mental illness, and oppressive conditions including extended questioning without adequate food or rest.

The accused, who suffered from schizophrenia, was subjected to approximately nine and a half hours of questioning over a twelve-hour period.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness and excluded the statement.

Without the statement, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial, and the accused was discharged on all counts.